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Summary introduction
In my thesis I investigate the conflicts of interests between underwriters, issuers,
and investors in initial public offerings (IPOs). I provide empirical evidence that
conflicts of interest exist, affect the IPO process, and have real monetary costs for
IPO issuers. The novel data, methodologies, and identification strategies used in
this thesis allow answering questions so far unexplored by the existing literature.
The thesis consists of two chapters: Chapter 1 “Nepotism in IPOs: consequences for
issuers and investors” and Chapter 2 “Do institutional investors play hide-and-sell
in the IPO aftermarket?”.
Nepotism in IPOs: consequences for issuers and investors (with Franc¸ois
Degeorge)
In this chapter, we investigate the conflicts of interest that may arise when IPO
underwriters allocate IPO shares to their affiliated funds. We hypothesize that
nepotism incentives may affect IPO pricing: the underwriter may intentionally un-
derprice the IPO, with a view to allocating the underpriced shares to its affiliated
funds and make them gain at the expenses of the issuer. Using a novel hand-
collected dataset of U.S. IPO allocations, we find support for this hypothesis in
a regression discontinuity design (RDD) setting: a one percentage point increase
in IPO allocations to affiliated funds leads to an increase in underpricing of 5.4
percentage points.
To construct our dataset we rely on section 10(f)-3 of the Investment Company
Act, which requires investment companies to report their affiliated transactions to
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Using reports from the SEC
EDGAR database, we compile data on all IPO allocations to underwriter-affiliated
funds between 2001 and 2013. Our novel hand-collected dataset provides a unique
opportunity to investigate the role of underwriter-affiliated allocations within the
IPO process, as prior studies could only rely on imprecise proxies for initial IPO
allocations.
To identify the causal effect of affiliated IPO allocations on IPO underpricing we
implement a fuzzy RDD, exploiting the institutional setting provided by rule 10(f)-
3. This rule sets a threshold, requiring issuers to be at least three years old before
the underwriter is allowed to allocate shares to its affiliated funds. Therefore, the
size (and the probability) of underwriter-affiliated allocations jumps discontinuously
when the age of the issuing firm is equal to or above the three year cutoff date. A
fuzzy RDD exploits this discrete jump at the cutoff point, allowing us to estimate
the effect of the treatment (affiliated allocations) on the outcome (underpricing),
while eliminating any observed or unobserved confounding factors. Intuitively, firms
that go public at slightly older than three years are arguably similar, on average, to
firms that go public at slightly younger than three years. Hence, they have similar
characteristics and expected underpricing. Because of the 10(f)-3 rule, however,
they differ in their underwriter-affiliated allocations. By exploiting the three year
cutoff in a fuzzy RDD setting, we estimate the causal effect of affiliated alloca-
tions on underpricing. Our evidence is consistent with underwriters intentionally
underpricing IPOs to benefit their affiliated funds.
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Our hand-collected dataset of affiliated IPO allocations also allows us to revisit
a milder version of nepotism analyzed in prior studies, and we find much clearer
support for it than prior work: we find a strong positive association between IPO
underpricing and affiliated allocations, which strengthens when nepotism incentives
are stronger.
Overall, our evidence suggests that the conflicts of interest generated by nepo-
tism incentives are pervasive in the IPO allocation market and have real monetary
costs for IPO issuers. Our results contribute to the existing literature by shed-
ding light on the types of conflicts of interest that affect the IPO process and their
consequences for both issuing firms and fund shareholders.
Do institutional investors play hide-and-sell in the IPO aftermarket?
(with Tamara Nefedova)
In this chapter, we investigate a moral hazard problem faced by IPO investors.
We hypothesize that investors have an incentive to hide their sell trades from the
lead underwriters in the IPO aftermarket for two main reasons. First, one common
view about book-built IPOs, which investment bankers tend to emphasize, is that
IPO allocations are directed toward long-term investors, rather than to investors
that readily sell their allocations in the IPO aftermarket (commonly referred to
as “flippers”). Hence, flippers might try to hide their allocations sales in order to
preserve their business with the lead underwriters in the IPO allocations market.
The second reason for hiding sell trades from the lead underwriters is related to a
practice known as “laddering”, which involves a quid-pro-quo arrangement between
underwriters and their clients: investors receive IPO allocations in exchange for
a committment to purchase additional shares in the aftermarket. Ladderers may
have an incentive to break their quid-pro-quo arrangements if the shares that they
committed to buy in the secondary market are in excess of their optimal holdings
in the IPO firm. The potential costs for the investors that break the agreement, in
terms of future business with the underwriters, may incentivize them to hide their
sell trades. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to hypothesize that the
laddering mechanism may provide an incentive for investors to hide their sell trades.
We investigate a simple hiding strategy, which is to sell stocks through brokers
other than the lead underwriters. Using detailed institutional trading data, we
document that institutional investors are less likely to sell than buy through the
lead underwriters in the aftermarket of IPOs issued between 1999 and 2010 in the
United States. The probability of trading through a lead underwriter during the first
month after the issue is about 6 percentage points less for sell trades than for buy
trades. This result holds when controlling for important determinants of the choice
to trade with a lead underwriter, such as the relationship between the institution
and the lead underwriters, and is robust to institution, IPO, and institution-IPO
fixed effects. Moreover, we find that the buy/sell asymmetry strengthens when
hiding incentives are stronger.
Our data and methodology allow us to disentangle investors’ allocation sales
from their buying and selling activity in the secondary market. Hence, we can in-
vestigate the reasons behind institutions’ hiding behavior, in order to understand
whether it is driven by flipping or laddering motives. Contrary to the conventional
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view, we find that the intention to flip is not an important motive for hiding sell
trades from the lead underwriters; institutions that sell shares through non-lead
brokers tend to have bought them through the lead underwriters in the IPO after-
market, consistent with institutions breaking their laddering agreements.
Our evidence sheds light on how hiding incentives affect institutions’ choice of
their broker in the IPO aftermarket and stimulates further research to investigate
how the incentives of IPO investors may influence the IPO allocation process.
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Abstract
Potential conflicts of interest arise when IPO underwriters allocate IPO
shares to their affiliated funds. We hypothesize that nepotism incentives may
affect IPO pricing. Using a novel hand-collected dataset, we find support for
this hypothesis in a regression discontinuity design (RDD): a one percentage
point increase in affiliated allocations increases underpricing by 5.4 percentage
points. Our evidence suggests that nepotism has real monetary costs for IPO
issuers. We also use our dataset to revisit a milder version of nepotism analyzed
in prior studies, and we find much clearer support for it than prior work:
we find a strong positive association between IPO underpricing and affiliated
allocations, which strengthens when nepotism incentives are stronger.
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1 INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
1 Introduction and motivation
The bookbuilding mechanism is the dominant method of bringing companies public
in the United States. A distinctive feature of this mechanism is that the investment
bank that underwrites the IPO has discretion over the choice of the offer price
and the investors who receive allocations. Therefore, when an IPO underwriter is
affiliated with a fund manager, three potential conflicts of interest arise:
1. The underwriter may allocate shares in overpriced (“cold”) IPOs to its affil-
iated funds in order to ensure the completion of the issue. Ritter and Zhang
(2007) refer to this conflict of interest as the “dumping ground” hypothesis.
2. The underwriter may allocate shares in underpriced (“hot”) IPOs to its af-
filiated funds in order to boost the performance of those funds. Ritter and
Zhang (2007) refer to this conflict of interest as the “nepotism” hypothesis.
3. The underwriter may intentionally underprice the IPO, with a view to allo-
cating the underpriced shares to its affiliated funds. To our knowledge this
potential conflict has not been investigated before. We label it the “supernepo-
tism” hypothesis.
Using a hand-collected dataset of U.S. IPO allocations, we find support for the
supernepotism hypothesis in a regression discontinuity design (RDD) setting: a one
percentage point increase in IPO allocations to affiliated funds leads to an increase
in underpricing of 5.4 percentage points. Our evidence suggests that the conflict
of interest inherent in the underwriter-fund manager association has real monetary
costs for IPO issuers, in addition to the distortions affecting investors that are
documented in the existing literature (Ritter and Zhang (2007)).
To construct our dataset we rely on section 10(f)-3 of the Investment Company
Act, which requires investment companies to report their affiliated transactions to
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Using reports from the SEC
EDGAR database, we compile data on all IPO allocations to underwriter-affiliated
funds between 2001 and 2013. Our final dataset includes 1,294 IPOs underwritten
by 64 underwriters involved in transactions with their affiliated funds.
Identifying the causal effect of affiliated IPO allocations on IPO underpricing is
challenging because IPO allocations and IPO offer prices are jointly endogenously
determined. As the outcome of profit-maximizing decisions of investment banks,
both allocations and offer prices are most likely affected by and correlated with firm
characteristics and other unobserved confounding factors. We argue that the 10(f)-
3 rule provides the institutional setting needed to single out the causal effect we are
interested in identifying. This rule sets a threshold, requiring issuers to be at least
three years old before the underwriter is allowed to allocate shares to its affiliated
funds. Therefore, the size (and the probability) of underwriter-affiliated allocations
jumps discontinuously when the age of the issuing firm is equal to or above the
three year cutoff date. A fuzzy regression discontinuity design (RDD) exploits
this discrete jump at the cutoff point, allowing us to estimate the effect of the
treatment (affiliated allocations) on the outcome (underpricing), while eliminating
any observed or unobserved confounding factors. Intuitively, firms that go public
at slightly older than three years are arguably similar, on average, to firms that go
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public at slightly younger than three years. Hence, they have similar characteristics
and expected underpricing. Because of the 10(f)-3 rule, however, they differ in their
underwriter-affiliated allocations. By exploiting the three year cutoff in a fuzzy RDD
setting, we can estimate the causal effect of affiliated allocations on underpricing.
Our hand-collected dataset of affiliated IPO allocations also allows us to revisit
the dumping-ground and nepotism hypotheses analyzed in the prior literature, es-
pecially by Ritter and Zhang (2007). Several prior studies use fund holdings to
proxy for initial IPO allocations (Ritter and Zhang (2007), Reuter (2006), Hao and
Yan (2012), and Mooney (2015)). These proxies may be imprecise, as the first
few days following an IPO typically exhibit strong trading volumes (Ellis et al.
(2000)). Moreover, underwriters trying to dump cold shares on an affiliated fund
are more likely to do so in aftermarket trading than during an initial IPO alloca-
tion, when they would run afoul of the spirit of rule 10(f)-3, which is to protect
“fund shareholders by preventing an affiliated underwriter from placing or ‘dump-
ing’ unmarketable securities with the fund.”1 Hence, the use of secondary-market
data (rather than initial allocations) is likely to overstress the relative importance
of dumping-ground incentives compared to nepotism incentives. In our dataset of
initial IPO allocations, we find strong evidence that nepotism is pervasive in IPO
allocations and dominates any dumping-ground incentives. Affiliated funds receive
more allocations when IPOs are more severely underpriced, suggesting that the
funds are favored by their affiliated investment banks.
We consider three elements that might determine the relative importance to
investment banks of the nepotism and dumping-ground conflicts. First, dumping-
ground incentives should be stronger when the underwriter is completing an abnor-
mally low number of IPOs (Ritter and Zhang (2007)). In such times, the marginal
benefit of completing an additional IPO is higher for the investment bank, which not
only receives revenues from the underwriting discount but may also be protecting its
reputation. Second, underwriters receive commissions kickbacks when they allocate
underpriced shares to independent, meaning unaffiliated, funds (Reuter (2006), Ni-
malendran et al. (2007), and Goldstein et al. (2011)); this source of revenue dampens
their incentive to favor their affiliated funds (Ritter and Zhang (2007)). Accordingly,
the nepotism incentive should be weaker when the underwriter receives an abnor-
mally high stream of brokerage commissions from institutional investors. Third,
we argue that the relative benefits and costs of affiliated allocations depend on the
level of asymmetry in information concerning the issuer’s value. When information
asymmetry is high, the contribution of affiliated funds to price discovery may be
lower than that of independent funds, as the affiliated funds might have access to sig-
nals that are highly correlated with those of the underwriters. Nepotism incentives
might be relatively low and dumping-ground behavior might rise as a consequence
of favoring independent funds to gain increased access to information. Therefore, we
postulate that the nepotism conflict weakens as information asymmetry increases.
Overall, we find evidence consistent with these hypotheses. This suggests that
while the nepotism and dumping-ground conflicts are likely both at play in the IPO
allocation process, the nepotism conflict dominates the other.
1See for example https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ic-25888.htm, section A.3.
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2 Literature review and hypothesis development
An increasing body of literature investigates the role played by conflicts of interest
within the IPO bookbuilding process, providing extensive evidence that underwrit-
ers allocate shares in ways that could be detrimental to issuers. Several researchers
examine the hypothesis that underwriters preferentially allocate IPO shares to in-
stitutional investors that give back part of the underpricing gains in the form of
brokerage commissions (the “commission-kickbacks conflict” hypothesis). Using an
event-study methodology, Goldstein et al. (2011) find that underwriters’ broker-
age commission revenues are abnormally high in the period preceeding hot IPOs.
Consistent with Nimalendran et al. (2007), they find that one of the strategies
used to increase commissions is churning shares through round-trip trades in liquid
stocks. Moreover, Reuter (2006) and Jenkinson et al. (2017) find a direct positive
correlation between the dollar amount of commissions paid by a fund family to an
investment bank and the family’s allocations of underpriced IPOs underwritten by
the same bank. Griffin et al. (2007) find evidence of the practice known as “ladder-
ing,” which involves a quid-pro-quo arrangement between underwriters and their
clients: investors receive IPO allocations in exchange far a promise to buy addi-
tional shares in the aftermarket. Liu and Ritter (2010) focus on “spinning,” the
practice of allocating hot shares to corporate executives to influence their decisions
to hire the investment bank for future services; they find that these executives are
less likely to switch investment bankers in follow-on offers. Ritter and Zhang (2007)
and Mooney (2015) analyze the conflicts of interest involved in the allocation of
IPOs to underwriter-affiliated funds, in the U.S. market and worldwide, respec-
tively. Their evidence is mixed. Ritter and Zhang (2007) find some evidence of
nepotism (underwriters favor their affiliated funds in the allocation of hot IPOs,
mainly during the internet bubble period). Mooney (2015) finds large cross-country
differences in the types of conflicts of interest that affect the allocation of IPO shares
to affiliated funds.
Another line of research focuses on conflicts of interest between investment banks
and their affiliated investment management arms. Consistent with the existence of
costly agency problems, Berzins et al. (2013) find that bank-affiliated funds sig-
nificantly underperform independent funds. Hao and Yan (2012) find one reason
behind this underperformance to be that affiliated funds tend to hold a dispropor-
tionately large amount of cold equity issues underwritten by their affiliated banks,
consistent with dumping-ground behavior.
Our study joins these two lines of research, as we examine the conflicts of inter-
est between issuers, investment banks, and their affiliated investment management
companies in the context of IPO allocations to underwriter-affiliated funds. Like
Ritter and Zhang (2007), we investigate the conflicts of interest involved in the al-
location of IPO shares to underwriter-affiliated funds, and we frame our discussion
in terms of the nepotism and dumping-ground conflicts. However, we approach
these questions using different hypotheses, methodology, data sources, and the time
period covered by our sample.
Our study makes four novel contributions. First, we construct a direct measure
of IPO allocations to affiliated funds using hand-collected data, instead of relying
on proxies based on fund holdings. Second, we argue that conflicts of interest
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incentives may affect IPO pricing, not just IPO allocations to affiliated funds, and
we find support for this new hypothesis using a RDD methodology (see subsection
2.1, Hypothesis 1). Our empirical analysis allows us to assess the monetary costs of
conflicts of interest for issuers. Third, we exploit our data to test some hypotheses
that have been developed by prior studies, but have not been directly tested yet; for
example, we use trading commission data to directly test that nepotism incentives
are weaker when the underwriter receives a high stream of brokerage commissions
in the secondary market (see subsection 2.3, Hypothesis 4). Fourth, we develop
and test a new hypothesis about the cross-sectional variation of conflicts of interest
incentives; that is, nepotism incentives are weaker when the information asymmetry
about the issuer’s value is higher (see subsection 2.3, Hypothesis 5).
2.1 The effect of the underwriter/affiliated fund conflict of interest
on IPO pricing
The nepotism hypothesis is generally framed within the allocation choice of the
underwriter, which gives preferential treatment to its affiliated funds. The existing
literature emphasizes the role played by the discretion of the underwriter in the
choice of allocation. However, the underwriter has discretion over both the allo-
cation decision and the pricing decision. When a bookbuilding method is used,
an investment bank can jointly set the offer price and the amount allocated to its
affiliated investors in a way that will maximize its own profits. We postulate that
if an underwriter is subject to nepotism, then there is an incentive to abnormally
underprice IPOs to benefit the affiliated funds. Hence, we formulate the following
“strong-form” of the nepotism conflict, which we label the supernepotism hypoth-
esis:
Hypothesis 1. If underwriters face supernepotism incentives, then underpricing is
an increasing function of the percentage of shares allocated to affiliated funds.
2.2 Nepotism vs. dumping-ground
Our hand-collected dataset of affiliated IPO allocations also enables us to revisit the
dumping-ground and nepotism hypotheses analyzed in the prior literature. On the
one hand, underwriters might give preferential treatment to their affiliated funds,
giving them hot IPOs to enhance their performance (nepotism hypothesis). Such
behavior might be costly for issuers, as their shares would not be allocated accord-
ing to their best interests. On the other hand, underwriters might dump cold IPOs
on their affiliated funds, so that more deals could be completed at the expense of
funds’ shareholders (dumping-ground hypothesis). These potential conflicts of in-
terest generate two opposite testable predictions. If the nepotism conflict dominates
the IPO allocation market, then allocations to underwriter-affiliated funds and un-
derpricing should be positively related. If the dumping-ground conflict dominates
the IPO allocation market, then allocations to underwriter-affiliated funds and un-
derpricing should be negatively related. Based on this discussion, we formulate the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. (2a) If nepotism incentives dominate dumping-ground incentives,
then the correlation between underpricing and the percentage of shares allocated to
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affiliated funds is positive. (2b) If dumping-ground incentives dominate nepotism
incentives, then the correlation between underpricing and the percentage of shares
allocated to affiliated funds is negative.
2.3 Variation in conflict of interest incentives
Ritter and Zhang (2007) argue that the relative weight of these two incentives in the
investment bank’s profit function depends on the market conditions the underwriter
faces. When the underwriter faces a cold IPO market, dumping-ground incentives
gain importance, as the marginal benefit of completing an IPO is higher. We build
on this intuition to argue that this incentive is underwriter-specific. When the
underwriter is completing a low number of IPOs, relative to its normal business, then
the pressure to complete IPOs gain importance and the dumping-ground conflict
emerges. When the underwriter is completing a high number of IPOs, relative
to its normal business, then the benefit of completing an additional IPO is low.
The revenues from the management and performance fees of affiliated funds gain
weight in the investment bank’s profit function and the nepotism conflict stands
out. Hence, we formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. The correlation between underpricing and the percentage of shares
allocated to affiliated funds is lower when the underwriter expects to complete a small
number of IPOs relative to its normal business.
Ritter and Zhang (2007) argue that IPO allocations depend on the relative abil-
ity of affiliated and independent funds to generate revenues for the investment bank.
As the commission-kickbacks conflict gains importance in the underwriter’s profit
function, the incentive to allocate underpriced shares to affiliated funds is reduced.
If the underwriter enters a quid-pro-quo agreement with unaffiliated, independent
funds, it might tend to give them preferential treatment in exchange for higher bro-
kerage commission revenues (Reuter (2006), Nimalendran et al. (2007), Goldstein
et al. (2011), and Jenkinson et al. (2017)), thus putting nepotism incentives aside.
Our access to trading commissions data enables us to test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. (4a) The correlation between underpricing and the percentage of
shares allocated to affiliated funds is higher when the underwriter receives a low
stream of brokerage commissions in the secondary market. (4b) The correlation
between underpricing and the percentage of shares allocated to unaffiliated funds is
higher when the underwriter receives a high stream of brokerage commissions in the
secondary market.
In standard information-based bookbuilding theories (such as Benveniste and
Spindt (1989)), underpricing is the compensation for the information-revealing in-
dications of interest by institutional investors. We argue that the level of information
asymmetry influences conflict of interest incentives because of the roles played by
different classes of investors in providing information. In firms with high information
asymmetry, the contribution of affiliated funds to price discovery may be lower than
that of independent funds. The affiliated funds might have access to signals that
are highly correlated with those of their affiliated underwriters, thus making their
contribution to price discovery of little value. Nepotism incentives still exist, but
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they might be relatively low, as the underwriter needs to reward the unaffiliated
funds for providing information. Therefore, underwriters might give preferential
treatment to independent funds that reveal their signals when information asym-
metry is high, thus penalizing the affiliated funds. Some dumping-ground behavior
might also arise as a consequence of favoring independent funds. In firms with low
information asymmetry, instead, price discovery matters less, giving the underwriter
more scope to allocate hot shares to its affiliated funds. Hence, the nepotism in-
centive might gain importance in the profit function of the investment bank. Based
on this argument, we posit that the correlation between underpricing and affiliated
allocations should be higher in low information asymmetric firms, while the corre-
lation between underpricing and non-affiliated allocations should be greater in high
information asymmetric firms. We formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5. (5a) The correlation between underpricing and the percentage of
shares allocated to affiliated funds is higher when information asymmetry is low.
(5b) The correlation between underpricing and the percentage of shares allocated to
unaffiliated funds is higher when information asymmetry is high.
3 Data and summary statistics
Section 10(f) of the investment company act of 1940 prohibits underwriters from
selling any shares of a security offering to funds that are in any way affiliated with
any member of the syndicate. This regulation was amended in 1958 and in sub-
sequent years to exempt certain transactions. As of today, rule 10(f)-3 permits
funds to buy securities underwritten by their affiliated underwriters if certain con-
ditions are satisfied. For the purposes of this research, four of these conditions are
of particular importance:
• the issuer must have been in continuous operation for at least three years prior
to the offering, including the operations of any predecessors;
• the securities are offered under a firm-commitment contract;2
• the affiliated transaction has to be executed by a syndicate member other
than the affiliated underwriter;3
• the existence of any transaction pursuant to the 10f-3 rule has to be reported
on the form N-SAR of the investment company, attaching a written record of
the details of each transaction.
The first three items allow us to identify IPOs that are eligible for 10(f)-3 transac-
tions, that is, IPOs whose shares can be allocated to underwriter-affiliated funds.
The last item allows us to hand collect a novel dataset containing data about IPO
allocations received by funds affiliated to the underwriters.
2In a firm-commitment contract, the underwriter guarantees to purchase all the securities offered
by the issuer, regardless of whether or not they can sell them to investors.
3For example, take issuer X, underwritten by banks A and B. Rule 10(f)-3 says that funds
affiliated to bank A can receive allocations only from bank B, and, viceversa, funds affiliated to
bank B can receive allocations only from bank A.
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In the following subsections, we describe our sample selection criteria, define the
main variables used in our analyses, and provide summary statistics.
3.1 IPO data
We use the Thomson Financial Security Data Company (SDC) database to identify
IPOs made in the United States from 2001 to 2013.4 We exclude all American
Depository Receipts (ADRs), Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), unit and
rights offerings, closed-end funds, IPOs with SIC codes between 6000 and 6199
and IPOs with offer price smaller than $5. Moreover, we require IPOs to have a
match with the Center for Research in Security Prices database (CRSP) within
seven calendar days from the issue. These filters leave us with 1,294 IPOs.
From SDC and CRSP we get the name of the issuer and its SIC code, the nation
where the issuer is located, the CUSIP and PERMNO numbers of the security
issued, the issue date and filing date, the offer price and the original midpoint of
the filing price range, the first day closing price, the number of shares issued and
whether they are primary or secondary shares, the total assets of the issuer before
the IPO,5 the primary exchange where the shares are listed, the identity and number
of lead managers and other syndicate members, the underwriting gross spread and
the type of underwriting contract under which the securities are issued, and a flag
identifying venture backed IPOs. We match our sample with data available on
the IPO data website managed by Jay R. Ritter at the University of Florida to
find the issuers’ founding years and the underwriters’ reputation rankings.6 When
the founding year is not available on the Ritter website, we complement it with the
founding date available on SDC. Underwriters’ reputations are coded using numbers
ranging from 1 (lowest ranking) to 9 (highest ranking). These rankings are described
in Loughran and Ritter (2004) and are an adjustment to the Carter and Manaster
(1990) rankings. Table 1 describes the IPO variables we compute by matching the
SDC, CRSP, and Ritter data.
[Table 1 about here.]
We define an IPO to be eligible for affiliated transactions pursuant to rule 10(f)-3
if each of the following four conditions is met:
• Age ≥ 3
• FirmCommitment = 1
• NumberSyndicateMembers > 1
• at least one lead underwriter has been involved in a 10(f)-3 transaction in our
sample.
4We clean the database from known mistakes by manually applying the corrections listed,
as of April 2014, on the IPO database managed by Jay R. Ritter at the University of Florida:
https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/.
5When the total assets pre-IPO are missing in SDC, we proxy them by subtracting the total
proceeds of the IPO from the total assets after the IPO, taking the latter from COMPUSTAT.
6The link is: https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/
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The first three conditions are a direct consequence of the 10(f)-3 rule’s require-
ments. The rationale behind our fourth condition is that underwriters that have
never been involved in 10(f)-3 transactions might not have affiliated funds.7 From
our original sample of 1,294 IPOs, we count 1,086 IPOs that are eligible for affil-
iated transactions; 208 IPOs do not satisfy at least one of the four requirements.
Figure 1 plots the number of IPOs by year, distinguishing between in eligible and
non-eligible IPOs.
[Figure 1 about here.]
The total number of IPOs per year varies considerably, ranging from 21 in 2008
to 169 in 2004. The percentage of eligible IPOs, at about 84% on average, appears
to be stable in the period 2001-2013.
Table 2 provides summary statistics on our sample of IPOs, breaking them down
into eligible IPOs (Panel A) and non-eligible IPOs (Panel B). All non-dummy vari-
ables except Age are winsorized at the 95% level.8 Table 2 shows that non-eligible
IPOs differ from eligible IPOs in that they are smaller and younger, have lower
underpricing, and are less likely to be underwritten by a top-ranked underwriter.
[Table 2 about here.]
3.2 Allocations data
Investment companies report their affiliated transactions to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) through the N-SAR filings. We download from the SEC
EDGAR database all the N-SAR forms filed from January 2001 to December 2014
and collect data on affiliated IPO allocations in the period 2001-2013. (Appendix
A explains the downloading, parsing, and matching procedures.) Using this data,
we build our Affiliated Allocations dataset, which contains: IPO identifiers (issuer
name, CUSIP, and issue date); the name of the affiliated fund and/or the sub-
portfolio of the fund and/or the investment company that receive an allocation; the
number of shares received by the affiliated fund and/or by the sub-portfolio of the
fund and/or by the investment company the fund is managed or advised by; the
name(s) of the affiliated underwriter(s); and the name(s) of the underwriter(s) from
whom the shares were purchased, often referred to as the “broker” in the N-SAR
filings. Hence, we observe the number of shares allocated at the IPO-investor-broker
level.
For the purposes of this paper, in our main analyses we aggregate affiliated
allocations at the IPO level, letting Ai be the total number of shares allocated
to affiliated funds in IPO i. Then we build the two main variables of our analysis:
AffiliatedAllocPerc andAffiliatedAllocDummy. The variableAffiliatedAllocPerc
is the percentage of the issue allocated to affiliated funds. If Ni is the number of




7Another possibility is that they do have affiliated funds, but consider the costs of allocating
shares to them to be too high (such as the costs of compliance with the 10(f)-3 rule).
8We do not winsorize Age because it is the forcing variable in the RDD of section 4.
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For robustness, we also use the variable AffiliatedAllocDummy, which is a dummy
variable equal to one if at least one share is allocated to an affiliated fund:
AffiliatedAllocDummyi = 1(Ai > 0)
The N-SAR filings provide information about affiliated allocations only. We also
build a proxy for the percentage of the issue allocated to independent funds, that
is, to funds not affiliated with the underwriters of a given IPO. First, we match the
SDC sample to the Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum 1&2 database (s12) using
CUSIP numbers. Then we compute the total holdings held by mutual funds at the
first reporting date after each IPO, excluding non-U.S. mutual funds and mutual
funds with investment codes of 5, 6, or 8, letting Hi be the total number of shares
held by mutual funds in company i at the first reporting date after the IPO of





In order to reduce the impact of potential data errors and outliers, we winsorize
the allocation variables AffiliatedAllocPerc and IndependentAllocPerc at the
95% level.
Table 3 summarizes the allocation data at the issuer level for the 1,086 eligible
IPOs (Panel A) and the 208 non-eligible IPOs (Panel B). Panel (A) reports that 611
IPOs, about 56% of the eligible IPOs, involve at least one affiliated transaction and,
on average, 1.44% of the issue is allocated to funds affiliated with the underwriters.
This implies that, conditional on involving at least one 10(f)-3 transaction, the
average percentage allocated to affiliated funds is 2.57% (1.44 divided by 0.56). The
median affiliated allocation is lower than the mean, indicating a positive skewness.
The average percentage of the issue allocated to independent funds is 18.3%.
Panel (B) reports the same statistics for non-eligible IPOs. Interestingly, un-
derwriters allocate shares of non-eligible IPOs to their affiliated funds in 17 IPOs,
about 8% of such IPOs. Eight of these IPOs do not satisfy the age requirement,
being less than three years old. There are several reasons why underwriters might
have allocated shares to their affiliated funds in these cases. First, these IPOs may
be misclassified as “non-eligible”. Errors in the issuers’ founding dates or the ex-
istence of unknown predecessors could have led us to miscalculate the issuers’ age.
A second possibility is that the age is correct, but no enforcement action was rec-
ommended by the SEC. In a private conversation, an SEC expert pointed out that
the Securities and Exchange Commission takes into account the general principles
behind the 10(f)-3 rule when interpreting and applying it. Consequently, certain
transactions that seem to formally violate the rule could, in fact, be allowed.10 A
9This proxy is noisy for two reasons. First, it is affected by aftermarket trading of both affiliated
and unaffiliated funds. Second, it is affected by the different coverage of funds in our Affiliated
Allocations dataset and in the s12 database.
10One popular example dates back to 2008, when the Goldman Sachs Trust requested assurance
that the SEC would not have recommended any enforcement action related to some affiliated
allocations of fixed-income securities issued by companies that were less than three years old.
These securities were co-issued with and 100% guaranteed by another company that was more
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third possibility is that underwriters might have broken the 10(f)-3 rule in these
cases, allocating shares of non-eligible issuers to their affiliated funds. A search on
Google provides information consistent with the founding dates contained in our
dataset, and we decide to flag these eight IPOs as non-eligible.
One of the 17 non-eligible IPOs does not satisfy the firm commitment require-
ment, while the remaining eight non-eligible IPOs do not satisfy the lead underwriter
requirement, meaning that none of their lead underwriters has ever been involved
in a 10(f)-3 transaction in our sample. In these eight IPOs, affiliated transactions
involve other syndicate members only.11
[Table 3 about here.]
Figure 2 shows the average allocations to affiliated and independent funds over
the period 2001-2013 for the 1,086 eligible IPOs. Panel (A) shows that the per-
centage of IPOs with affiliated allocations ranges from a minimum of 41% in 2008
to a peak of 77% in 2009, with no apparent trend in the period 2001-2013. The
average percentage allocation to affiliated funds ranges from a minimum of 0.87%
in 2005 to a peak of 2.72% in 2009 and behaves similarly to the average percentage
of the issue allocated to affiliated funds conditional on IPOs involving at least one
affiliated transaction. This means that in periods when underwriters are more likely
to allocate some shares to their affiliated funds, the size of the affiliated allocations
tend, on average, to be larger.
We notice no apparent increase in affiliated allocations after 2003, when the
SEC amended the 10(f)-3 rule, loosening some of its constraints. In particular,
after 2003 the maximum amount of shares that an underwriter can allocate to its
affiliated funds (the “percentage limit,” or 25% of the issue) applies to the principal
underwriter only. This constraint is not binding in the IPO allocations market, as
affiliated allocations are far below the percentage limit imposed by the 10(f)-3 rule.
While affiliated allocations do not show a clear trend over the time period of
our sample, we do notice that the percentage of the issue allocated to independent
funds has sharply increased in recent years, from about 15% before 2010 to almost
25% afterward.
[Figure 2 about here.]
To assess the contribution of our novel dataset, it is worth comparing these sum-
mary statistics with those of Ritter and Zhang (2007), as they used the Spectrum
1&2 holdings to proxy for affiliated allocations. The only overlapping year between
our research and theirs is 2001. Ritter and Zhang (2007) find that affiliated funds
report positive holdings for approximately 26% of the IPOs in 2001, while the true
percentage of IPOs involving affiliated allocations, based on N-SAR filings, is about
than three years old and, thus, was compliant with the 10(f)-3 rule. The SEC concluded that
the characteristics of the co-issue and the 100% guarantee were consistent with the aim of the
rule, which is to avoid unmarketable securities being dumped to affiliated funds. Hence, it assured
Goldman Sachs that it would not have recommended any enforcement action. See the SEC’s
interpretative letter for more details:
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/noaction/2008/goldmansachstrust081908.htm
11Including these 17 IPOs in the eligible sample does not sensibly change the magnitude and the
statistical significance of the regressions estimates in section 5.
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71%. Moreover, they find that the average allocation - conditional on the allocation
being greater than zero - is 0.7%, while according to the N-SAR filings it is 2.93%.
These numbers suggest that using the Spectrum 1&2 holdings to proxy for affiliated
allocations might considerably understate their prevalence and size.
In our dataset, we preserve the names of the underwriters affiliated with the
funds that receive allocations. We count 64 underwriters involved in at least one
10(f)-3 transaction in our sample. In the average IPO, there are 5.3 syndicate
members - 2.2 of whom are lead managers - who could be involved in an affiliated
transaction. On average, 1.2 of them allocate some shares to their affiliated funds.
Table 4 lists the names of the 14 underwriters that are most active in the affiliated
allocations market.12 The table reports the number of eligible IPOs underwritten by
each underwriter and the number and percentage of IPOs in which each underwriter
allocates some shares to its affiliated funds. JP Morgan stands out, with 230 IPOs
allocated to its affiliated funds, about 60% of the eligible IPOs that it underwrites.
Morgan Stanley and Merrill Lynch follow, with about half the number of IPOs
allocated to their affiliated funds. Some banks, however, do not often allocate IPO
shares to their affiliated funds. For example, Credit Suisse allocated only 32 IPOs
out of 352 to its affiliated funds.
[Table 4 about here.]
3.3 Do IPOs allocated to affiliated funds differ from other IPOs?
Table 5 reports difference-of-means (Panel A) and difference-of-proportions (Panel
B) tests to assess whether IPOs with a positive allocation to affiliated funds differ
from those with no allocations to affiliated funds. The table shows that the two
groups of IPOs do differ significantly, both economically and statistically. Notice-
ably, affiliated funds are more likely to receive allocations when the issue is more
underpriced: the first day return is about 11.8 percentage points higher when funds
affiliated with the underwriters receive some allocation, consistent with nepotism
behavior. This pattern is confirmed by the main predictor of underpricing, which
is the percentage adjustment from the midpoint of the filing range to the offer price
(Hanley (1993)). On average, IPOs allocated to affiliated funds are priced 3.1 per-
centage points above the midpoint of the filing range, while IPOs with no allocations
to affiliated funds are priced about 7.6 percentage points below the midpoint of the
filing range. The two groups differ by approximately 10.7 percentage points.
Though suggestive, this univariate evidence is not enough to conclude that the
nepotism/supernepotism hypotheses hold or that the dumping-ground hypothesis
does not hold, as IPOs with affiliated allocations also differ from those with no
affiliated allocations in several other ways. As concerns the characteristics of the
issuer, affiliated funds are more likely to receive shares of older and larger firms:
IPOs with affiliated allocations are approximately seven years older than, and almost
two times as large as, other IPOs. Hence, affiliated funds are more likely to receive
shares when the information asymmetry of the issuer is lower. This finding is broadly
consistent with bookbuilding theories, as underwriters might allocate more shares
12These 14 most active affiliated underwriters are involved in 10(f)-3 transactions in at least 25
IPOs.
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to independent funds that reveal their signals when information asymmetry is high,
thus penalizing their affiliated funds.13 As concerns the characteristics of the issue
itself, affiliated funds are more likely to receive shares when the size of the issue is
larger, when the number of syndicate members and lead managers is greater, and
when at least one underwriter’s reputation is ranked highly. On the other hand,
the gross spread, the percentage of IPOs listed on NASDAQ, the percentage of
IPOs issuing only primary shares, and the percentage of issuers backed by venture
capitalists are all significantly lower for IPOs allocated to affiliated funds. The
positive relation between affiliated allocations and the number of lead managers
and syndicate members is not surprising. The larger the syndicate, the more likely
it is that more than one member has affiliated funds to which to allocate shares.
It is also more likely that the shares can be allocated pursuant to rule 10(f)-3,
as they must be allocated through an underwriter other than the affiliated one.
Finally, the percentage of shares received by independent funds is greater by about
2.5 percentage points when the issue is allocated to affiliated funds. Since all these
characteristics might be significant determinants of underpricing, it is important to
control for them in the regressions of section 5.
[Table 5 about here.]
In subsection 3.2 we find that the percentage of IPOs allocated to affiliated funds
varies by year. Moreover, we find that the affiliated allocation business is dominated
by certain underwriters. It is interesting to investigate whether the practice of fa-
voring affiliated funds with the allocation of underpriced shares, observed for the
whole sample, is driven by some subperiods or by a few underwriters. Table 6
shows that this is not the case: the tendency to allocate more underpriced shares
to affiliated funds holds in every sub-period (Panel A), and for every underwriter
(Panel B), though with some variation in the magnitude and statistical significance
of the difference. In Panel (A), we see that affiliated funds were favored the most
in 2007: the IPOs in which they received allocations were more underpriced than
other IPOs by almost 20 percentage points. The smallest difference in underpricing
between IPOs with affiliated allocations (“Allocated” column) and those without
affiliated allocations (“Not allocated” column) occurred in 2001, when it was about
6 percentage points and statistically insignificant. For comparison with Ritter and
Zhang (2007), it is worth noting that they find the opposite result for 2001: in
their sample, underpricing of IPOs allocated to affiliated funds is smaller than it
is for other IPOs. This suggests that using the Spectrum 1&2 to proxy for affili-
ated allocations might not only influence their average size, as pointed out in the
previous subsection, but also their variation and correlation with other variables.
Panel (B) shows that each of the 14 main underwriters is prone to favoritism. The
underwriter that seems to favor its affiliated funds the most is Merrill Lynch: when
it allocates shares to its affiliated funds, underpricing is 18 percentage points higher.
For Citigroup, by comparison, the difference between IPOs allocated to affiliated
investors and other IPOs is only 1 percentage point and statistically insignificant.
13Broadly consistent with this argument, we notice that the correlation between the fraction of
shares received by independent funds, IndependentAllocPerc, and the size of the firm before the
issue is -0.1 (untabulated). The correlation between IndependentAllocPerc and the age of the firm
is -0.06 (untabulated).
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[Table 6 about here.]
4 The effect of affiliated allocations on underpricing
In section 2, we posit that underwriters might underprice IPOs in order to increase
their affiliated funds profits (Hypothesis 1). In order to test this supernepotism
hypothesis and identify a causal link between affiliated allocations and underpricing,
we need to find a source of exogenous variation in affiliated allocations.
Rule 10(f)-3 provides the institutional setting we need to the design a quasi-
experiment. The rule requires issuers to be at least three years old for the under-
writer to be permitted to allocate shares to its affiliated funds. Hence, the prob-
ability of allocating some shares to affiliated funds might discontinuously increase
at the cutoff point, thus allowing us to implement a fuzzy regression discontinuity
design (RDD).14
In order to introduce the RDD terminology, we use the following terms inter-
changeably: Underpricing is the “outcome” variable; our affiliated allocations mea-
sures – AffiliatedAllocPerc and AffiliatedAllocDummy – are the “treatment”
variables; and Age is the “forcing” (or “running”) variable that determines the
assignment-to-treatment status through the three year cutoff. We are interested in
the causal effect of the treatment on the outcome variable. The fuzzy RDD exploits
the discontinuous variation in the treatment status provided by the forcing variable
at the three-year cutoff point in order to identify that causal effect.
The RD framework allows us to approximate an ideal experimental setup, where
the possibility of allocating shares to underwriter-affiliated funds is randomly as-
signed, thus helping us overcome the joint endogeneity of affiliated allocations and
underpricing. Consider an underwriter who is hired by firms of random ages in
order to perform their IPOs. Firms that choose to go public at two years old prob-
ably differ, in several dimensions, from those that go public when they are in their
twenties. These IPO-specific differences may influence both the allocation and the
pricing decisions of the underwriter, thus making it difficult to identify causal ef-
fects. If we consider an arbitrarily small neighborhood around the three year cutoff
point, however, we can compare firms that differ discontinuously in their treatment
status (that is, firms just above and just below the cutoff point), but do not differ
discontinuously along other dimensions.
The identification assumption is that only the treatment (the affiliated alloca-
tions) changes discontinuously at the cutoff point, while the conditional expectation
function of other unobservable and observable factors is continuous. If there is some
randomness in the age of the IPO firm around the cutoff, that is, if the underwriter
has only imprecise control over the age of the firm at the offer date, then the con-
ditional expectation function of other factors is indeed continuous in the forcing
variable (Lee and Lemieux (2010)). We discuss the validity of this identification
assumption in section 4.1.
Our identification strategy is illustrated in Figure 3. Consider an underwriter
14As observed in section 3, the three year cutoff does not perfectly determine the affiliated
allocation decision, neither below nor above the threshold. Hence, a sharp RDD does not fit our
setting.
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that faces nepotism incentives and which has a profit function such that:15 i) its
optimal choice of the offer price, P , as a function of the affiliated allocation, A,
is given by the line P ∗(A); ii) its optimal choice of A, as a function P , is given
by the line A∗(P ). If the underwriter complies with the 10(f)-3 rule, its affiliated
allocations are constrained to zero when the age of the IPO falls just below the
cutoff. In this case, the affiliated allocation and the optimal price are given by
the pair (0, P0). When the age of the IPO is just above the cutoff, instead, the
underwriter can optimally choose P and A to maximize its profits, that is, it chooses
the pair (A1, P1). Hence, the cutoff identifies movements along the P
∗(A) function,
thus allowing us to estimate its slope, that is, to estimate the change in the optimal
offer price caused by a change in the allocation to affiliated investors. Since we
implement a fuzzy RDD, we estimate a Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE),
that is, the effect of affiliated allocations on underpricing for units that comply to
the 10(f)-3 rule.
[Figure 3 about here.]
For the purposes of this section, we restrict the sample to eligible IPOs (1,086 ob-
servations) and IPOs that are not eligible because they do not meet the age require-
ment (65 observations), that is, syndicated IPOs issued under a firm-commitment
contract whose lead underwriters have been involved in at least one 10(f)-3 trans-
action in our sample. In this way, we focus the RDD analysis on observations for
which the three year cutoff is binding.
The remaining 143 IPOs are not eligible regardless of their age, as they do not
meet at least one of the other 10(f)-3 requirements. The cutoff is not binding for
them and they are useful for placebo tests only.
4.1 Relevance and exogeneity: graphical analysis and discussion
We follow the RDD literature (Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Lee and Lemieux
(2010)), providing graphical evidence that supports the relevance and exogeneity of
the three year threshold.
For the cutoff to be a valid instrument in a fuzzy RDD, it must discontinuously
affect the treatment variable. Figure 4 plots the average value of the variables
AffiliatedAllocDummy and AffiliatedAllocPerc by one year age groups (bins).
Panel (A) shows that the probability of receiving the treatment jumps at the cutoff.
The probability that an IPO involves a 10(f)-3 transaction is less than 20% for
IPOs below the threshold, but jumps to more than 50% just above the threshold. A
similar pattern holds for the average percentage of the issue allocated to affiliated
funds (Panel (B)): it is smaller than 0.5% below the cutoff, but jumps to much more
than 1% above the cutoff.
[Figure 4 about here.]
If the cutoff affects underpricing through a discontinuous change in affiliated al-
locations, then we should observe a jump in the outcome variable at the cutoff point
15For the sake of simplicity, we rule out dumping-ground incentives for the purposes of this
illustration.
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(this is known as the intent-to-treat effect). Figure 5 plots the average underpricing
by age bins. Underpricing shows a large, clear jump at the cutoff, from about 5%
to more than 15%.
[Figure 5 about here.]
The exogeneity of the cutoff is not testable. However, we can check to see if the
implications of exogeneity hold in our setting.
In principle, the three year cutoff could be endogenous. Underwriters do have
some control over the length of the IPO process, and they might time their IPOs
so as to make them eligible for 10(f)-3 transactions. Although appealing, this ar-
gument is not supported by empirical evidence. If underwriters were manipulating
the length of the IPO process, then we would see a jump or spike in the variable
LengthIPOprocess at the cutoff point: three-year-old firms would experience longer
IPO processes because of their underwriters’ timing strategy. Figure 6, Panel (B),
shows this not to be the case. There is no evidence of a jump or spike at the cutoff
point.
Digging into the issue of manipulation more deeply, we can see that if manipu-
lation were a concern, then a particular group of IPOs might be subject to it: firms
that start their going-public process before they are three years old, but perform the
IPO when they become three years old. In our sample, we find only four IPOs for
which the length of the process might have been manipulated in order to meet the
10(f)-3 requirement: Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc., Encore Acquisition Company,
Orbitz Inc., and Talecris Biotherapeutics Holdings. Each filed its IPO when it was
two years old and completed it when the firm was three years old or older. We
notice that:
• the percentage of IPOs that start the process at two years old and complete it
at three years old or older is 17% (4 out of 23). For comparison, the percentage
of IPOs that start the process when they are already three years old (that is,
when they do not have any incentive to manipulate the timing) and complete
it when they are more than three years old is 37%.16 Hence, there is no
evidence that underwriters systematically time IPOs.
• two of the four IPOs we identified were clearly not timed for reasons related
to nepotism or dumping-ground incentives. Vanda Pharmaceuticals has no
affiliated allocations. Encore Acquisition has a relatively small percentage of
its issue allocated to underwriter-affiliated funds (0.35%) and its underpricing
is positive and low (3.9%).
• two of the four IPOs we identified do raise suspicions that they might have
been timed: Orbitz and Talecris Biotherapeutics. A relatively large percent-
age of their shares has been allocated to affiliated funds (3% and 6.5%, respec-
tively), and the underpricing of each IPO raises concerns that dumping-ground
and nepotism incentives might be involved (-3.9% and 11.3%, respectively).
However, their IPO processes took 19 and 26 months, respectively. Most likely
16One might be concerned about age misclassification. However, we find similar percentages for
higher values of age.
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they went public when their ages were already several months above the three
year cutoff, suggesting that their IPOs were not timed to meet the threshold.
Overall, we conclude that the underwriters’ manipulation of the length of the
IPO process, if any, is unlikely to be a concern in our setting.
[Figure 6 about here.]
Another possibility, however, is that the underwriter might manipulate the age
of the issuer by postponing the filing date and the beginning of the IPO process.
This would leave the length of the IPO process unchanged for three-year-old firms,
thus preventing us from detecting their manipulation in Figure 6, Panel (B) and
invalidating our design. We find this argument not convincing for three reasons.
First, underpricing the IPO is not the underwriter’s sole objective. Accomplishing
the IPO and not missing a window of opportunity most likely dominates under-
pricing as an objective. This would push the underwriter to not delay the start of
the IPO process, as the issuer might turn to a competing underwriter in order to
complete its IPO. Thus, competition among underwriters to get deals reduces the
scope for manipulation. Second, the RDD setting is invalid only if underwriters
can precisely manipulate the assignment variable (Lee and Lemieux (2010)). It is
unlikely that an underwriter could do so before starting the IPO process, as the
length of the process is a random variable over which the underwriter does not have
full control.17 Third, if underwriters were systematically manipulating the IPO age,
then we would observe a jump in the density of the variable Age at the cutoff point.
Figure 6, Panel (A), shows that this is not the case: there seems to be no jump in
the density of Age at the three year threshold, suggesting that Age manipulation
by underwriters is unlikely to be systematic. Figure 7 plots by age bin the number
of IPOs underwritten by the most important underwriters: there seems to be no
general jump in the number of IPOs underwritten by each underwriter at the cutoff
point; only Wells Fargo shows a spike there. Overall, the non-manipulation evidence
seems to hold also at the underwriter level.
[Figure 7 about here.]
The identification assumption of the RD design is that the conditional expecta-
tion functions of observable and unobservable factors related to the outcome (other
than the treatment) are continuous at the cutoff point. We cannot test whether
this assumption holds for unobservable factors, but in Figure 8 we plot the average
value of the observable covariates by age bins. The figure shows no clear jump in the
conditional expectation function of any of the covariates. Interestingly, the main
predictor of underpricing – the variable Adjustment – is continuous at the cutoff
point. Some variables (NumberLeadManagers and NumberSyndicateMembers)
show a spike at the three year threshold, but this spike does not seem to be a
jump in the conditional expectation function, which might plausibly be continuous.
Overall, the expectation functions of the covariates conditional on age do not seem
to be discontinuous at the cutoff point.
17The random component in the length of the IPO process includes factors that make it not fully
predictable, such as the processing capacity of the SEC, indications of interest collected during the
bookbuilding process, last minute news, pressures from the firm to complete the IPO, etc.
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[Figure 8 about here.]
Another identification concern that we need to address is the following. The goal
of the 10(f)-3 rule is to prevent underwriters from dumping unmarketable securities
on their affiliated funds. Hence, the regulators might have chosen the three year
threshold exactly because IPOs in their early stages of life are more likely to be
unmarketable, thus resulting in lower average underpricing. This argument, though
plausible, does not in itself affect the RD design, which focuses on the discontinuities
at the cutoff point. It suggests, however, that it might be important to control for
the underlying relation between underpricing and age in our regressions.
4.2 Local linear IV results
In this subsection, we estimate the effect of underwriter-affiliated allocations on
underpricing in a fuzzy RD design.
Let xi be the age of firm i at the IPO date minus the cutoff level, xi = Agei−3,
and let zi be a dummy variable identifying firms that are at least three years old,
zi = 1(xi ≥ 0). We then estimate several specifications of the following local
linear IV model, where Alloci is one of our two measures of affiliated allocations,
AffiliatedAllocPerci or AffiliatedAllocDummyi, and Underpricingi is the first
day return:{
Underpricingi = β0 + β1Alloci + β2xi + β3zixi + ei with xi ∈ [−h, h− 1]
Alloci = γ0 + γ1zi + γ2xi + γ3zixi + vi with xi ∈ [−h, h− 1]
Based on the discussion and the graphical evidence presented in our previous
subsection, we assume that E(ei|xi) is continuous at the cutoff point. Following
Imbens and Lemieux (2008), we estimate the model via 2SLS, using zi as the in-
strumental variable for Alloci, in a neighborhood of the cutoff.
Our setting faces three distinct challenges. First, the forcing variable Age is
discrete: we observe it only at the year level. Second, Age is measured with noise:
given its definition (see Table 1), some truly n-year old firms might fall into the
n+ 1 age bin. This might generate some misclassification around the cutoff. Third,
the number of values that the forcing variable can take around the threshold is low:
it can only take three distinct values below the cutoff. These three issues affect our
choice of the bandwidth and standard errors to use.
Concerning the bandwidth size, h, we face a trade-off that goes beyond the usual
one related to the sample size, between bias and variance. If we choose h = 1, then
we use observations relatively close to the cutoff point, which are more likely to meet
the random assignment condition. However, given the discrete nature of our forcing
variable, we cannot control for the underlying relation between Underpricing and
x. If we choose h > 1, for example h = 3, then we can control for a local linear
relation between the outcome variable and the discrete forcing variable. However,
we do so at the cost of using observations relatively far from the cutoff point, which
are less likely to meet the random assignment condition.
Concerning standard errors, clustering by the forcing variable is popular in the
literature on RDD with discrete running variables (Lee and Card (2008)). However,
in a recent paper Kolesa`r and Rothe (2017) warn that clustering by the forcing
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variable can lead to serious over-rejection problems when the number of clusters is
low. In particular, they show that clustered standard errors perform worse than
robust standard errors. We run simulations (unreported here) and confirm that
Kolesa`r and Rothe’s concerns persist in our particular setting, with its low number of
clusters and its misclassification around the cutoff. We find that clustered standard
errors face a major over-rejection problem, while robust standard errors seem to
be fairly conservative in our setting. However, the power of our test is very low
when we choose h = 2 or h = 3 and control for the underlying relation between
underpricing and age.18
Based on this discussion, we use robust standard errors and we perform our
analysis using three symmetric bandwidth levels (h = 1, h = 2, and h = 3), in order
to check the robustness of the results in regards to the particular problems we face.
Table 7 reports the results of the local 2SLS estimation for different values of the
bandwidth.
[Table 7 about here.]
Consistent with the supernepotism hypothesis, Hypothesis 1, the coefficients of
our affiliated allocation variables are positive in all specifications; they are statis-
tically significant at conventional levels in all specifications but one, probably due
to a lack of power. Focusing on model (6) of Panel (A), which controls for changes
in the underlying relation between the outcome and the forcing variable, we find
that a one percentage point increase in the fraction of the issue allocated to af-
filiated funds increases underpricing by about 5.4 percentage points. Table 7 also
reports the first-stage F statistic, which is always bigger than 10, suggesting that
the instrument z is not weak.
As a benchmark for judging the size of the LATE effect, we estimate the control
complier mean (CCM) (Katz et al. (2001)): the average underpricing of IPOs below
the cutoff whose underwriters would have allocated shares to affiliated funds if they
had been eligible for 10(f)-3 transactions. First, we use the estimates from the
first-stage regression of Table 7, Panel (B), using the h = 3 bandwidth:
AffiliatedAllocDummy = γˆ0 + γˆ1zi + γˆ2xi + γˆ3zixi + vˆi
Second, we limit the sample to IPOs that are not allocated to affiliated funds.
On the right hand side of the cutoff, we have IPOs that are eligible for 10(f)-3
transactions, but nevertheless are not allocated to affiliated funds (never-takers).
On the left hand side of the threshold, we have IPOs that are not eligible for 10(f)-3
transactions and are not allocated to affiliated funds (a mixture of compliers and
never-takers). We estimate the reduced-form regression on this subsample, using a
bandwidth level of h = 3:
Underpricingi = θ0 + θ1zi + θ2xi + θ3zixi + i
Letting κˆ = (1 − γˆ0 − γˆ1)/(1 − γˆ0) be the percentage of never-takers among
IPOs that are not eligible for 10(f)-3 transactions and are not allocated to affiliated
18Our simulations show that the power of a two-sided 5% test can be as low as 15%, depending
on parameter values.
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and find CCM = −6.8. This result suggests that IPOs whose shares are allo-
cated to affiliated funds because of the 10(f)-3 rule would be on average overpriced
by 6.8 percentage points if they were not eligible. By adding the LATE evaluated
at the mean value of AffiliatedAllocPerc for complier IPOs, which is equivalent
to the coefficient of AffiliatedAllocDummy, we find the treated complier mean
(TCM): TCM = CCM + 24.8 = 18. The 10(f)-3 rule moves the average underpric-
ing of compliers from -6.8% to 18%.
Dong (2015) shows that the conventional fuzzy RDD estimator may be biased
when the running variable is discrete and rounded down. However, the bias is equal
to zero when the slopes (and higher derivatives) of the outcome and the treatment,
as functions of the forcing variable, do not change around the cutoff. We notice that
the coefficient for the forcing variable x is weakly significant in only one specification,
while the interaction term z x is not statistically different from zero. Hence, we do
not expect this bias to significantly affect our results. (We analyze this issue more
in detail in our robustness subsection.)
4.3 Placebo IPOs
If the three year threshold affects underpricing only through affiliated allocations,
then we should observe no jumps in the outcome variable when the cutoff is not
binding.
Underwriters of non-eligible IPOs (such as non-syndicated IPOs) cannot allocate
shares to their affiliated funds, regardless of the age of the issuer. Hence, there
should be no jump in underpricing at the cutoff for these non-eligible IPOs. Figure 9
plots the average underpricing by age bins for non-eligible IPOs: we see no evidence
of discontinuities at the three year threshold.
[Figure 9 about here.]
The three year threshold is set by the 10(f)-3 rule and is specific to U.S. regula-
tions. Therefore, we should observe no jump in underpricing at the three year cutoff
for non-U.S. IPOs. We verify this fact using a SDC sample of 488 European IPOs
issued in the period 2001-2013.19 In Figure 10 we plot their average underpricing
by age bins and we find no evidence of discontinuities at the three year threshold.
[Figure 10 about here.]
Following the RDD literature (Imbens and Lemieux (2008)), we check that there
are no jumps at non-discontinuity points, that is, where the effect on underpricing
should be zero. We define three arbitrary thresholds: the median value of age
conditional on Age > 3, which is 11 years; the 25th percentile of age conditional on
19In addition to the usual filters, we require the founding date to be non-missing in the SDC
database. We compute underpricing using the closing prices available in SDC.
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Age > 3, which is 7 years; and the 75th percentile of age conditional on Age > 3,
which is 25 years. Figure 11 plots the average underpricing by age bins around
these arbitrary thresholds and we see no evidence of discontinuities.
[Figure 11 about here.]
4.4 Robustness checks
Two additional pieces of evidence suggest that the discretization of the forcing
variable does not affect our conclusions.
Dong (2015) derives a formula to correct for the bias that arise when the running
variable is discrete. Under standard assumptions, the fuzzy RDD local average
treatment effect can be expressed as the ratio between the intent-to-treat effect
(θ1) and the coefficient of the first-stage regression of the treatment variable on
the assignment-to-treatment variable (γ1): βˆFRD =
θˆ1
γˆ1
. Dong shows that this ratio
is biased when the forcing variable is discrete and rounded. The direction of the
bias depends on the change in the slope (and higher derivatives) of the outcome
and the treatment, as functions of the forcing variable, around the cutoff. In order
to implement Dong’s correction, we need to assume a polynomial relation between
underpricing and age. Given the structure of our data, we consider the case of
a linear relation only. We estimate via OLS the intent-to-treat equation and the
first-stage equation as:
Underpricingi = θ0 + θ1zi + θ2xi + θ3zixi + i
Alloci = γ0 + γ1zi + γ2xi + γ3zixi + vi
Dong’s bias-corrected version of βˆFRD can be computed as:
βˆFRD =
θˆ1 − 12 θˆ3
γˆ1 − 12 γˆ3
Focusing on the h = 3 case, we find that the linear correction changes the
estimated FRD coefficient of AffiliatedAllocDummy from 24.8 to 27.35. The
coefficient of AffiliatedAllocPerc changes from 5.43 to 6.1. The bias, if any, seems
to work against finding results, thus suggesting that our results in section 4.2 are
conservative.
For a small subsample of 280 IPOs, we know the exact founding date at the
mm/dd/yyyy level and can compute the precise age of the firm at the issue date;
33 of these IPOs fall within the one-year bandwidth around the cutoff point. Table
8 replicates the fuzzy RDD analysis of section 4.2 for these 33 IPOs.20 Given
their precise age, we can, in principle, control for the underlying relation between
underpricing and age within the one-year bandwidth. However, the small sample
size might affect the statistical significance of the estimates and the validity of the
instrument. Hence, these results should be interpreted very cautiously.
20The bandwidth selector proposed by Calonico et al. (2014) would include 29 IPOs with age
between 2.1 and 3.9 years. This is very close to the one-year bandwidth that we use for consistency
with our baseline analysis.
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[Table 8 about here.]
The coefficients of AffiliatedAllocPerc and AffiliatedAllocDummy are al-
ways positive in all specifications. We notice that the estimates of model (1) are
very similar in magnitude to the results reported in Table 7. The statistical sig-
nificance is weaker because of the smaller sample size. The results of model (2)
and model (3) are qualitatively consistent with section 4.2, but their estimates are
statistically insignificant. Moreover, the magnitudes are implausible in some speci-
fications. We acknowledge that the instrument z becomes weak in models (2) and
(3), when we introduce x and z x as control variables in the first-stage regression.
Model (3), in particular, suffers from multicollinearity. Nevertheless, Table 8 sug-
gests that the positive effect documented in section 4.2 is unlikely to be driven
entirely by the discrete nature of our forcing variable.
Our main treatment variables (AffiliatedAllocPerc andAffiliatedAllocDummy)
measure allocations to underwriter-affiliated funds without distinguishing the role
played by the affiliated underwriter in the syndicate. Hence, Table 7 implicitly as-
sumes that the lead managers set the IPO offer price while acting in the interests
of the underwriting syndicate as a whole. If the lead managers act in their own
interests, however, they may choose the IPO price to maximize their own profit as
a function of the allocations received by their own affiliated funds. For robustness,
Table 9 replicates the fuzzy RDD analysis of section 4.2, using as the treatment vari-
able the allocation received by funds affiliated with the lead underwriters only. If
anything, our second stage results are stronger. However, we acknowledge that the
instrument becomes weak in some specifications of Panel (A), according to the first
stage F statistic. The reason is that the percentage of the issue allocated to funds
affiliated to the lead underwriters is about as half as the percentage of the issue allo-
cated to affiliated funds as a whole, thus reducing the jump of AffiliatedAllocPerc
around the cutoff.
[Table 9 about here.]
5 Nepotism and dumping-ground incentives
We now revisit two hypotheses analyzed in prior work: a milder version of the
nepotism hypothesis, and the dumping ground hypothesis. According to the for-
mer, underwriters will tend to allocate underpriced shares preferentially to their
affiliated funds to boost their performance. According to the latter, underwriters
will tend to allocate overpriced shares to their affiliated funds to ensure the success
of the IPO. Both these hypotheses have affiliated allocations as the outcome vari-
able. A natural specification would then have a measure of affiliated allocations as
the dependent variable, and underpricing as one of the explanatory variables. How-
ever, Ritter and Zhang (2007) argue that such a specification could be misleading,
as the coefficient of underpricing would capture also the relation between initial
IPO returns and allocations to institutional investors as a whole. Building on the
empirical model of Aggarwal et al. (2002), they propose to circumvent this issue
by regressing underpricing on affiliated allocations, and controlling for independent
allocations to capture any private information institutional investors may have. We
follow their approach in our analyses.
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We first assess which of the two conflicts of interest dominates the IPO market
(subsection 5.1). Then we analyze how variation in conflict of interest incentives
affects IPO allocations to affiliated funds (subsections 5.2 and following).
5.1 Nepotism or dumping-ground?
In order to assess which type of conflict of interest, nepotism or dumping-ground, is
more pervasive in the IPO market, we follow Ritter and Zhang (2007) and estimate
several specifications of the following reduced-form model at the IPO level:
Underpricing = β0 + β1(Alloc) + β2(IndependentAllocPerc)
+ β3(Controls) + β4(indFE) + β5(yearFE) + β6(uwFE) + u (1)
where Underpricing is the first day return and Alloc is either one of our two
measures of affiliated allocations: the percentage of the issue allocated to affiliated
funds, AffiliatedAllocPerc, or a dummy variable identifying IPOs with affiliated
allocations, AffiliatedAllocDummy. Under the null hypothesis of no conflict of
interest, there should be no relation between underpricing and allocations to affili-
ated funds at the IPO level: β1 = 0. The nepotism hypothesis predicts a positive
relation between underpricing and affiliated allocations (Hypothesis 2a), β1 > 0,
while the dumping-ground hypothesis predicts a negative relation between under-
pricing and affiliated allocations (Hypothesis 2b), β1 < 0. Control variables and
fixed-effects dummies are described below. We estimate the model via OLS. Since
we reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity of the error term u, we use robust
standard errors for inference.21 Results are reported in Table 10.
[Table 10 about here.]
Our affiliated allocation measures, AffiliatedAllocDummy andAffiliatedAllocPerc,
have a positive coefficient in all specifications, providing evidence that the nepotism
conflict dominates the dumping-ground conflict. The coefficient estimates are sta-
tistically significant either at the 1% or the 5% level. They are also economically
significant. If we consider the most conservative estimates, underpricing is 6.28 per-
centage points higher when underwriter-affiliated funds receive shares in an IPO.
Moreover, a one percentage point increase in the fraction of the issue allocated to
affiliated funds is associated with a 0.62 percentage point increase in underpricing,
meaning that affiliated allocations account for 6.3% of average underpricing.22
We control for several factors that might jointly determine underpricing and
affiliated allocations. Control variables enter the regression equation with the sign
that we expect, often consistent with the existing literature.
Following Ritter and Zhang (2007), we include in all specifications the percent-
age allocation received by non-affiliated funds, IndependentAllocPerc, in order to
control for the effect of private information possessed by financial institutions. Con-
sistent with Aggarwal et al. (2002), we find that IndependentAllocPerc is positively
21In unreported tables, we also use industry-year clustered standard errors and bootstrapped
standard errors, with similar findings.
22This number is computed as: β1*average(AffiliatedAllocPerc)/average(Underpricing).
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related to underpricing in all regressions and the coefficient estimates are statisti-
cally significant at the 1% level. This result is in line with the partial adjustment
literature (Hanley (1993)): financial institutions seem to have private information
which is not fully incorporated into the offer price during the bookbuilding process.
It is also consistent with the conflicts of interest literature, as the positive coeffi-
cient might be driven by underwriters favoring some clients with the allocation of
underpriced shares (Reuter (2006), Goldstein et al. (2011)). We shed more light on
these two potential interpretations in the next subsections.
As expected, ln(Age+ 1) and ln(Assets) are negatively correlated with under-
pricing. Consistent with the standard “winner’s curse” (Rock (1986)) and book-
building (Benveniste and Spindt (1989)) arguments, underpricing is higher when the
information asymmetry about the issuer is more pronounced, that is, when the is-
suer is younger and smaller. However, statistical significance varies across the model
specifications: ln(Age + 1) is always statistically significant at conventional levels;
ln(Assets) becomes insignificant only when other variables highly correlated with
it and potentially prone to endogeneity problems, such as the issue size and the syn-
dicate size, are added to the specification. Consistent with the partial adjustment
literature, the coefficient for Adjustment is positive and statistically significant at
the 1% level in all specifications. The coefficients for OnlyPrimaryShares, Nasdaq
and Foreign, however, are not significantly different from zero.
Columns (3) and (8) introduce additional control variables that might affect
both underpricing and allocations. We introduce them in a separate specification
because of endogeneity concerns.
Lowry et al. (2017) notice that, since the 1990s, the largest IPOs are frequently
the most underpriced. Indeed, we find a positive correlation between ln(Proceeds)
and the first day return in most specifications. However, the coefficient is not
statistically significant.
Consistent with Lee and Wahal (2004), we find that venture capital backed IPOs
have significantly higher underpricing. This positive relation is consistent with the
“grandstanding effect” described by Gompers (1996), but it might also be due to
endogeneity, as the V entureCapitalBack dummy might capture the effect of firm
characteristics positively related to the first day return (Lowry et al. (2017)).
Aggarwal et al. (2002) argue that the IPO process might take longer in times of
high issuance volume and high underpricing, thus generating a positive correlation
between the first day return and the amount of time spent in registration. In
contrast, we find that the length of the IPO process is significantly negatively related
to underpricing: an additional month spent in the registration process is associated
with a decrease of about 0.3 percentage points in the first day return. This finding
is broadly consistent with the intuitive idea that underwriters can price the issue
more accurately when they have more time to do it.
The variable HighRankDummy, which is a dummy equal to one if at least one
underwriter has a Carter-Manaster rank of 9, is positively related to underpric-
ing. Although the statistical significance is weak, this positive relation is broadly
consistent with the existing literature (Beatty and Welch (1996), Loughran and
Ritter (2004), and Ritter and Zhang (2007)) and might be driven by endogeneity,
as riskier and more difficult-to-price issuers, with higher expected underpricing, are
more likely to choose highly ranked underwriters to perform their IPOs (Habib and
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Ljungqvist (2001) and Lowry et al. (2017)).
The syndicate size and the number of lead underwriters are not significantly re-
lated to underpricing.23 Hence, we do not find evidence in favor of larger syndicates
being able to produce more information during the bookbuilding process. However,
endogeneity problems work against finding such a result, as issuers whose value is
more uncertain and whose expected underpricing is higher are more likely to hire
larger syndicates (Lowry et al. (2017)).
Finally, we find a positive relation between the gross underwriting spread and
the first day return. This is consistent with the existing literature and with the
idea that underpricing and gross spreads are complements: underwriters that can
charge high spreads to their customers are also able to leave more money on the
table (Kim et al. (2010) and Ritter (2011)).
Columns (4) and (9) introduce year and industry dummy variables, to control
for year-specific and industry-specific effects on underpricing and affiliated alloca-
tions. In order to define industry dummies, we use SIC codes and we implement the
Fama-French 12-industries classification (Fama and French (1997)), as available on
Kenneth French’s website.24 In columns (5) and (10), we introduce variables that
control for lead underwriters’ specific effects on underpricing and affiliated alloca-
tions. Controlling for underwriter-specific effects might be important for at least two
reasons. First, Hoberg (2007) finds underpricing to have a persistent underwriter-
specific component. Second, in section 3 we find that the affiliated allocation busi-
ness is dominated by a few underwriters and that there is some variation in their
propensity to allocate underpriced shares to affiliated funds. Therefore, for each
underwriter j, we define the variable uwFEi,j to be equal to 1 if the underwriter is
a lead manager of IPO i.25 It is important to note that these underwriter-specific
control variables are not mutually exclusive, as an IPO can have more than one
lead manager in its syndicate. Year and industry fixed effects and underwriter-
specific controls do not seem to have a major impact on the correlation between
underpricing and our affiliated allocation measures.
Overall, we find a positive and statistically significant relation between under-
pricing and allocations to underwriter-affiliated funds. This evidence is consistent
with the nepotism hypothesis: underwriters seem to favor their affiliated funds
with the allocation of underpriced shares. This positive correlation persists after
controlling for issuer and issue characteristics, year and industry fixed effects, and
underwriter-specific control variables. Hence, we find that fund managers’ incen-
tives, in the context of IPO allocations, seem to be more in line with those of the
fund’s shareholders than with those of their affiliated investment bankers. Con-
versely, the investment bankers’ incentives seem to be more in line with those of
their affiliated funds than with those of the issuer. Our evidence, based on the
actual affiliated allocations reported by investment companies to the SEC, is much
23Regression diagnostics raise a weak concern of multicollinearity by introducing
NumberLeadManagers as a regressor. For robustness, we run the same regressions excluding it
from the independent variables and our results do not sensibly change (not reported).
24The link is: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html
25In order to define the underwriter-specific variable uwFEi,j , we require the underwriter j to
be a lead manager at least four times in our dataset. Moreover, we require the underwriter j to
be involved in at least one 10(f)-3 transaction in our dataset. These filters allow us to define the
variable uwFEi,j for 33 distinct lead underwriters.
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clearer than that available in the existing literature.
We stress that the evidence provided in this subsection does not necessarily mean
that dumping-ground incentives do not exist or that they are irrelevant. It could be
that dumping-ground incentives are simply weaker than nepotism incentives. There
are several reasons why the nepotism conflict of interest might stand out. First, it
might inherently have a greater weight in the profit function of investment banks,
given the structure of the IPO market. Second, the 10(f)-3 rule might be effective
in preventing dumping-ground behavior, thus leaving space mainly for nepotism
conflicts. Third, the affiliated funds might circumvent the 10(f)-3 rule by buying
cold securities in the IPO aftermarket, supporting their price. This would transfer
the dumping-ground conflict of interest to the secondary market, allowing us to
observe mainly the nepotism conflict in the primary market. In any case, we should
observe the dumping-ground conflict in the IPO allocations market whenever the
benefits of dumping cold shares to affiliated funds are high enough. We explore this
possibility in the next subsections, analyzing how variation in conflict of interest
incentives affects the correlation between IPO allocations to affiliated funds and
underpricing.
5.2 Conflict of interest incentives and the number of IPOs
Hypothesis 3 states that dumping-ground incentives are stronger when the under-
writer is completing a relatively low number of deals. To test this idea, we measure
the abnormal number of deals completed by each underwriter at the time the IPO
in question and check whether the correlation between underpricing and affiliated
allocations varies consistently with conflict of interest incentives.
For each IPO, we measure the abnormal number of IPOs completed by its un-
derwriters as follows. Take IPO i performed in quarter q by underwriter j. We
require that each underwriter j has been involved in at least one 10(f)-3 transac-
tion in our sample. First, we define Fi,j,q−t to be the number of IPOs filed by the
underwriter j of IPO i in the quarter q − t. We compute Fi,j,q−1 and use it as a
proxy for the number of deals that underwriter j expects to complete in quarter q.
Then, we compute a benchmark measure as the average number of IPOs filed by







Using this benchmark, we measure the abnormal number of IPOs that underwriter
j expects to complete in quarter q as:
AFi,j = Fi,j,q−1 − F i,j
Finally, as IPO i may have more than one underwriter, we compute an aggregate








26To compute the benchmark measure for IPOs performed in 2001 and 2002, we download
additional IPO data for the period 1999-2000 from the SDC database.
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where Ji is the number of underwriters of IPO i that satisfy the filter of being
involved in at least one 10(f)-3 transaction in our sample.
We split the sample into terciles based on AF i. The top (bottom) tercile contains
IPOs whose underwriters expect to complete a high (low) abnormal number of deals
in the quarter of the IPO in question. Hypothesis 3 states that nepotism incentives
dominate dumping-ground incentives in the highest tercile, while dumping-ground
incentives gain importance relative to nepotism incentives in the lowest tercile. We
estimate model 1 in the subsample of IPOs in the highest and lowest terciles of the
variable AF i and report the OLS regression results in Table 11. Under Hypothesis
3, we expect the coefficient β1 to be higher in the top tercile.
[Table 11 about here.]
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, we find that the coefficient ofAffiliatedAllocPerc
is positive and statistically significant in the highest tercile. In the lowest tercile,
instead, the coefficient is much smaller in magnitude (and even negative in one
specification) and is not statistically significant.
We notice that a similar qualitative pattern holds for independent funds, sug-
gesting that unaffiliated funds are favored the most when the underwriter’s need to
complete deals is weakest. Changes in the magnitude and statistical significance of
the coefficient of IndependentAllocPerc, however, are not as pronounced as they
are for affiliated funds.
Even though the difference between the coefficients in the bottom and top ter-
ciles is not significant at conventional levels, we nevertheless notice that the nepo-
tism conflict observed for the whole sample is enhanced by the highest tercile, while
it is weakened by the lowest tercile. Overall, this evidence is consistent with con-
flict of interest incentives. When the underwriter expects to complete an abnormally
low number of deals, the benefits of completing an additional IPO gain importance.
This increases the incentive for dumping cold IPOs to affiliated funds, thus lowering
the correlation between underpricing and affiliated allocations.
5.3 Conflict of interest incentives and commission kickbacks
Hypothesis 4a states that the correlation between underpricing and affiliated alloca-
tions should be weaker when the underwriter receives a high stream of commissions
from institutional investors. Hypothesis 4b states that the correlation between
underpricing and allocations to independent funds should be stronger when the
underwriter receives a high stream of commissions from institutional investors.
We follow Goldstein et al. (2011) in measuring the abnormal commissions re-
ceived by the brokerage arm of the lead underwriters around the IPOs’ issue dates.
We use the Abel Noser Solutions database to gather trade-level brokerage com-
mission data for the period October 2000 to March 2011. We match Abel Noser’s
brokers to SDC’s underwriters by name and require IPOs to have at least one lead
underwriter matched to the Abel Noser Solutions database. Hence, for the pur-
poses of this subsection, we drop from our sample IPOs performed in the period
2011-2013, as well as non-matched IPOs. These filters leave us with 735 IPOs in the
period 2001-2010. For each IPO, we collect all trades in non-IPO stocks executed
by its lead underwriters in a time window of [-60,+60] trading days around the IPO
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issue date and aggregate commission revenues at the daily level. We let Ci,j,t be the
dollar amount of brokerage commissions received by the lead underwriter j of IPO
i in the trading day t relative to the offer date. First, we compute a benchmark
level of brokerage commissions received by the lead underwriter j of IPO i as the





















Finally, as IPO i may have more than one lead manager, we compute an aggregate





where Ji is the number of lead underwriters of IPO i matched to Abel Noser
Solutions’ brokers.
We split the sample into terciles based on ACi. The top (bottom) tercile con-
tains IPOs whose underwriters received a high (low) abnormal stream of brokerage
commissions from institutional trading in non-IPO stocks in the 10-day window
before the IPO in question. We estimate model 1 in these two subsamples of IPOs
and report our OLS regression results in Table 12. Under Hypotheses 3a and 3b,
we expect the coefficient β1 to be higher in the bottom tercile and the coefficient
β2 to be higher in the top tercile.
[Table 12 about here.]
Consistent with Hypothesis 4a, we observe that the coefficient ofAffiliatedAllocPerc
is lower in magnitude when the lead underwriters receive an abnormally high stream
of brokerage commissions from institutional investors. Statistical significance is also
weaker in the highest tercile of ACi. Consistent with Hypothesis 4b, the coefficient
of IndependentAllocPerc is higher when quid-pro-quo incentives are likely at play.
Moreover, the coefficient is not statistically different from zero when institutional
investors do not pay high brokerage commissions to the lead underwriters. This
finding provides additional evidence of the importance of commission paybacks in
the IPO allocation process, supporting Reuter (2006), Nimalendran et al. (2007),
Goldstein et al. (2011), and Jenkinson et al. (2017).
Even though the differences between the coefficients in the bottom and top
terciles are not significant at conventional levels, we nevertheless notice that the
nepotism conflict (the commission-kickbacks conflict) observed for the whole sam-
ple is enhanced (weakened) by the lowest tercile. Overall, this evidence is consistent
27The abnormal commission revenue in the event period is positive on average and statistically
different from zero (result not reported).
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with underwriters’ conflict of interest incentives. When brokerage commissions gain
weight in the profit function of the investment bank, the revenues from allocating
underpriced shares to the affiliated investment management arm become less impor-
tant and the underwriter tends to favor non-affiliated institutions that have entered
into a quid-pro-quo agreement.
5.4 Conflict of interest incentives and information asymmetry
Hypothesis 5a states that the correlation between underpricing and affiliated allo-
cations should be stronger for firms with low information asymmetry. Hypothesis
5b states that the correlation between underpricing and unaffiliated, independent
allocations should be stronger for firms with high information asymmetry.
As our proxy for information asymmetry we use the size of the firm, ln(Assets),
and split the sample into terciles based on firm size. We estimate model 1 in the
highest and lowest terciles and report our OLS regression results in Table 13. Under
Hypotheses 5a and 5b, we expect the coefficient β1 to be higher in the top tercile
and the coefficient β2 to be higher in the bottom tercile.
[Table 13 about here.]
Consistent with Hypothesis 5a, we observe that the coefficient ofAffiliatedAllocPerc
is positive and statistically significant in the highest tercile, while it is statistically
not different from zero in the lowest tercile. Moreover, in two specifications, the sign
of the coefficient becomes negative. There is some evidence in favor of Hypothesis
5b as well, though it is weaker: the magnitude and statistical significance of the
coefficient of IndependentAllocPerc are higher in the lowest tercile of ln(Assets).
Even though the difference between the coefficients in the bottom and top ter-
ciles is not significant at conventional levels, we nevertheless notice that the nepo-
tism conflict observed for the whole sample is driven by the highest tercile, while
it is weakened by the lowest tercile. Overall, this evidence is consistent with un-
derwriters’ conflict of interest incentives and with standard information production
theories of bookbuilding. When information asymmetry is high, the underwriter
tends to favor those investors whose indications of interest in the bookbuilding pro-
cess are more valuable. When information asymmetry is low, price discovery is less
important and the nepotism conflict emerges.
6 Conclusion
We argue that nepotism incentives might not only influence the allocation decision,
as prior research has suggested, but also the pricing decision, which has not before
been suspected. We hypothesize that underwriters might abnormally underprice
IPOs to benefit their affiliated funds (our “supernepotism” hypothesis).
We exploit the 10(f)-3 rule of the Investment Company Act, and we construct
a novel hand-collect dataset containing IPO allocations received by funds affiliated
to the underwriters. To test our idea, and to assess the causal effect of affiliated
allocations on the IPO offer price, we implement a fuzzy regression discontinuity
design. We exploit a regulatory threshold, set by section 10(f)-3 of the Investment
34
6 CONCLUSION
Company Act, that provides exogenous variation in the allocation decision. We
find that a one percentage point increase in the allocations to affiliated funds causes
underpricing to be nearly 5.4 percentage points higher. Our evidence suggests that
the supernepotism conflict of interest might have large consequences and costs for
the issuing firm.
Our hand-collected dataset of affiliated IPO allocations also enables us to revisit
the dumping-ground and nepotism hypotheses analyzed in the prior literature. We
find that, controlling for other joint determinants, there is a strong and statistically
significant positive correlation between underpricing and affiliated allocations: a
one percentage point increase in the allocation to affiliated funds is associated with
a 0.62 percentage point increase in underpricing. This evidence suggests that the
nepotism conflict is more pervasive than the dumping-ground one. Our evidence
supporting the nepotism hypothesis is much clearer than that reported in previous
papers.
We also investigate whether the correlation between affiliated allocations and
underpricing varies consistently with the nepotism and dumping-ground incentives.
We find that the positive correlation between affiliated allocations and underpricing
is weaker in periods when the underwriter performs an abnormally low number of
IPOs. This result is consistent with the idea that, in such periods, dumping-ground
incentives gain importance relative to those of nepotism, as the marginal benefit
of completing an IPO is higher for the underwriter. Moreover, we find that the
positive correlation between affiliated allocations and underpricing is weaker when
the investment bank underwriting the IPO receives an abnormally high stream of
brokerage commissions from other non-affiliated funds. In this scenario, underwrit-
ers tend to favor the clients that give them commission kickbacks, and nepotism
incentives become less important. Finally, we find some evidence consistent with
both information-based bookbuilding theories and conflict of interest incentives.
The positive correlation between affiliated allocations and underpricing is stronger
when the information asymmetry about the issuer is lower. In these IPOs, the in-
formation providing role of the bookbuilding method is not as important as it is for
IPOs whose value is more uncertain. Hence, underwriters do not need to reward
independent funds for their information-revealing indications of interest and the
nepotism conflict emerges.
One interesting question that remains unanswered is why the nepotism conflict
dominates the dumping-ground one in the context of IPO allocations. We argue
that there are several reasons why the nepotism conflict might stand out. First, it
might inherently have a greater weight in the profit function of investment banks,
given the structure of the IPO market. Second, the 10(f)-3 rule might be an effective
tool preventing dumping-ground behavior, thus leaving space mainly for nepotism
conflicts. Third, affiliated funds might circumvent the 10(f)-3 rule by buying cold
securities in the IPO aftermarket, supporting their price. This would transfer the
dumping-ground conflict to the secondary market, allowing us to observe mainly the
nepotism conflict in the primary market. We plan to explore this third possibility
in an extension of the present paper.
Our findings shed light on a previously unexplored tradeoff facing IPO issuers.
For them, the benefits of going public must be compared with the potential foregone
IPO proceeds stemming from supernepotism behavior on the part of the IPO under-
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writer. Our conversations with asset managers suggest to us that the supernepotism
behavior we document is known to at least some participants in the IPO market.
It is not clear to us whether this behavior is widely known to potential IPO issuers.
Conceivably, an IPO issuer concerned about supernepotism could turn to an under-
writer less active in the fund management business, but we have no indication, even
anecdotal, that this is the case. An intriguing possibility is that issuers may view
the underwriter’s dumping ground incentives as an offsetting virtue to nepotism: an
issuer might accept the risk of foregone proceeds due to supernepotism, if that risk
comes bundled with the guarantee that the underwriter will use his own funds to
place the issuer’s shares and guarantee a successful offering when market conditions
deteriorate.
Overall, using a novel dataset that allows us to directly measure affiliated allo-
cations, we find that underwriters favor their affiliated funds when allocating under-
priced IPOs. Our results contribute to the existing literature by shedding light on
the types of conflicts of interest that affect the IPO process and their consequences
for both issuing firms and fund shareholders.
A Appendix: downloading and parsing N-SAR filings
The 77o item of the N-SAR filing asks the filer whether it was involved in affiliated
transactions pursuant to the 10(f)-3 rule. If the answer is yes, then the filer has to
provide additional information about the affiliated transaction in an attachment.
We download from the SEC EDGAR database the 104,207 N-SAR forms filed in
the period January 2001 to December 2014. This time span covers the affiliated
transactions executed in the period 2001-2013, because an N-SAR form filed in year
X can contain information about year X-1. Since 2001, institutions are instructed to
name their attachment type: “EX-99.77O 10f-3 RULE.” However, a non-negligible
number of attachments is filed with a wrong or incomplete name. Hence, we do not
rely only on that tag to find the attachments we are interested in. We focus on the
N-SAR filings that satisfy at least one of the following (case insensitive) criteria:
• contain in the main form or in any attachment the string “077 O000000 Y”;
• contain in the main form or in any attachment the string “10f”;
• contain in the main form or in any attachment the string “77o.”
Using these criteria, we keep many false positives that do not contain a 10(f)-3
attachment. Our objective is to minimize false negatives, so as to lose the smallest
possible amount of information.28 These criteria leave us with 10,622 N-SAR filings.
We parse them manually because the reporting format differs considerably, both
between and within investment companies. Figure 12 provides an example of a
10(f)-3 attachment to the N-SAR filings.
[Figure 12 about here.]
28Under these criteria, false negatives are N-SAR filings that contain a 10f-3 attachment, but: i)
mistakenly answer “NO” to the 77o item, and ii) do not contain the terms “10f” or “77o” in the
entire N-SAR document and its attachments.
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10(f)-3 attachments report information about both equity and bond issues. We
hand-collect information about equity issues only. Sometimes the filings explicitly
distinguish the two categories; most of the time, however, we have to infer the kind
of security issued. For bond issues, filings often report the maturity date or the yield
to maturity; the name of the fund receiving an allocation often reveals whether it is
a bond/municipal fund or an equity fund; the reported offer price is typically close
to 100 for bond issues; etc. When no such information is provided and we are unable
to distinguish equity from bond issues, we store the observation in our dataset in
order to minimize false negatives.29 In this way, we collect 18,872 observations at
the issue-“investor”-broker level, meaning that we observe the number of shares
allocated to investor f in IPO i by broker b. The “investor” can be a fund, a
sub-portfolio of a fund, or an investment management company.
We match 10(f)-3 issuers to SDC issuers mainly by using issuer names and
issue dates. We complement the matching with other pieces of information (such
as the offer price and the number of shares issued) to increase the accuracy of the
match. Moreover, we match 10(f)-3 underwriters to SDC underwriters by name,
taking into account name changes and M&A activities. The matching with SDC
allows us to disentangle IPOs and SEOs and to focus on IPOs that satisfy the
usual filters applied in the literature. This leaves us with 8,828 IPO-investor-broker
observations.
We identify and exclude duplicates. Duplicates arise when distinct N-SAR forms
report the same information about fund f receiving n shares in the IPO i from
broker b. This happens, for example, when an investment company reports the
same information both in the annual and semi-annual N-SAR filings (both NSAR-
B and NSAR-A).
Some 10(f)-3 attachments contain missing values. For example the amount of
shares allocated to affiliated funds is missing for about 5% of the observations,
before any cleaning. We use information from other filings to fill in some of these
missing values. For example, if the individual number of shares n of IPO i allocated
to the fund f affiliated to underwriter j is missing in a filing, but we observe the
total number of shares W allocated to the adviser of fund f , then, if other filings
report the individual number of shares m received by other funds with the same
adviser, we can find out n as: n = W −m. In this way, we reduce the percentage of
observations with missing allocations to about 1.5%. This implies that we slightly
underestimate the total percentage of shares allocated to affiliated funds at the IPO
level (AffiliatedAllocPerc). The allocation dummy (AffiliatedAllocDummy),
however, is not affected by this problem.
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Table 2. This table provides summary statistics at the issuer level for 1,086 eligible IPOs
(Panel A) and 208 non-eligible IPOs (Panel B). We define an IPO as “eligible” if it satisfies
these conditions: the issuer is at least three years old; the securities are issued under a firm-
commitment contract; there is more than one underwriter in the syndicate; at least one lead
underwriter has been involved in a 10(f)-3 transaction in our sample. IPO variables are defined




Underpricing 14.2 9.09 19.4
Age 22.9 11 27.7
Proceeds 219.1 117.3 266.2
Assets 1351.2 217.6 2372.7
Adjustment -1.59 0 13.3
GrossSpread 6.63 7 0.73
NumberLeadManagers 2.38 2 1.47
NumberSyndicateMembers 7.51 6 4.59
LengthIPOprocess 4.41 3.37 3.57
OnlyPrimaryShares 0.52 1 0.50
Nasdaq 0.61 1 0.49
Foreign 0.097 0 0.30
VentureCapitalBack 0.45 0 0.50
HighRankDummy 0.78 1 0.41
(B) Non-eligible IPOs
mean p50 sd
Underpricing 5.13 1.16 13.9
Age 11.1 5 22.5
Proceeds 86.7 48.2 112.3
Assets 1122.7 51.3 2455.2
Adjustment -4.49 0 11.2
GrossSpread 6.93 7 0.66
NumberLeadManagers 1.69 1 1.13
NumberSyndicateMembers 4.80 4 3.34
LengthIPOprocess 4.39 3.60 3.39
OnlyPrimaryShares 0.79 1 0.41
Nasdaq 0.75 1 0.43
Foreign 0.21 0 0.41
VentureCapitalBack 0.31 0 0.46
HighRankDummy 0.25 0 0.44
42
TABLES
Table 3. This table summarizes the allocation data at the issuer level for 1,086 eligi-
ble IPOs (Panel A) and 208 non-eligible IPOs (Panel B). AffiliatedAllocPerc is the per-
centage allocated to funds affiliated with the underwriters; AffiliatedAllocDummy is a
dummy variable identifying IPOs with at least one share allocated to affiliated funds; and




AffiliatedAllocPerc 1.44 0.12 2.36
AffiliatedAllocDummy 0.56 1 0.50
IndependentAllocPerc 18.3 16.1 13.3
(B) Non-eligible IPOs
mean p50 sd
AffiliatedAllocPerc 0.077 0 0.68
AffiliatedAllocDummy 0.082 0 0.27
IndependentAllocPerc 10.1 5.73 12.0
Table 4. List of the underwriters that are more active in the affiliated allocations market.
The table reports the number of eligible IPOs underwritten by each underwriter and the
number and percentage of IPOs in which each underwriter has allocated some shares to its
affiliated funds.
Underwriter IPOs underwritten IPOs allocated %
JP Morgan (JPM) 390 230 59.0%
Morgan Stanley & Co 307 116 37.8%
Merrill Lynch & Co Inc 234 112 47.9%
Goldman Sachs & Co 321 81 25.2%
Banc of America Securities LLC 196 78 39.8%
Wells Fargo 118 69 58.5%
Deutsche Bank Securities Corp 276 69 25.0%
Jefferies & Co Inc 182 60 33.0%
UBS Investment Bank 262 53 20.2%
Raymond James & Associates Inc 149 50 33.6%
Citigroup 226 43 19.0%
Needham & Co Inc 98 38 38.8%
Credit Suisse First Boston 352 32 9.1%
Wachovia Securities Inc 118 25 21.2%
Other 50 underwriters (average) 50.1 4.6 9.1%
43
TABLES
Table 5. Difference-of-means tests with unequal variances (Panel A) and difference-of-
proportions tests (Panel B) of IPO characteristics by affiliated allocation dummy. The sample
includes 1,086 eligible IPOs, 611 of which have some allocation to affiliated funds (i.e., they
are “Allocated”). IPO characteristics are defined in Table 1; IndependentAllocPerc is the
percentage of the issue allocated to funds not affiliated with the underwriters. Significance
levels are denoted as: * 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
(A) Difference-of-means tests
Allocated Not Allocated diff. t-stat
Underpricing 19.4 7.61 11.8∗∗∗ 10.9
Proceeds 302.0 112.5 189.5∗∗∗ 13.6
Assets 1661.0 952.6 708.4∗∗∗ 5.04
Adjustment 3.08 -7.59 10.7∗∗∗ 14.3
GrossSpread 6.49 6.82 -0.32∗∗∗ -7.78
Age 26.0 18.9 7.17∗∗∗ 4.43
NumberLeadManagers 2.72 1.94 0.78∗∗∗ 9.48
NumberSyndicateMembers 8.80 5.86 2.94∗∗∗ 11.6
LengthIPOprocess 4.44 4.37 0.066 0.30
IndependentAllocPerc 19.4 16.9 2.49∗∗∗ 3.08
(B) Difference-of-proportions tests
Allocated Not allocated diff. z-stat
OnlyPrimaryShares 0.42 0.64 -0.22∗∗∗ -7.44
Nasdaq 0.47 0.79 -0.33∗∗∗ -11.9
Foreign 0.092 0.10 -0.012 -0.63
VentureCapitalBack 0.40 0.51 -0.11∗∗∗ -3.47
HighRankDummy 0.92 0.60 0.33∗∗∗ 13.1
44
TABLES
Table 6. This table reports the results of the difference-of-means tests with unequal variances
of underpricing by the affiliated allocation dummy in different sub-periods (Panel A) and for
different underwriters (Panel B). In panel (A), the sample includes 1,086 eligible IPOs, 611
of which have some allocation to affiliated funds. In Panel (B), the sample includes the IPOs
underwritten by each of the 14 main underwriters (see Table 4), and the affiliated allocation
dummy is defined at the IPO-underwriter level. Significance levels are denoted as: * 0.1, **
0.05, *** 0.01.
(A) Difference of mean underpricing by sub-periods
Allocated Not allocated diff. t-stat
2001 17.0 10.9 6.11 1.48
2002 12.0 5.25 6.71 1.48
2003 16.7 9.52 7.18∗ 1.74
2004 20.5 5.73 14.8∗∗∗ 5.51
2005 14.8 7.08 7.73∗∗∗ 2.67
2006 19.6 5.97 13.6∗∗∗ 4.29
2007 25.8 6.46 19.4∗∗∗ 5.26
2008 16.4 2.64 13.8 1.27
2009 14.8 0.69 14.1∗∗∗ 3.39
2010 13.6 4.24 9.36∗∗∗ 2.74
2011 20.1 10.7 9.38∗ 1.77
2012 20.8 13.5 7.22 1.34
2013 26.4 14.5 11.9∗∗∗ 2.86
(B) Difference of mean underpricing by underwriters
Allocated Not allocated diff. t-stat
JP Morgan (JPM) 17.8 6.12 11.7∗∗∗ 6.53
Morgan Stanley & Co 24.0 11.4 12.6∗∗∗ 4.93
Merrill Lynch & Co Inc 24.2 6.23 18.0∗∗∗ 7.68
Goldman Sachs & Co 25.2 13.8 11.3∗∗∗ 3.93
Banc of America Securities LLC 19.6 7.02 12.6∗∗∗ 4.97
Deutsche Bank Securities Corp 24.0 8.29 15.7∗∗∗ 5.47
Wells Fargo 15.6 8.24 7.37∗∗ 2.30
Jefferies & Co Inc 20.0 10.6 9.42∗∗∗ 2.97
UBS Investment Bank 24.2 10.4 13.8∗∗∗ 4.19
Raymond James & Associates Inc 20.2 10.8 9.43∗∗∗ 2.79
Citigroup 13.0 11.9 1.02 0.38
Needham & Co Inc 27.1 11.1 16.0∗∗∗ 3.50
Credit Suisse First Boston 17.8 12.4 5.37∗ 1.71
Wachovia Securities Inc 24.0 11.6 12.4∗∗ 2.33
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Table 7. This table contains the second stage coefficients of a local 2SLS regression
of Underpricing on two measures of affiliated allocations instrumented by z, for different
values of the bandwidth h. The two measures are AffiliatedAllocPerc (Panel A) and
AffiliatedAllocDummy (Panel B). z is a dummy variable equal to one if Age ≥ 3 and
zero otherwise, x = Age − 3, and z x = z · x. Relevant statistics from the first stage regres-
sion (F , coefficient of z, t-stat of z, and R2) are also reported. All percentages and returns
are multiplied by 100. All non-dummy variables except Age are winsorized at the 95% level.
Heteroschedasticity-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted as:
* 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
(A)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
h=1 h=2 h=2 h=3 h=3 h=3
AffiliatedAllocPerc 6.72∗∗ 8.76∗∗∗ 5.28 10.4∗∗∗ 6.55∗ 5.43∗
(2.22) (3.12) (1.29) (3.59) (1.74) (1.90)




Constant 4.47∗∗∗ 3.73∗ 7.15∗ 1.49 5.01 7.64∗∗∗
(2.67) (1.90) (1.76) (0.58) (1.48) (2.67)
F (2nd stage) 4.93 9.76 6.47 12.9 9.76 7.23
F (1st stage) 10.0 24.6 12.2 23.0 12.8 14.4
Coefficient of z (1st stage) 1.53 1.28 1.79 1.13 1.59 1.64
t-stat of z (1st stage) 3.16 4.96 2.18 4.79 2.68 3.30
R2 (1st stage) 0.14 0.097 0.10 0.064 0.067 0.067
Observations 57 130 130 217 217 217
(B)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
h=1 h=2 h=2 h=3 h=3 h=3
AffiliatedAllocDummy 24.6∗∗ 28.5∗∗∗ 21.1 27.4∗∗∗ 29.0∗∗ 24.8∗∗
(2.66) (3.62) (1.47) (5.12) (2.00) (2.17)




Constant 1.72 0.91 3.88 0.51 -0.097 2.87
(0.74) (0.33) (0.69) (0.24) (-0.02) (0.69)
F (2nd stage) 7.05 13.1 7.82 26.3 12.7 9.11
F (1st stage) 13.1 28.0 13.9 55.6 28.2 18.9
Coefficient of z (1st stage) 0.42 0.39 0.45 0.43 0.36 0.36
t-stat of z (1st stage) 3.63 5.29 2.41 7.46 2.62 2.71
R2 (1st stage) 0.19 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16
Observations 57 130 130 217 217 217
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Table 8. This table contains the second stage coefficients of a local 2SLS regression of
Underpricing on two measures of affiliated allocations instrumented by z, for a bandwidth
h = 1, in a subsample of 33 IPOs whose exact age is known. The two measures are
AffiliatedAllocPerc (Panel A) and AffiliatedAllocDummy (Panel B). z is a dummy vari-
able equal to one if Age ≥ 3 and zero otherwise, x = Age − 3, and z x = z · x. Relevant
statistics from the first stage regression (F , coefficient of z, t-stat of z, and R2) are also re-
ported. All percentages and returns are multiplied by 100. All non-dummy variables except
Age are winsorized at the 95% level. Heteroschedasticity-robust t-statistics are in parentheses.
Significance levels are denoted as: * 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
(A)
(1) (2) (3)






Constant 7.65∗∗ 9.81∗ 9.80
(2.05) (1.78) (0.77)
F (2nd stage) 2.96 1.66 1.46
F (1st stage) 10.8 6.46 4.97
Coefficient of z (1st stage) 2.08 4.03 2.98
t-stat of z (1st stage) 3.29 1.76 2.05
R2 (1st stage) 0.15 0.20 0.21
Observations 33 33 33
(B)
(1) (2) (3)






Constant 5.70 1.20 -1.50
(1.30) (0.08) (-0.05)
F (2nd stage) 3.88 1.48 1.35
F (1st stage) 10.3 5.18 7.21
Coefficient of z (1st stage) 0.45 0.38 0.25
t-stat of z (1st stage) 3.21 1.14 0.73
R2 (1st stage) 0.19 0.19 0.20
Observations 33 33 33
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Table 9. This table contains the second stage coefficients of a local 2SLS regression of
Underpricing on two measures of lead managers’ affiliated allocations instrumented by z, for
different values of the bandwidth h. The two measures are AffiliatedAllocPerc (Panel A)
and AffiliatedAllocDummy (Panel B). z is a dummy variable equal to one if Age ≥ 3 and
zero otherwise, x = Age−3, and z x = z ·x. Relevant statistics from the first stage regression
(F , coefficient of z, t-stat of z, and R2) are also reported. All percentages and returns are
multiplied by 100. All non-dummy variables except Age are winsorized at the 95% level.
Heteroschedasticity-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted as:
* 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
(A)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
h=1 h=2 h=2 h=3 h=3 h=3
AffiliatedAllocPerc 10.9∗∗ 15.3∗∗∗ 8.11 20.1∗∗∗ 9.94∗ 8.53∗
(2.17) (2.80) (1.31) (2.90) (1.73) (1.83)




Constant 4.63∗∗∗ 3.74∗ 7.77∗∗ 0.85 5.96∗∗ 8.01∗∗∗
(2.67) (1.87) (2.09) (0.25) (2.06) (2.72)
F (2nd stage) 4.69 7.84 6.28 8.41 9.17 6.81
F (1st stage) 7.18 14.9 7.42 11.6 7.14 8.29
Coefficient of z (1st stage) 0.95 0.74 1.17 0.58 1.05 1.04
t-stat of z (1st stage) 2.68 3.86 1.94 3.41 2.42 2.87
R2 (1st stage) 0.11 0.061 0.066 0.034 0.040 0.040
Observations 57 130 130 217 217 217
(B)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
h=1 h=2 h=2 h=3 h=3 h=3
AffiliatedAllocDummy 28.9∗∗∗ 35.3∗∗∗ 23.7 37.3∗∗∗ 30.2∗∗ 27.3∗∗
(2.72) (3.59) (1.54) (4.68) (2.07) (2.17)




Constant 2.15 1.56 5.11 0.44 2.44 4.15
(0.92) (0.59) (1.10) (0.19) (0.59) (1.09)
F (2nd stage) 7.39 12.9 8.25 21.9 12.7 8.90
F (1st stage) 10.2 21.6 10.7 34.3 17.1 11.4
Coefficient of z (1st stage) 0.36 0.32 0.40 0.32 0.34 0.33
t-stat of z (1st stage) 3.19 4.65 2.21 5.86 2.59 2.63
R2 (1st stage) 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.097 0.097 0.098
Observations 57 130 130 217 217 217
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Table 10. This table contains the coefficient estimates from several specifications of an OLS
regression of Underpricing on two measures of affiliated allocations: a dummy variable that
identifies IPOs with affiliated allocations (columns 1-5) and the percentage of the issue allo-
cated to affiliated funds (columns 6-10). The sample includes 1086 eligible IPOs in the period
2001-2013. Columns 2, 3, 7 and 8 introduce IPO level control variables, as defined in section
3. Columns 4 and 9 introduce year and industry fixed effects. Columns 5 and 10 introduce
lead underwriters’ control variables. All percentages and returns are multiplied by 100. All
non-dummy variables except Age are winsorized at the 95% level. Heteroschedasticity-robust
t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted as: * 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
AffiliatedAllocDummy 11.0∗∗∗ 6.94∗∗∗ 6.54∗∗∗ 6.28∗∗∗ 6.50∗∗∗
(10.30) (6.11) (5.45) (5.15) (5.15)
AffiliatedAllocPerc 0.99∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗ 0.67∗∗
(3.48) (3.31) (2.80) (2.44) (2.52)
IndependentAllocPerc 0.30∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
(6.50) (5.18) (4.71) (4.44) (3.93) (7.21) (5.55) (4.98) (4.59) (4.03)
ln(Age+1) -1.64∗∗∗ -1.13∗ -1.70∗∗∗ -1.60∗∗ -1.65∗∗∗ -1.08∗ -1.61∗∗ -1.48∗∗
(-2.86) (-1.91) (-2.64) (-2.44) (-2.88) (-1.83) (-2.51) (-2.25)
ln(Assets) -1.55∗∗∗ -0.68 -0.94 -0.90 -1.45∗∗∗ -0.78 -1.06 -1.07
(-3.91) (-1.10) (-1.43) (-1.30) (-3.54) (-1.26) (-1.60) (-1.54)
Adjustment 0.63∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗
(15.91) (14.12) (12.70) (11.92) (18.46) (15.95) (14.38) (13.60)
OnlyPrimaryShares -0.91 -1.23 -0.32 -0.33 -1.59 -1.76∗ -0.79 -0.80
(-0.93) (-1.26) (-0.31) (-0.31) (-1.62) (-1.80) (-0.78) (-0.75)
Nasdaq 1.43 1.17 1.85 2.05 0.38 0.43 1.21 1.39
(1.09) (0.89) (1.42) (1.51) (0.30) (0.33) (0.94) (1.04)
Foreign 0.88 0.17 -0.080 -0.034 1.07 0.29 -0.0047 0.11
(0.54) (0.11) (-0.05) (-0.02) (0.64) (0.17) (-0.00) (0.06)
ln(Proceeds) -0.33 0.45 0.27 0.28 1.15 0.91
(-0.23) (0.31) (0.17) (0.20) (0.79) (0.58)
VentureCapitalBack 3.52∗∗ 4.98∗∗∗ 5.19∗∗∗ 3.49∗∗ 4.98∗∗∗ 5.20∗∗∗
(2.49) (3.48) (3.44) (2.47) (3.49) (3.45)
LengthIPOprocess -0.39∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗ -0.29∗∗ -0.38∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗ -0.28∗∗
(-3.09) (-2.19) (-2.21) (-2.96) (-2.09) (-2.10)
HighRankDummy 0.87 1.11 2.01 2.01 2.29∗ 2.89∗
(0.66) (0.82) (1.17) (1.51) (1.68) (1.68)
NumberLeadManagers 0.40 -0.34 1.89 0.38 -0.33 1.48
(1.02) (-0.73) (1.26) (0.95) (-0.71) (0.98)
NumberSyndicateMembers -0.028 0.12 0.10 0.0067 0.12 0.11
(-0.22) (0.77) (0.63) (0.05) (0.75) (0.66)
GrossSpread 1.65∗ 1.74∗ 1.61 2.17∗∗ 2.20∗∗ 2.08∗
(1.71) (1.77) (1.43) (2.27) (2.26) (1.89)
Constant 2.63∗∗∗ 19.8∗∗∗ 3.97 8.67 9.33 6.66∗∗∗ 22.8∗∗∗ 0.057 5.26 6.49
(2.81) (6.36) (0.38) (0.78) (0.73) (6.67) (7.27) (0.01) (0.48) (0.52)
industry FE No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
year FE No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
underwriter FE No No No No Yes No No No No Yes
R2 0.131 0.342 0.354 0.393 0.408 0.067 0.328 0.343 0.383 0.397
F 86.7 64.8 36.4 16.7 9.99 32.4 60.9 34.4 15.9 9.47
Observations 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086 1086
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Table 11. This table contains the coefficient estimates from several specifications of an
OLS regression of Underpricing on its determinants in two subsamples. For each IPO, we
compute a measure of the abnormal number of IPOs completed by its underwriters. We split
the sample into terciles based on this measure. Regression results are reported for the top
tercile (“High”) and the bottom tercile (“Low”). The sample includes IPOs performed in
the period 2001-2013. All percentages and returns are multiplied by 100. All non-dummy
variables except Age are winsorized at the 95% level. Heteroschedasticity-robust t-statistics
are in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted as: * 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
Low number of IPOs High number of IPOs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AffiliatedAllocPerc 0.32 0.15 -0.15 1.20∗∗ 0.87∗∗ 1.08∗∗
(0.69) (0.33) (-0.31) (2.33) (2.14) (2.39)
IndependentAllocPerc 0.32∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(4.26) (2.97) (2.51) (4.82) (4.09) (2.89)
IPO controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
industry FE No No Yes No No Yes
year FE No No Yes No No Yes
underwriter FE No No Yes No No Yes
R2 0.054 0.357 0.456 0.087 0.381 0.469
F 9.46 13.6 5.90 13.7 13.3 5.91
Observations 362 362 362 362 362 362
Table 12. This table contains the coefficient estimates from several specifications of an OLS
regression of Underpricing on its determinants in two subsamples. For each IPO, we compute
a measure of abnormal brokerage commissions received by its underwriters from institutional
investors in a 10-day window before the IPO. We split the sample into terciles based on this
measure. Regression results are reported for the top tercile (“High”) and the bottom tercile
(“Low”). The sample includes IPOs performed in the sub-period 2001-2010. All percentages
and returns are multiplied by 100. All non-dummy variables except Age are winsorized at the
95% level. Heteroschedasticity-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels are
denoted as: * 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
Low commissions High commissions
from institutional investors from institutional investors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AffiliatedAllocPerc 2.10∗∗∗ 1.45∗∗ 1.71∗∗ 0.90∗∗ 0.62∗ 0.79∗
(3.11) (2.04) (2.30) (1.99) (1.67) (1.95)
IndependentAllocPerc 0.080 0.027 0.088 0.26∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
(0.84) (0.35) (1.05) (2.56) (2.82) (2.95)
IPO controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
industry FE No No Yes No No Yes
year FE No No Yes No No Yes
underwriter FE No No Yes No No Yes
R2 0.053 0.425 0.499 0.038 0.349 0.445
F 5.31 10.4 5.13 4.85 8.59 3.98
Observations 246 246 246 245 245 245
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Table 13. This table contains the coefficient estimates from several specifications of an OLS
regression of Underpricing on its determinants in two subsamples. We split the sample into
terciles based on ln(Assets). Regression results are reported for the top tercile (“Large”)
and the bottom tercile (“Small”). The sample includes IPOs performed in the period 2001-
2013. All percentages and returns are multiplied by 100. All non-dummy variables except
Age are winsorized at the 95% level. Heteroschedasticity-robust t-statistics are in parentheses.
Significance levels are denoted as: * 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
Small firm size Large firm size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AffiliatedAllocPerc 1.15 -0.21 -0.22 1.12∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗
(1.59) (-0.39) (-0.36) (3.35) (2.86) (2.27)
IndependentAllocPerc 0.35∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.17∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.051
(4.14) (2.65) (1.95) (2.34) (2.02) (0.70)
IPO controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
industry FE No No Yes No No Yes
year FE No No Yes No No Yes
underwriter FE No No Yes No No Yes
R2 0.058 0.389 0.486 0.056 0.336 0.403
F 10.7 15.5 7.70 8.97 11.9 4.48
Observations 362 362 362 362 362 362
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Figure 2. This figure shows the affiliated and independent allocations from 2001 to 2013
of 1,086 eligible IPOs. Panel (A) plots the number and the percentage of IPOs that involve
at least one affiliated transaction, and the number of IPOs with no affiliated allocations.
Panel (B) plots the average percentage of the issue allocated to affiliated funds, the average
percentage of the issue allocated to independent funds, and the average percentage of the issue
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Average % of the issue allocated to independent funds
Average % of the issue allocated to affiliated funds
Average % of the issue allocated to affiliated funds (conditional)
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FIGURES
Figure 3. A visual and intuitive representation of our identification strategy.
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Figure 4. This figure plots average treatments by forcing variable. We compute the average
AffiliatedAllocDummy (Panel A and B) and AffiliatedAllocPerc (Panel C and D) for
each age group (bin) of one-year size. Fitted values come from a linear fit on both sides of
the three-year cutoff in panels (A) and (C); they come from a linear fit for Age < 3 and a
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Age bins
Figure 5. This figure plots the average outcome by forcing variable. We compute average
Underpricing for each age group (bin) of one-year size. Fitted values come from a linear fit
on both sides of the three-year cutoff in panel (A); they come from a linear fit for Age < 3






































Figure 6. This figure plots the number of IPOs (Panel A) and the average length of the
IPO process (Panel B) by forcing variable. Panel (A) reports the histogram and its smoothed
values from a kernel-weighted polynomial regression with epanechnikov kernel. In Panel (B),
we compute average LengthIPOprocess for each age group (bin) of one-year size. Fitted
values come from a linear fit for Age < 3 and a quadratic fit for 3 ≤ Age ≤ 25. 95%




































Figure 7. This figure plots the number of IPOs underwritten by the most important under-
writers by age groups (bins) of one-year size. All sub-figures report histograms and smoothed
values from kernel-weighted polynomial regressions with epanechnikov kernel. 95% confidence











































































































































































































Figure 8. This figure plots average covariates by forcing variable. We compute the average
value of each control variable by age groups (bins) of one-year size. Fitted values come from
a linear fit for Age < 3 and a quadratic fit for 3 ≤ Age ≤ 25. 95% confidence intervals are
































































































































































































































Figure 9. This figure plots the average outcome by forcing variable for non-eligible IPOs.
We compute average Underpricing for each age group (bin) of one-year size. Fitted values
come from a linear fit on both sides of the three-year cutoff in panel (A); they come from
a linear fit for Age < 3 and a quadratic fit for 3 ≤ Age ≤ 25 in panel (B). 95% confidence
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Age bins
Figure 10. This figure plots the average outcome by forcing variable for a sample of 488
European IPOs performed in the period 2001-2013. We compute average Underpricing for
each age group (bin) of one-year size. Fitted values come from a linear fit on both sides of the
three-year cutoff in panel (A); they come from a linear fit for Age < 3 and a quadratic fit for



































Figure 11. This figure plots the average outcome by forcing variable for arbitrary thresholds.
In Panel (A), the arbitrary threshold is the median value of the forcing variable, conditional on
the forcing variable being higher than the cutoff. In Panel (B), the arbitrary threshold is the
25th percentile of the forcing variable, conditional on the forcing variable being higher than
the cutoff. In Panel (C), the arbitrary threshold is the 75th percentile of the forcing variable,
conditional on the forcing variable being higher than the cutoff. Fitted values come from a
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Figure 12. An example of a 10(f)-3 attachment to the N-SAR form
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Do institutional investors play hide-and-sell in the IPO
aftermarket?∗
Tamara Nefedova† and Giuseppe Pratobevera‡
Abstract
We document a robust buy/sell asymmetry in the choice of the broker in
the IPO aftermarket: institutional investors are less likely to sell than buy
through the lead underwriters in a sample of IPOs issued between 1999 and
2010 in the United States. Consistent with investors hiding their sell trades,
the asymmetry is the strongest in cold IPOs and it is limited exclusively to
the first month after the issue. The asymmetry survives when we control for
any unobserved institution, IPO, and institution-IPO specific characteristics,
including any relationship between institutional investors and underwriters.
Contrary to the conventional view, the intention to flip IPO allocations is not an
important motive for hiding sell trades from the lead underwriters; institutions
that sell shares through non-lead brokers tend to have bought them through the
lead underwriters in the IPO aftermarket, consistent with institutions breaking
their laddering agreements.
∗We thank Franc¸ois Degeorge and Laurent Fre´sard for useful comments. We thank Jay Ritter
for making IPO data available on his website. All errors and omissions are our own.
†Universite´ Paris-Dauphine. E-mail: tamara.nefedova@dauphine.fr





Despite considerable research on the conflicts of interest in initial public offerings,
there is little evidence describing moral hazard problems faced by IPO investors.
This topic deserves attention because investors’ behavior may ultimately affect the
benefits and the costs of the bookbuilding method. In particular, we are interested
if the IPO mechanism in place motivates the choice of the broker(s) to which in-
vestors direct their trades in the IPO aftermarket. We hypothesize that the IPO
bookbuilding method provides incentives to investors to avoid lead underwriters for
their sell trades in the IPO stocks in the early aftermarket.
Institutional investors may have an incentive to hide their sell trades from the
lead underwriters in the IPO aftermarket (we call it “hide-and-sell” hypothesis) for
two main reasons. First, investors might try to hide their allocations sales in order
to preserve their business with the lead underwriters in the IPO allocations market.
A key feature of book-built IPOs is that the investment banks that underwrite the
issue have considerable discretion over who receives allocations. As explained by
Jenkinson and Jones (2004), one of the popular justifications for such discretion,
often emphasized by investment bankers, is that underwriters can allocate shares to
long-term holders of the stock in the interests of the issuer. Investors that readily
sell their allocations in the IPO aftermarket, commonly referred to as “flippers”,
tend to put a downward pressure on the trading price. While this might not be a
relevant concern in hot IPOs, where flipping may serve to increase market liquidity,
the selling pressure generated by flippers could lower the price below the offer price
in cold offerings (Aggarwal (2003)). Underwriters may find it convenient to reward
institutions that play a supportive role and do not flip their allocations, as they
play a role as market makers in the secondary market (Ellis et al. (2000)), and they
may face reputational losses in case of poor aftermarket performance and too much
flipping activity (Aggarwal (2003)). Consistent with this view, Chemmanur et al.
(2010) find that investors receive larger allocations when they hold their allocations
for longer periods. This gives investors an incentive to hide their allocation sales
from the lead underwriters. We label this incentive as the “flipping hiding motive”.
Some existing studies suggest that investors may try to hide their allocation sales
in post-IPO trading (Griffin et al. (2007), Chemmanur et al. (2010)).
The second reason for hiding sell trades from the lead underwriters is related
to a practice known as “laddering”, which involves a quid-pro-quo arrangement be-
tween underwriters and their clients: investors receive IPO allocations in exchange
for a committment to purchase additional shares in the aftermarket. The clients
that enter in such an agreement are called “ladderers”. As explained by Hao (2007)
and Griffin et al. (2007), laddering could be beneficial for the lead underwriters as
the buying pressure from ladderers could reduce the underwriters’ price support
costs in the IPO aftermarket, especially in cold IPOs. Moreover, the pre-arranged
client demand in the aftermarket may increase underwriters’ brokerage commission
revenues. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) considers laddering as
a manipulative practice prohibited by Rule 101 of Regulation M under the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934. However, the legal definition of laddering requires the
aftermarket purchase to be a condition imposed by the underwriter, thus leaving
some space for implicit quid-pro-quo arrangements in which investors volunteers to
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buy additional shares (Hao (2007)). Consistent with lead underwriters engaging in
laddering agreements with their clients, Griffin et al. (2007) find that investors are
net buyers through the lead underwriters in a sample of Nasdaq IPOs. We posit
that ladderers may have an incentive to break their quid-pro-quo arrangements if
the shares that they committed to buy in the secondary market are in excess of
their optimal holdings in the IPO firm. The potential costs for the investors that
break the agreement, in terms of future business with the underwriters, may in-
centivize them to hide their sell trades. We label the incentive to hide sell trades
that break investors’ laddering agreements with the lead underwriters as “ladder-
ing hiding motive”. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to document
that laddering mechanism may provide an incentive for the investor to avoid the
underwriting brokers when selling the IPO stock in the aftermarket.
The hiding strategy that we consider in this paper is to sell IPO shares through
brokers other than the lead underwriters (henceforth, “non-lead brokers”). We mo-
tivate our focus on this hiding strategy because of its simplicity of execution, as
institutional investors usually trade through more than one brokerage house (Gold-
stein et al. (2009)). If the hide-and-sell hypothesis holds and investors use this simple
hiding strategy, then we should observe them to be less likely to trade through the
lead underwriters when they sell than when they purchase shares in the IPO after-
market. We directly test this prediction using detailed institutional trading data,
which allow us to control for important variables that may affect both the selling
decision and choice of the broker, such as the relationship between the institution
and the lead underwriters or any other institution-IPO specific characteristic. To
the best of our knowledge, we are the first to directly test this prediction. Our
analyses document a robust buy/sell asymmetry in the choice of the broker in the
IPO aftermarket: institutional investors are significantly less likely to sell than buy
through the lead underwriters during the first month of trading after the IPO.
We consider two factors that may affect the hiding incentives of financial institu-
tions. First, if the buy/sell asymmetry is driven by hiding incentives, then it should
be the strongest in cold IPOs: both the “flipping hiding motive” and the “ladder-
ing hiding motive” predict the lead underwriters to be concerned the most about
investors’ selling activity in weak offerings. Second, if the buy/sell asymmetry is
driven by hiding incentives, then we should not be able to detect it when there are
no incentives to hide stock sales from the lead underwriters. We perform placebo
tests to show that the buy/sell asymmetry disappears after few months from the
issue date and in a matched sample of non-IPO stocks. Overall, our evidence is
consistent with the predictions of the hide-and-sell hypothesis.
The buy/sell asymmetry may be driven by both the “flipping hiding motive” and
the novel “laddering hiding motive”. Our data and methodology allow us to disen-
tangle allocation sales from investors’ buying and selling activity in the secondary
market. Hence, we can investigate the reasons behind institutions’ hiding behavior,
in order to understand whether it is driven by flipping or laddering motives.
We argue that the “flipping hiding motive” might be overall weak in the United
States because underwriters receive reports documenting the allocation sales of
their customers. Flipping of shares is tracked via the Depository Trust Company’s
(DTC) IPO Tracking System and the lead underwriters receive two types of reports
(Aggarwal (2003)). The first report provides them with client-level information
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about the flipping activity of the investors to whom they allocated IPO shares. The
second report provides them with information about the aggregate flipping activity
for each syndicate member, but this does not include client-level details. Therefore,
lead underwriters can detect which one of their clients sold its allocations, but do
not have direct access to the identity of flippers that received their allocations from
other syndicate members. Consequently, investors that received IPO shares from
other syndicate members have some chances to hide their flipping activity from the
lead underwriters by avoiding selling through them. Morevover, flipping reports are
not flawless and there is anecdotal evidence of institutional investors circumventing
the DTC IPO Tracking System.1 Though imperfect, the DTC IPO Tracking System
dampens the scope for hiding flipping trades. The risk of being caught by the lead
underwriters might not be zero even for other syndicate members’ clients, as lead
underwriters could exploit their relationship with the other syndicate members or
use allocations and aggregate flipping data to infer flippers’ identities. Since a great
portion of the IPO shares are underwritten by the lead managers (Corwin and
Schultz (2005)), the incentive to hide allocations sales might be overall weak.
On the contrary, the hiding technology that we investigate in this paper, that
is, selling IPO shares through non-lead brokers, might allow investors to break their
laddering agreements without being caught by the lead underwriters. Ladderers
may purchase the shares that they committed to buy through the lead underwriters
and then sell the shares in excess of their optimal holdings through any other broker.
Since these stock sales (henceforth, “other sales” or “other sell trades” or “secondary
sales”) do not involve allocation sales, they are not detected by the DTC IPO
Tracking System and leave scope for hiding them.
We disentagle allocation sales from other sales and, consistent with the above
arguments and contrary to the conventional view, we find that flipping is not a
relevant hiding motive: the buy/sell asymmetry is mainly driven by sell trades other
than allocation sales. Furthermore, we investigate other predictions of the novel
laddering hiding motive. First, if investors break their laddering agreements, then
it has to be the case that they sell the shares that they committed to buy through
the lead underwriters. Second, if investors hide the breaking of the agreement
and use the simple hiding technology considered in this paper, then they should
tend to execute a higher proportion of their sell trades through non-lead brokers
when they buy shares through the lead underwriters and when they sell secondary
shares. Third, investors that buy through the lead underwriters in the aftermarket
and want to hide their secondary sales, should avoid allocation sales. Because of
flipping reports, allocation sales signal to the underwriters that an investor sold more
shares than it bought in the aftermarket, meaning that it sold also secondary shares.
These three arguments predict a positive correlation between the proportion of sell
trades executed through non-lead brokers, the volume of shares bought through
the lead underwriters, and the volume of other sales, and a negative correlation
between the volume of shares bought through the lead underwriters and the volume
of shares flipped. Overall, we find evidence consistent with these predictions and
with financial institutions breaking their laddering agreements.
The idea that investors may hide their sell trades is not new, even though the
1Griffin et al. (2007) report that “in March 2005, the NASD fined Spear, Leeds and Kellogg $1
million for concealing IPO shares from the DTC system from August 1997 to January 2001”.
63
1 INTRODUCTION
literature has exclusively framed it within the flipping hiding motive. Some existing
studies suggest that investors might try to hide their allocation sales from the lead
underwriters in the IPO aftermarket. For example, Griffin et al. (2007) find that
investors are overall net sellers through brokers that do not belong to the syndicate
group and net buyers through the lead underwriters during the first month after
the issue. Using institutional trading data, Chemmanur et al. (2010) finds that
institutional investors abnormally split their orders in the IPO aftermarket and
suggest that it might be an attempt to hide flipping trades. In both papers, the
idea is that flippers would like to hide their allocations sales in order to preserve
their business with the lead underwriters in subsequent IPOs.
Though suggestive and relevant, the existing evidence is far from being conclu-
sive. Investors could split their orders or sell through non-lead brokers for reasons
other than hiding. For example, they could split their trades in order to generate a
stream of abnormal commissions to the lead underwriters as a reward for receiving
IPO allocations (Reuter (2006), Nimalendran et al. (2007), Goldstein et al. (2011),
and Jenkinson et al. (2017)). The difference in net buy between lead underwriters’
clients and non-lead brokers’ clients might be driven by the characteristics of the
trading institutions, such as their relationship with the lead underwriters. Since
institutional investors tend to keep stable relationships with their brokers (Gold-
stein et al. (2009)), institutions that are usual underwriters’ clients are more likely
to trade with them in the IPO aftermarket. In order to preserve this relationship,
they may also be more likely to support IPO prices by buying or avoiding to sell in
the secondary market. On the contrary, institutions that are not usual underwriters’
clients are more likely to trade with their own usual brokers in the IPO aftermarket
and may also be more likely to sell IPO stocks. Moreover, the existence of flipping
reports dampens the scope for hiding allocations sales through any trading strategy
in the aftermarket. Whether, to what extent, and why hiding behavior is at place
are, therefore, open questions and the aim of this paper is to shed light on them.
Our findings contribute two streams of research. First, our paper is related to
an extensive literature that investigates the benefits and costs of the bookbuilding
method of bringing companies public. While underwriters’ discretion may have the
benefits of incentivizing investors’ information production (Benveniste and Spindt
(1989), Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990), Sherman (2000), Cornelli and Goldreich
(2001), and Sherman and Titman (2002)) and of placing allocations in the hands
of long-term investors (Aggarwal (2003), Jenkinson and Jones (2004), Jenkinson
and Jones (2009), and Chemmanur et al. (2010)), an increasing body of research
unravels the conflicts of interest inherent to the bookbuilding method (Loughran
and Ritter (2004), Reuter (2006), Griffin et al. (2007), Hao (2007), Nimalendran
et al. (2007), Ritter and Zhang (2007), Jenkinson and Jones (2009), Liu and Ritter
(2010), Goldstein et al. (2011), Ritter (2011), and Jenkinson et al. (2017)).2 As the
existing literature mainly focuses on the conflicts of interest between underwriters
and issuers, we enrich it by investigating a so far overlooked moral hazard problem
faced by investors. Our findings suggest that investors’ hiding behavior may affect
the potential benefits and costs of underwriters’ discretion and stimulate further
research to study the incentives of IPO investors.
2See Lowry et al. (2017) for a recent comprehensive survey of the IPO literature.
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Second, we shed light on the determinants of the choice of the broker by financial
institutions. Our findings are consistent with models in which investors face a trade-
off between preserving long-term relationships with brokers that give them access
to premium services and the need to hide their trading strategies (Goldstein et al.
(2009)). We find a clear persistence in the choice of the broker, which is not much
affected by trading costs motives and depends strongly on the long-term relationship
between institutions and their brokers. However, we show how hiding incentives
affect the choice of the broker in the context of IPOs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our sample
selection criteria, defines the main variables used in our analyses, and provides
summary statistics. Section 3 presents our baseline results and documents that
institutions are less likely to trade through the lead underwriters when they sell than
when they buy shares in the IPO aftermarket, especially in cold IPOs, consistent
with the hide-and-sell hypothesis. Morever, it performs placebo analyses to check
that this behavior is not present when there are no hiding incentives. Section 4
rules out potential alternative explanations, addresses endogeneity problems, and
performs several robustness checks. Section 5 investigates the motives and drivers
of institutions’ hiding behavior. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Data and summary statistics
2.1 IPO data
We use the Thomson Financial Security Data Company (SDC) database to identify
IPOs made in the United States from 1999 to 2010.3 We exclude all American
Depository Receipts (ADRs), Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), unit and
rights offerings, closed-end funds, IPOs with SIC codes between 6000 and 6199 and
IPOs with offer price smaller than $5. Moreover, we require IPOs to have a match
with the Center for Research in Security Prices database (CRSP) within seven
calendar days from the issue. These filters leave us with 1,439 IPOs. In addition,
we require IPOs to have a CUSIP match with the ANcerno/Abel Noser Solutions
database, which provides us with detailed institutional trading data. We describe
ANcerno trading data in the next subsection. This criterion leads us to drop 51
IPOs. Moreover, we drop three IPO firms that show inconsistent data: these firms
show trading activity in the ANcerno database before the IPO date. Finally, we
require at least one lead underwriter of each IPO to be matched with a broker of
the Abel Noser Solutions database. This filter leaves out 24 firms. Our final sample
consists of 1,361 IPOs involving 89 different lead underwriters. The number of IPOs
varies considerably by year, ranging from 14 in 2008 to 373 in 1999.
By matching SDC and CRSP, we get the percentage return from the IPO offer
price to the first day closing price (Underpricing) and we winsorize it at the 95%
level. The average underpricing in our sample is 37.6% and the median is 14.8%.
Since the hide-and-sell hypothesis depends on underpricing, we split our sample in
terciles based on this variable. We define an IPO as “hot” if it is in the highest
3We clean the database from known mistakes by manually applying the corrections listed,
as of April 2014, on the IPO database managed by Jay R. Ritter at the University of Florida:
https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/.
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tercile (Underpricing > 29.4% ), “weak” if it is in the middle tercile (5.1% >
Underpricing ≤ 29.4%), and “cold” if it is in the lowest tercile (Underpricing ≤
5.1%).
2.2 Institutional trading data in the IPO aftermarket
We obtain institutional trading data for our sample of 1,361 IPOs from the AN-
cerno/Abel Noser Solutions database. The IPO trading data covers the period from
January 1999 to March 2011. For each trade placed by an institution, we get the
following information: the name and the identity code (“managercode”) of the insti-
tution, the name and the identity code (“brokercode”) of the broker executing the
trade, the trading date, the CUSIP of the stock traded, the number of shares traded,
a variable identifying the side of the trade (buy or sell), the execution price, and
the commissions paid. The reader may refer to the data appendix for the detailed
description of the database.
We require trades to have non-missing managercodes and brokercodes, and to
be sent to ANcerno by pension plan sponsors or money managers.4 We match the
Abel Noser Solutions database to the Thomson Reuters Institutional 13F Holdings
database by institution names. We require institutions to have a match with 13F. A
description of the matching procedure across several databases is provided in Figure
5 of the data appendix.
Summary statistics for more than 1.2 million institutional trades during the first
year after the issue date are presented in Table 1.5 The trades in the sample are
placed by 227 different institutions of Abel Noser Solutions and are executed by 700
different brokers. The average trade involves 6565 shares. 8.2 billion IPO shares are
traded during the first year from the issue, for a total value of 251.9 billion dollars.
Lead underwriters have a large weight in the brokerage market of IPO stocks: during
the first month after the IPO date, 40.4% of the IPO shares are traded through the
lead underwriters. The percentage decreases in subsequent months to about 15%.
The brokerage market shares of brokers that did not participate in the underwriting
syndicate (henceforth, “other brokers”) shows the opposite pattern: it is 52.4%
during the first month after the IPO date and it increases in subsequent months to
about 70%.
[Table 1 about here.]
The hide-and-sell hypothesis predicts that institutions’ decision to trade with
the lead underwriters depend on the side of their trade. Figure 1 breaks down the
brokerage market shares of the lead underwriters for buying trades (black lines)
and selling trades (light grey lines). For each IPO, we compute the percentage
volume of institutional buy and sell trades executed by the lead underwriters and
other brokers in each month from the IPO date. Then we average these percentages
across IPOs and compute 95% confidence intervals around the means. Panel (A)
shows that the weight in the brokerage market of the lead underwriters during the
first month after the IPO date differs significantly depending on the trade side: it is
4This means that we require trades to have client-type code equal to 1 or 2. We exclude the
relatively small amount of trades sent to ANcerno by brokers.
5Results are very similar if we exclude IPOs issued after March 2010.
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almost 40% for buy trades and it is below 30% for sell trades, consistent with hiding
behavior.6 The market share of buy and sell trades becomes undistinguishable after
the first month, consistent with hiding incentives being at place only during the
first month of trading. Panels (B)-(D) break down the brokerage market share by
underpricing terciles. We notice that the difference between buy and sell trades is
mainly driven by cold IPOs, consistent with hiding incentives being stronger in cold
IPOs.
[Figure 1 about here.]
In the rest of the paper, we aggregate Abel Noser Solutions’ trade volumes at the
daily level. Thus, our trading dataset comprises observations at the IPO-institution-
broker-day level. Henceforth, with the word “trade” we mean “daily trade”. The
daily level of aggregation allows us to neglet intra-day trading decisions, which
might involve several factors unrelated to our subject of study, such as institutions’
churning shares to generate commissions to the lead underwriters (Goldstein et al.
(2011)). Morevover, it allows us to avoid complications related to the intra-day
trading time reported by the Abel Noser Solutions database. Figure 2 focuses
on the first 21 trading days after the IPO. For each IPO, we compute the total
amount bought and sold in each day by institutions that trade through the lead
underwriters, through other syndicate members, and through brokers that did not
participate in the IPO syndicate (bars). We also compute the cumulative netbuy
of lead managers’ clients, syndicate members’ clients, and other brokers’ clients
(lines). The volume traded is scaled by the number of shares issued and it is
averaged across IPOs. Panel (A) plots buy, sell, and cumulative netbuy volumes
for all sample IPOs. Broadly consistent with the existing literature (Griffin et al.
(2007), we see that institutions are net buyers through lead managers and syndicate
members and net sellers through other brokers in the first few trading days after
the IPO. Moreover, the daily volume sold tends to be larger through other brokers
than through the lead underwriters; on the contrary, the daily volume bought tends
to be larger through the lead underwriters than through other brokers. Finally, the
difference in net buy between lead underwriters’ clients and other brokers’ clients
is greater in cold IPOs. This is broadly consistent with hiding behavior.
[Figure 2 about here.]
The aggregate graphical evidence presented in this section suggests that some
hiding behavior might be at place, but it is far from being conclusive. For ex-
ample, the difference between buy and sell trades might be driven by institutions
characteristics affecting both the decision to sell and the decision to trade with the
lead underwriters, without any hiding behavior being at place. Institutions that
decide to buy IPO shares and support the price of cold IPOs might be usual lead
underwriters’ clients; therefore, they might also tend to trade more through lead
underwriters in the IPO aftermarket. Institutions that decide to sell IPO shares
migth not be usual lead underwriters’ clients; therefore, they might also tend to
6These numbers are slightly different from those in Table 1 because Figure 1 computes the
average broker market shares in IPOs, while Table 1 computes brokerage market shares in the IPO
aftermarket for IPOs as a whole.
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trade more through their usual brokers in the IPO aftermarket. Our institution-
level analysis of section 3 sheds light on these issues and directly tests the predictions
of the hide-and-sell hypothesis.
2.3 Identifying institutional IPO allocations sales
We identify institutional IPO allocations sales following the algorithm proposed by
Chemmanur et al. (2010), which is consistent with the Depository Trust Company’s
(DTC) IPO Tracking System. The objective is to disentangle an institution’s allo-
cations sales from its buying and selling activity in the IPO aftermarket. In order to
do so, we classify as IPO allocation sales only those shares that are sold in excess of
the shares bought until that point in time by an institution. For example, consider
an institution that buys 500 shares in the secondary market during the first day
after the issue date and then sells 300 shares on the second day and 300 shares on
the third day. Then the IPO allocation sales of that institution are equal to zero
on day 1 and 2 and are equal to 100 on day 3.
Figure 3 tracks the average cumulative percentage of IPO shares flipped, scaled
by the number of shares offered, by month. 95% confidence intervals are reported
with dotted lines. We report the average for the whole sample of IPOs (black line)
and for the subsamples of hot, weak, and cold IPOs, defined by underpricing terciles
(grey lines). Our sample institutions flip 3.2% of the shares offered within the first 21
trading days post-IPO and continue to sell their allocations in subsequent months.
By the end of the first year, our sample institutions flip 8.5% of the shares issued
on average. The amount of flipping is the highest for hot IPOs (almost 12% at the
end of the first year) and the lowest for cold IPOs (less than 5% at the end of the
first year).
[Figure 3 about here.]
2.4 Identifying institutional IPO allocations
We identify IPO allocations by combining institutional trading data with quarterly
holdings data reported in 13F. The basic idea is to compute IPO allocations as the
difference between the institution’s holdings in the IPO firm at the first 13F filing
date following the IPO and the net buying by the institution in the IPO firm between
the IPO date and the 13F filing date. However, as pointed out by Chemmanur et al.
(2010), it is unlikely to compute allocations precisely by matching 13F and the
Abel Noser’s Solution Database because of data differences in the two databases.
For example, 13F might not contain all stock holdings, as institutions are required
to disclose common stock positions greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000. This
kind of matching problems might generate some inconsistencies when computing
allocations as holdings minus net buying. For example, we might compute negative
allocations and/or allocations smaller than the amount of shares flipped.
In order to rule out these inconsistencies, we complement our allocation proxy
with flipping data. The idea is that an IPO allocation has to be at least equal to the
amount of shares flipped by the institution. Formally, we proxy IPO allocations as
follows. Let Hi,j be the number of shares of IPO i held by institution j at the first
filing date after the IPO. Let ∆i,j be the total netbuy of IPO i shares by institution
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j between the IPO date and the first filing date after the IPO. Let Fi,j be the
number of shares of IPO i flipped by institution j – as computed in section 2.3 – in
the first three months after the IPO. We compute the percentage of shares of IPO
i allocated to institution j, AllocPerci,j , as:
AllocPerci,j =
max(Hi,j −∆i,j , Fi,j)
SharesIssuedi
100
and we winsorize it at the 95% level. Table 2 reports IPO allocations summary
statistics at the institution and issuer level. Conditional on receiving an allocation,
the average institution gets 1.89% of the issue. In the average IPO, about 23 sample
institutions receive an allocation and get 42.7% of the offer.
Allocations vary with underpricing. Institutions that receive cold IPO shares
get a larger percentage of the issue than institutions that receive hot IPO shares
(2.53% versus 1.53%). However, the number of institutions that receive allocations
is much smaller in cold IPOs than in hot IPOs (13.6 versus 30.6). Thus, the total
allocation to institutional investors is lower in cold IPOs than in hot IPOs (34.3%
versus 47%).
[Table 2 about here.]
3 Do institutional investors hide their sell trades?
If investors systematically hide some of their sell trades from the lead underwriters
(hide-and-sell hypothesis) by trading with other brokers, then we should observe
the probability of trading through the lead underwriters to be lower for sell trades
than for buy trades in the IPO aftermarket. In order to test this prediction, we run
several specifications of the following linear probability model (LPM):
LeadDummyi,m,b,t = α+ βSelli,j,b,t +Xi,j,b,tΓ + δj + θi + λi,j + ui,j,b,t
where Selli,j,b,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the istitution j is selling the
IPO i through broker b on day t and zero if it is buying. The dependent variable,
LeadDummyi,j,b,t, is a dummy variable equal to one if the broker b executing the
trade is any of the lead underwriters of IPO i and zero otherwise. Xi,j,b,t is a vector
of control variables, which are described below. δj , θi, and λi,j are institution, IPO,
and institution-IPO fixed effects. ui,j,b,t is the error term, which we allow to be
correlated within institution. The hide-and-sell hypothesis predicts β < 0.
The vector of control variables includes the trading volume RelV ol, which is the
number of shares traded by the institution scaled by the number of shares issued and
multiplied by 100. Moreover, we control for the relationship between institutional
investors and lead underwriters. Lead underwriters’ usual clients are more likely
to choose a lead underwriter as a broker at any point in time, including the IPO
aftermarket (Goldstein et al. (2009)). They might also be more likely to support
the IPO price to preserve their relationship with the underwriters, thus being less
likely to sell IPO shares than other investors. Conversely, institutions that are not
usual underwriters’ clients are less likely to trade with them and might be more
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likely to be IPO sellers. Therefore, a negative correlation between the decision to
sell IPO shares and the decision to trade with a lead underwriter might be driven
by the relationship between investors and underwriters. We control for it by means
of the variable NormalTradeLead. For each institution-IPO pair, we compute the
percentage volume traded in non-IPO stocks by the institution through the lead
underwriters in a 6-month period prior to the issue.7 We compute this variable
separately for buy and sell trades, to capture any potential heterogeneity in the
investor/lead underwriters relationship by trade side. We include in the specification
the variable Day, which is the day in which the trade is executed relative to the
issue date, in order to control for the likely decreasing trend in the probability
of trading with a lead underwriter. One important determinant of the choice to
trade with the lead underwriters might be their trading expenses. ExcLeadComm
is the average percentage commission to the lead underwriters minus the average
percentage commission to any other broker paid by sample institutions in the first 21
trading days after the issue date. With this variable we capture how expensive it is
to trade with the lead underwriters relative to other brokers in the IPO aftermarket.
We compute this variable separately for buy and sell trades to capture any potential
heterogeneity in brokerage commissions by trade side. Finally, we control for the
percentage IPO allocation received by an institution, AllocPerc. Institutions that
receive IPO allocations might be more likely to trade with the underwriters for
several reasons, including quid-pro-quo agreements to generate a stream brokerage
commissions to the lead underwriters (Goldstein et al. (2011), Reuter (2006), and
Nimalendran et al. (2007)) and “laddering” agreements to buy shares in the IPO
aftermarket (Griffin et al. (2007)).
We choose a LPM because it allows us to control for fixed effects without in-
curring in the incidental parameter problem and it estimates marginal effects. The
potential biasedness and inconsistency of OLS with binary outcome are unlikely to
be a concern in our setting, as the average value of the dependent variable is not at
the boundaries of the unit interval (it is 0.292). For monitoring purposes, we keep
track of the proportion of predicted probabilities outside the [0, 1] interval in our
regression tables.
Table 3 reports the OLS estimation results. We use standard errors clustered
at the institution level for inference.8 Panel (A) includes trades executed during
the first 21 trading days after the issue date. We focus on this period because lead
underwriters’ practices suggest that investors’ incentives to hide their sell trades
should exist mainly during the first month of trading. For example, lead under-
writers track IPO flipping through the Depository Trust Company’s (DTC) IPO
Tracking System and engage in market stabilization activities usually during the
first 30 calendar days after the issue date (Aggarwal (2000)). In column (1) we
regress LeadDummy on Sell; column (2) introduces control variables in the speci-
fication; columns (3), (4), and (5) control for institution, institution and firm, and
institution-firm fixed effects.
[Table 3 about here.]
7The 6-month period includes trades in non-IPO stocks executed from the trading day -147 to
the trading day -22 from the issue date.
8In unreported analyses, we allow the error term to be correlated within IPO, clustering standard
errors at the firm level. Results get stronger.
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The coefficient of the variable Sell is negative and statistically significant in all
specifications. Considering the estimate in column (1), institutional investors are
6 percentage points less likely to trade through a lead underwriter when they sell
IPO shares than when they buy, consistent with the hide-and-sell hypothesis. The
coefficient is statistically significant at least at the 5% level. It is also economically
significant: the probability of selling with a lead underwriter is almost 20% less than
the probability of buying (0.06/0.32). The correlation survives when we control for
institution, firm, and institution-firm fixed effects. Column (3) controls for institu-
tion fixed effects, such as their usual trading strategies in IPOs. Column (4) intro-
duces IPO fixed effects, which capture any IPO-specific characteristics, including
the identity of the lead underwriters. It might be argued that NormalTradeLead
controls only for the past relationship between institutions and lead underwriters
in brokarage services, but not for their future expected relationship nor for their
relationship in other services; in column (5) we control for any institution-IPO spe-
cific factor, exploiting within institution-IPO variation: an institution that is both
buying and selling a given IPO is more likely to trade with the lead underwriters
when it buys than when it sells.
The coefficient of RelV ol is positive and significant in all specifications: in-
stitutions that make larger trades are more likely to trade with the lead under-
writers. A one percentage point increase in the trading volume is associated with
about 13 percentage points increase in the probability of trading with a lead un-
derwriter. As expected, there is a positive and statistically significant correlation
between LeadDummy and NormalTradeLead. A one percentage point increase in
the proportion of trades that the institution normally execute through the lead un-
derwriters is associated with about 0.9 percentage points increase in the probability
of trading with a lead underwriter in the IPO aftermarket. The coefficient becomes
much smaller and statistically insignificant when we control for institution-firm fixed
effects, suggesting that the relationship between investors and underwriters is ho-
mogeneuos across trade side and, thus, captured by these fixed effects. As expected,
the coefficient of Day is negative and statistically significant. A one day increase in
the trading time relative to the issue date is associated with about one percentage
point decrease in the probability of trading with a lead underwriter. The coefficient
of ExcLeadComm is negative in all specifications. However, it is statistically signifi-
cant only when we control for institution-firm fixed effect. Even though commissions
does not seeem to be a main driver of the choice of the broker, differences in trad-
ing commissions across trade side help explain the within institution-IPO variation
of LeadDummy. Finally, AllocPerc is only weakly significant in one specification
(at the 10% level). Moreover, its sign flips across specifications. We cannot make
definitive conclusions about its correlation with the choice of the broker in the IPO
aftermarket.
In Panel (B), we replicate our analysis considering trades executed during the
first 7 trading days after the issue date. The coefficient on Sell gets much stronger
in all specifications, suggesting that most of the documented effect is concentrated
in the first few trading days after the IPO.
Hiding incentives are stronger in cold IPOs. Underwriters are more likely con-
cerned with sell trades when the aftermarket demand for the IPO stock is weak,
as they put additional downward pressure on the price (Chemmanur et al. (2010)).
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Hence, we hypothesize the buy/sell asymmetry in the choice of the broker docu-
mented in Table 3 to be stronger in cold IPOs. We define the variable ColdIPOi
to be equal to one if the firm i is in the lowest tercile of the variable Underpricingi
and zero otherwise. We introduce an interaction variable between ColdIPOi and
Selli,j,b,t in our regression specifications. Under the hide-and-sell hypothesis, we
expect the coefficient on the interaction term to be negative. Table 4 reports the
estimation results.
[Table 4 about here.]
Consistent with the hide-and-sell hypothesis, the negative correlation between
LeadDummy and Sell is stronger when hiding incentives are more pronounced.
The coefficient of the interaction term is negative and statistically significant at
least at the 5% level. The economic magnitude is also significant: considering
column (1), investors are about 11.7 percentage points less likely to trade with a
lead underwriter when they sell cold IPOs’ shares than when they buy cold IPOs’
shares (0.051+0.066). This number is about as double as it is for other IPOs (5.1).
3.1 Placebo tests
If institutional investors are less likely to sell through the lead underwriters because
they try to hide their sell trades, then we should not observe this behavior when
there is no incentive to hide.
Lead underwriters’ practices suggest that investors’ incentives to hide their sell
trades should exist mainly during the first month of trading. Hence, we should
not detect systematic hiding behavior after the first month. Table 5 implements
our regression analysis for institutional investors’ trading activity during the third
month after the IPO date. The coefficient of Sell is not statistically different from
zero in all specifications. Moreover, its sign is positive in most specifications and
its magnitude is often economically small.
[Table 5 about here.]
The hiding incentive is peculiar to IPOs: it should not exist for non-IPO stocks.
Hence, we test the hide-and-sell hypothesis in a matched sample of trades in non-
IPO stocks. We match trades as follows. First, we require candidate non-IPO
stocks to be similar to the matched IPO. For each IPO, we select candidate non-
IPO stocks that: (i) are in the same one-digit industry; (ii) are in the same quintile
of market capitalization; (iii) are in the same tercile of Tobin’s Q.9 Then, we match
each buy (sell) trade in IPO stocks with a buy (sell) trade made by the same
institution in a candidate non-IPO stock within a 21 trading days window from
the IPO date. The matched trade is the one with the closest dollar volume. We
lose 1,909 trades in 55 IPOs because of missing data about market capitalization,
industry, or Tobin’s Q. Moreover, we lose 13,677 trades because of no match found.
Our final sample consists of 28,990 trades in non-IPO stocks matched to 1,109
IPOs.10 Table 6 implements our regression analysis for institutions’ trading activity
9We get this data from CRSP and COMPUSTAT.
10The median volume difference between matched non-IPO trades and original IPO trades is 50
dollars. The correlation between dollar volumes of original and matched trades is 0.7.
72
4 ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS AND ENDOGENEITY ISSUES
in non-IPO stocks. The coefficient of Sell is not statistically different from zero in
most specifications and it is weakly significant (10% level) only in two specifications.
Moreover, its sign is positive in most specifications and its magnitude is economically
small.
[Table 6 about here.]
Overall, our placebo tests confirm that the buy/sell asymmetry in the choice of
the broker is peculiar to the IPO aftermarket, consistent with hiding incentives.
4 Alternative explanations and endogeneity issues
An alternative explanation to our findings is the following. Underwriters might try
to disincentivize selling of IPO stocks by increasing brokerage commissions selec-
tively on sell trades. If this is the case, some investors might choose to sell through
brokers other than the lead underwriters in order to save on commissions, without
any intention to hide their trade. This would generate the buy/sell asymmetry in
the choice of the broker observed in our regressions even when the null hypothesis
of no hiding behavior holds, thus invalidating our conclusions. Broadly consistent
with this argument, Ellis (2006) finds evidence of bookrunners offering better terms
on buy trades in a sample of Nasdaq IPOs.
We show that the commission story is unlikely to drive our results. First, notice
that we control for the average commission required by lead underwriters in excess
of the commission required by other brokers (ExcLeadComm) in our regressions.
The variable ExcLeadComm is computed for buy trades and sell trades separately.
Hence, it controls for the effect of the potential differential treatment that lead
underwriters give to different trades on the investors’ probability of choosing a lead
underwriter as a broker. Second, we can dig into the commission story more deeply.
If the commission story is a concern, then we should observe lead underwriters
to require higher brokerage commissions for sell trades relative to at least one of
these benchmarks: i) lead underwriters’ commissions for buy trades in the IPO
aftermarket; ii) lead underwriters’ commissions for sell trades few months after the
IPO; iii) commissions of brokers other than the lead underwriters for sell trades in
the IPO aftermarket. Figure 4 and Table 7 show the none of the above statements
holds. Figure 4 plots the average trading commission paid to the lead underwriters
for buying trades (dark grey line) and sell trades (light grey line) by month from the
issue date. Commissions are scaled by the dollar volume traded and 95% confidence
intervals are reported with dotted lines. If anything, average brokerage commissions
of lead underwriters are higher for buy trades than for sell trades during the IPO
aftermarket. Moreover, average brokerage commissions for sell trades tend to be
somewhat higher several months after the IPO than during the first month after
the issue date. Table 7 reports difference of means tests for the percentage trading
commission paid to lead underwriters and to any other broker during the first month
after the IPO. The table shows that trading commissions do not significantly differ
between broker type for sell trades. They do differ, however, for buy trades: lead
underwriters require higher commissions for buy trades than other brokers do.
[Figure 4 about here.]
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[Table 7 about here.]
Hence, empirical evidence does not support the commission story: lead under-
writers do not increase commissions on sell trades to disincentivize selling of IPO
stocks. In fact, there is some evidence that they might do the opposite: commissions
on buy trades seem to be particularly high in the IPO aftermarket.11 If anything,
this could actually work against finding results in favor of the hide-and-sell hypoth-
esis.
In Section 3.1, we find that institutional investors are about 6 percentage points
less likely to sell with the lead underwriters relative to their buy trades. One could
argue that our results are driven by investors buying through the lead underwriters
and not by investors selling through other brokers. We do not claim that abnor-
mal buying through lead underwriters does not play a role in this setting. In fact,
in Section 5 we argue that it might be a relevant factor for understanding why
investors hide their sell trades. However, we need to provide evidence that the
buy/sell asymmetry in the choice of the broker documented in this section is driven
also by investors selling less through the lead underwriters. Figure 2 shows that the
asymmetry between buy and sell trades is driven both by investors buying more
through lead underwriters and by investors selling more through other brokers dur-
ing the first month after the issue. Though relevant, Figure 2 focuses on the first
21 trading days and, hence, it does not take into account that investors might trade
more with other brokers at any point in time, not just in the IPO aftermarket. Only
few brokers are lead underwriters of an IPO and, thus, it is not surprising that in-
vestors trade more shares with other brokers. To overcome this issue, in Table 8
we test whether investors sell more shares through other brokers than through lead
underwriters during the first month of trading relative to the third month of trad-




SVi,m,l is the total number of shares of IPO i, scaled by the number of shares
issued, sold by financial institutions in month m through a broker of type l. We con-
sider trades executed in month 1 and month 3 after the IPO (m = 1, 3); Month1i,m
is a dummy variable equal to one if the shares are sold in month 1 and zero other-
wise. We consider trades executed through two types of brokers: lead underwriters
and brokers that do not belong to the underwriting syndicate (l = Lead, Other);
LeadDummyi,l is a dummy variable equal to one 1 if the shares are sold through the
lead underwriters and zero otherwise. LeadDummy ∗Month1i,m,l is the interaction
between the two variables. Table 8 reports the results of the DiD estimation. We
cluster standard errors at the IPO level.
11Understanding why lead underwriters’ commissions on buy trades are high in the IPO after-
market goes beyond the scope of this paper. Though difficult to reconcile with Ellis (2006)’s result,
we notice that our evidence is broadly consistent with the literature on quid-pro-quo agreements
in IPOs, which suggest that investors might get preferential treatment in the allocation of IPOs in
exchange of paying excessive brokerage commissions to the lead underwriters (e.g., Reuter (2006)).
Our finding is also broadly consistent with Griffin et al. (2007), who finds that there is more net
buying through the bookrunners in IPOs in which the bookrunner charges higher trading costs.
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[Table 8 about here.]
Table 8 shows that investors sell a smaller amount of shares through the lead
underwriters than through other brokers both in month 3 and in month 1, as ex-
pected. The magnitude of the difference, however, is more pronounced in month
1 (β3 = −0.64), consistent with hiding incentives.12 Hence, the buy/sell asymme-
try in the choice of the broker, that we document in Section 3, is likely not only
driven by investors buying relatively more through the lead underwriters, but also
by investors selling relatively less through the lead underwriters.
The decision to sell is endogenous. Institutions that decide to sell an IPO
stock might differ from institutions that buy the IPO under several dimensions
that might be correlated with their choice of the broker. In an ideal experiment,
we would like to observe how institution j would have traded IPO i if, for a given
trade, it would have switched trade side. Since in one of our specifications we
exploit within institution-IPO variation, we rule out sources of endogeneity that are
constant within institution-IPO pairs (e.g., the relationship between an investor and
the lead underwriters of an IPO): we observe the same institution buying and selling
the same IPO stock through different brokers, often over the same trading day.13
Even though this might seem reasonably close to the ideal experiment mentioned
above, we cannot exclude that some trade-varying unobserved factors jointly drive
investors’ selling and broker choices within institution-IPO pairs. However, it is
hard to find a trade-level factor that would make the buy/sell asymmetry in the
choice of the broker vanish, given that we control for commissions, volume, and day.
Another source of potential criticism is related to the fact that our estimation in
column (5) of Table 3 exploits variation in the trading side within institution-IPO
pairs. In our sample, more than 50% of the observations do not exhibit variation
within institution-IPO; i.e., the investor is either buying or selling the IPO stock.
Hence, in column (5) we use information of a specific subsample of observations.
This is unlikely to be a relevant issue for our purposes, as the specification of column
(5) still serves the goal of detecting hiding behavior. Moreover, the coefficient of Sell
in the regressions of Table 3 is fairly stable across different specifications, including
column (5). Overall, even though we do not claim that we estimate a causal effect,
endogeneity concerns are unlikely to qualitatively change our conclusions about the
buy/sell asymmetry in the choice of the broker.
For robustness, we also seek for a source of exogenous variation in the selling
decision of financial institutions. Funds in distress, which experience large outflows,
tend to decrease their existing positions (Coval and Stafford (2007)), including their
IPO holdings. Hence, institutions that manage funds in distress are more likely to
sell IPO shares. This suggests a candidate instrument for financial institutions’
selling decisions: the number of funds in distress managed by the institution. This
instrument is plausibly exogenous in this setting, as funds’ distress events are likely
unrelated with the probability that the institution trades through the lead under-
12In an unreported analysis, we perform DiD comparing the first month with all the other months
during the first year after the issue, excluding month 2 and dropping IPOs issued after March 2010
because of lack of trading data in later months. Results are robust.
13We observe an institution j trading the same stock i through several distinct brokers b during
the same trading day t for 23% of the observations.
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writers of a given IPO.14 Moreover, underwriters usually allocate shares to fund
families, which then decide how to distribute them within the family (Ritter and
Zhang (2007)). This lowers the scope for direct links between distressed funds and
the institution’s choice to trade through the underwriters in the IPO aftermarket.
We use clientcode-clientmgrcode pairs in the Abel Noser Solutions’ database to
identify distinct funds managed by our sample institutions.15 We define a fund to
be in distress in a given month if two conditions are met: 1) more than 99% of
its trading volume in non-IPO stocks is due to sell trades; 2) the monthly dollar
volume traded by the fund in non-IPO stoks is above the 90th percentile. The idea
is that funds with large selling volumes are likely experiencing a fire-sales event. Our
institution-level distress variable, LnDistressFundsi,j , is the natural logarithm of
the number of funds in distress managed by institution j during the month in which
the IPO i is made. We use it as instrumental variable for Sell. Table 9 reports the
2SLS results, which are qualitatively consistent with our baseline regressions.
[Table 9 about here.]
The results of Table 9 have to be taken cautiously. We acknowledge that they
are sensitive to the choice of the dollar volume threshold: the instrument becomes
weak when we set lower thresholds, such as the 50th or the 75th percentiles of the
monthly volume traded. Even though it make sense that only large transaction
volumes are related to fire-sales events that could be relevant in the first stage
regression, we cannot justify the choice of a specific volume threshold to build our
variable. Table 9 suggests that endogeneity concerns do not seem to qualitatively
change our conclusions, but the potential weakness of the instrument does not allow
us to make strong causal statements.
4.1 Other robustness checks
We use a linear probability model (LPM) in our baseline regressions and we esti-
mate its coefficients via OLS. We justify the use of OLS because the unconditional
probability of trading with the lead underwriters is not at the boundaries of the unit
interval (it is 0.292). Moreover, a very small proportion of the predicted probabili-
ties of trading with the lead underwriters fall outside the [0, 1] interval and only one
specification out of five suffers of this problem (see Table 3). Horrace and Oaxaca
(2006) show that OLS is unbiased and consistent if all the observations have true
predicted probabilities within the unit interval. We cannot know the true predicted
14A theoretically possible channel that could invalidate the exogeneity assumption is that in-
stitutions with several funds in distress might be institutions with little or no connections with
important brokers, which also underwrite IPOs. Under this “connection” argument, institutions
with distressed funds would tend to trade more with non-lead brokers regardless of the side of the
trade. We find no evidence in this direction: the number of distressed funds of an institution is not
significantly correlated with its normal number of trades executed through the lead underwriters
in non-IPO stocks (NormalTradeLead).
15From our talks with ANcerno it became clear that clientmgrcode identifies individual funds,
fund managers, or separately managed accounts (see also Hu et al. (2017)). Clientmgrcode is
provided by the client and may change over time, ANcerno however reassured us that clientmgrcode
remains unchaged within each a batch of data provided by the client (identified by the lognumber).
For this reason, we follow Eisele et al. (2017) and use a couple clientcode-clientmgrcode to separate
among individual funds.
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probabilities, but our predicted probabilites do not raise suspect that potential OLS
biasedness and inconsistency are relevant concerns in our setting. Finally, a LPM
is desirable in our situation because it allows us to control for fixed effects without
incurring in the incidental parameter problem and it estimates marginal effects. For
robustness, we also run logit regressions and get rid of the fixed effects by means of
a conditional logit model. Table 10 reports the estimation results, which are overall
consistent with our baseline regressions.16
[Table 10 about here.]
Almost 50% of the IPOs in our sample are issued during the internet bubble
period. We replicate our regression analysis excluding IPOs issued in 1999 and 2000
and report our findings in Table 11. The results are similar to those of our baseline
regressions.
[Table 11 about here.]
We use LeadDummy as dependent variable in our baseline regressions. This
implies that we pool in the same group of brokers the other syndicate members and
brokers that do not belong to the underwriting syndicate. For robustness, we repli-
cate our regression analysis using UWDummy as dependent variable. UWDummy
takes the value of 1 if the trade is executed through any of the underwriters of the
IPO and zero otherwise. Table 12 shows that results are overall consistent with our
baseline regressions. If anything, they are slightly weaker, consistent with hiding
incentives being mainly related to lead underwriters.
[Table 12 about here.]
5 Why do institutional investors hide their trades?
In this section, we investigate the drivers and motives of institutional investors’
hiding behavior. The existing literature suggests that investors might try to hide
their allocations sales in order to preserve their business with the lead underwriters
in the IPO allocations market (Griffin et al. (2007), Chemmanur et al. (2010)).
Though relevant, consistent, and sound, the incentive to hide allocation sales might
be overall weak because of the lead underwriters’ ability to infer flippers’ identities:
though imperfect, the flipping reports produced via the DTC IPO Tracking System
dampen unambiguously the investors’ chances to hide their allocation sales. We
find evidence consistent with this view by introducing in our baseline regression
of Section 3 the dummy variable Flip, which takes the value of one when the sell
trade contains an allocation sale and zero otherwise.17 Flip trades are a subset
16We cannot estimate all the specifications because of computational problems with the condi-
tional logit model. In unreported analyses, we also run the LPM while trimming observations with
predicted probabilities outside the unit interval, as suggested by Horrace and Oaxaca (2006). If
anything, our results get stronger.
17Since we observe allocation sales at the institution-IPO-day level (see section 2.3), this definition
of Flip may be inaccurate if investor j executes both secondary sales and allocation sales of IPO
i during the same trading day t through several distinct brokers b. In our sample, this problem
can affect at most 645 observations out of 44,576. In Table 13, we assume that all of these 645 sell
trades contain an allocation sale. In unreported analyses, we exclude these 645 observations from
the sample and find similar results.
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of Sell trades, thus every Flip is a Sell, but not vice versa. For the sake of the
interpretation of the regression coefficients, Flip is essentially an interaction variable
because it can take the value of one only when Sell is also one.18 Table 13 reports
the results.
[Table 13 about here.]
Table 13 shows that the buy/sell asymmetry is mainly driven by sell trades other
than allocation sales. The coefficient of Flip is positive and significant, meaning that
sell trades are significantly more likely to be executed through the lead underwriters
when they contain allocation sales than when they do not contain allocation sales.
Nevertheless, there is evidence of some hiding activity also for flipping trades: sell
trades that contain allocations sales are somewhat less likely to be executed through
the lead underwriters than buy trades, as the coefficient of Sell plus the coefficient
of Flip is a negative number.
We suggest a novel reason for why investors might have an incentive to hide their
sell trades. An investor that enters in a laddering agreement a la` Hao (2007) receives
an IPO allocation and agrees with the lead underwriters to generate additional
demand in the IPO aftermarket by buying shares. As argued by Griffin et al. (2007),
this form of laddering helps explaining why investors are overall net buyers through
the lead underwriters in the IPO aftermarket. However, investors might have an
incentive to break the laddering agreement if the shares bought in the secondary
market are in excess of their optimal holding in the IPO firm. A way to do it without
being caught by the lead underwriters is to sell the shares in excess through any
other broker. If investors sistematically break their laddering agreements, then
we should observe them simultaneously buying through the lead underwriters and
selling through non-lead brokers. Column (5) of Table 3 is consistent with this
view: since we control for institution-firm fixed effects, we do observe institutional
investors that simultaneously buy and sell an IPO being more likely to buy than
sell through the lead underwriters. Table 3 detects a behavior which is consistent
with investors breaking the laddering agreement, but it is silent on how relevant
this hiding motive is. If laddering is a relevant hiding motive, we should observe
a clear positive correlation between hiding behavior (i.e., selling through non-lead
brokers) and buying through the lead underwriters.
In order to dig into the drivers of hiding behavior, we decompose trading volume
in four parts. Let V Ti,j be the total number of shares traded by institution j in IPO
i during the first 21 trading days after the issue and let Ni be the number of shares















where F Ti,j is the total number of shares of IPO i flipped by institution j during
the first 21 trading days, BLi,j (S
L
i,j) is the number of shares of IPO i bought (sold)
18This may raise a concern of collinearity between Flip and Sell. Standard regression diagnostic
suggests that this is not the case. For robustness, we also modify our regression specification by
including the variable OnlySecondary := Sell − Flip instead of Sell. OnlySecondary takes the
value of one when the sell trade does not contain any allocation sales and zero otherwise. Results
(unreported) are consistent.
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by institution j through the lead underwriters during the first 21 trading days,
BNLi,j (S
NL
i,j ) is the number of shares of IPO i bought (sold) by institution j through
brokers other than the lead underwriters during the first 21 trading days, and BT =
BL + BNL (ST = SL + SNL). The third component on the right hand side of the
identity, (STi,j − F Ti,j)/Ni, is the institution’s total volume of “secondary” shares
sold, meaning total sales excluding allocations sales, scaled by the number of shares
issued. In order to capture the propensity to sell through brokers other than the
lead underwriters, we compute the percentage of shares of IPO i sold by institution
j through non-lead brokers, SNLi,j /S
T
i,j . Since we are interested in analyzing selling
hiding motives, we constrain our dataset to institutions that have positive sales (i.e.,
STi,j > 0 ). We count 9,018 institution-firm observations.
Under the laddering motive for hiding, institutions tend to sell shares through
non-lead brokers, while having bought them in the IPO aftermarket through the
lead underwriters. Hence, controlling for how the institution normally trades with
the lead underwriters (NormalTradeLead), we should observe the percentage of
shares sold through non-lead brokers, SNLi,j /S
T
i,j , to be positively correlated with
the relative volume of shares bought through the lead underwriters, BLi,j/Ni, and
the relative volume of “secondary” shares sold, (STi,j − F Ti,j)/Ni. These predictions
are conditional on the institution j having received some allocation in the IPO i,
as institutions involved in laddering received some allocation in the IPO. Hence,
under the laddering motive, these predictions should not hold for institutions with
no allocations. Moreover, they should not hold after the first month of trading,
when there are no hiding incentives.
In order to test these predictions, we perform a linear projection of the propen-
sity to sell through non-lead brokers on the trading volume components, running
several specifications of the following regression:
SNLi,j
STi,j












+Xi,jΓ + φi + ϕj + vi,j
where Xi,j is a vector of control variables (which includes NormalTradeLeadi,j
and AllocPerci,j), φi and ϕj are firm and institution fixed effects, and vi,j is the
error term, which we allow to be correlated within institution. The laddering motive
for hiding predicts γ1 > 0 and γ2 > 0 for institutions that received allocations and
trade during the first month after the issue. Table 14 reports the OLS results.
All ratios are multiplied by 100, thus being expressed as percentages. We use
institution-clustered standard errors for inference.19
[Table 14 about here.]
In columns (1)–(4), we perform the regression on first-month trading data, in-
cluding in the sample institutions that received some allocations (i.e., institutions
with AllocPerci,j > 0). Overall results are consistent with the laddering motive
for hiding. The coefficients γ1 and γ2 are positive in all specifications: institutions
19In unreported analyses, we allow the error term to be correlated within IPO, clustering standard
errors at the firm level. Results are consistent.
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tend to execute a higher proportion of their sell trades through non-lead brokers
when they buy more shares through the lead underwriters and when they sell more
“secondary” shares. Looking at column (4), a one unit increase in the volume of
shares bought through the lead underwriters (volume of “secondary” shares sold)
as a percentage of the amount of shares issued is associated with a 1.24 (2.02) per-
centage points increase in the proportion of sell trades executed through non-lead
brokers. Results are also statistically significant at the 1% level in most specifi-
cations. The specification in column (2), which does not control for fixed effects,
shows insignificant or weakly significant results. Firm fixed effects keep IPO char-
acteristics constant, including the identity of the lead underwriters, which might
be relevant factors affecting both the propensity to sale and the amount of shares
bought in the aftermarket through lead underwriters. For example, some underwrit-
ers might have simultaneously a higher proportion of sell trades executed through
them and a larger buying activity from investors than other underwriters, thus mak-
ing it difficult to detect the laddering hiding motive in specifications (1) and (2).20
Controlling for IPO fixed effects allows us to keep these factors constant, exploiting
within IPO variation. Hence, specifications (3) and (4) are more suitable tests of
the laddering motive for hiding.
Consistent with flipping not being a relevant hiding motive, we find that γ3 is
negative in most specifications and statistically significant at the 1% level when con-
trolling for IPO and institution fixed effects: the proportion of shares sold through
non-lead brokers is lower when institutions flip more of their IPO allocations.
In column (5) we perform a placebo analysis, including in the sample only insti-
tutions with no IPO allocations (i.e., institutions with AllocPerci,j = 0). Consistent
with the laddering motive for hiding, γ1 and γ2 are not statistically different from
zero for institutions with no allocations; in addition, γ1 enters the regression with
a negative sign. In column (6) we perform another placebo analysis, running the
regression on volumes traded during the third month after the issue. We include
in the sample only institutions that received a positive allocation. Consistent with
the laddering motive for hiding, γ1 and γ2 are not significantly positive after the
first month of trading; both coefficients enter the regression with a negative sign. In
addition, γ1 is statistically significant, consistent with hiding incentives not being
at place after the first month.
The remaining volume component, that is the relative amount of shares bought
through brokers other than the lead underwriters (BuyNonLead or BNLi,j /Ni), is
in general positively correlated with the proportion of sell trades executed through
the lead underwriters, especially in placebo samples. Intuitively, it makes sense:
institutions that buy more through non-lead brokers also tend to sell more through
non-lead brokers. Noticeably, this positive correlation disappears in specifications
(3) and (4), where the laddering hiding motive becomes an important driver of insti-
tutions’ behavior. Unsurprisingly, the coefficient of NormalTradeLead is negative
and significant in all specifications, including the placebo analyses: the higher the
proportion of trades that the institution usually executes through the lead under-
20In an unreported analysis, we aggregate data at the lead underwriter level and, indeed, we
observe a negative correlation between the proportion of sell trades through non-lead brokers and
the volume components of interest, confirming the importance of controlling for IPO fixed effects
in our regressions.
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writers, the lower the proportion of sell trades executed through non-lead brokers
in IPOs. AllocPerc enters the regression with a positive sign, but only during the
first month of trading.
The laddering motive for hiding produces two other testable predictions. First,
if institutions that enter in a laddering agreement break it, it has to be the case
that they sell the shares that they bought through the lead underwriters. Hence,
there should be a positive correlation between the volume bought through the lead
underwriters and the volume of “secondary” shares sold. Second, since laddering
involves an aggreement between the lead underwriter and the institution, an insti-
tution that engages in laddering is most likely a lead underwriter client. Hence, the
lead underwriter is going to detect any of its flipping activities thanks to detailed
flipping reports. Flipping trades signal to the lead underwriter that the institution
sold more shares than it bought in the aftermarket. Hence, flipping trades reveal
to the lead underwriter that the institution sold also “secondary” shares through
other brokers, thus breaking the laddering agreement, if any. Therefore, institu-
tions that buys through the lead underwriters and want to hide their “secondary”
sales should avoid allocation sales, thus generating a negative correlation between
flipping and buying through the lead underwriters. If these correlations are driven
by hiding incentives related to laddering, then they should hold only for institutions
that received IPO allocations and trade during the first month after the issue.
In order to test these predictions, we regress the amount of net buy through the
lead underwriters on the other trading volume components:
BLi,j − SLi,j
Ni
= θ0 + θ1








+Xi,jΓ + κj + ηi + εi,j
where Xi,j is a vector of control variables (which includes NormalTradeLeadi,j
and AllocPerci,j), κj and ηi are institution and firm fixed effects, and εi,j is the error
term, which we allow to be correlated within institution. The laddering motive for
hiding predicts θ1 > 0 and θ2 < 0 for institutions that received allocations and trade
during the first month after the issue. We use net buy, (BLi,j − SLi,j)/Ni, instead of
total buy, BLi,j/Ni, as dependent variable in order to prevent a mechanical correlation
between BLi,j/Ni and (S
T
i,j − F Ti,j)/Ni to arise when we control for BNLi,j /Ni in the
regression. Table 15 reports the OLS results. All ratios are multiplied by 100, thus
being expressed as percentages. We use institution-clustered standard errors for
inference.21
[Table 15 about here.]
In columns (1)–(4), we perform the regression on first-month trading data, in-
cluding in the sample institutions that received some allocations (i.e., institutions
with AllocPerci,j > 0). Overall, results are consistent with the laddering motive
for hiding. The coefficient θ1 (θ2) is positive (negative) and statistically significant
at the 1% level in all specifications. Column (4) reports that selling an additional
“secondary” share-per-shares-issued is associated with an increase in the net buying
21In unreported analyses, we allow the error term to be correlated within IPO, clustering standard
errors at the firm level. Results are consistent.
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through the lead underwriters of 0.33 shares-per-share-issued; flipping an additional
share-per-shares-issued is associated with a decrease in the net buying through the
lead underwriters of 0.4 shares-per-share-issued.
We perform placebo analyses running the regression on institutions with no
allocations (column (5)) and institutions that trade during the third month after
the issue (column (6)). Consistent with the correlations in columns (1)-(4) being
driven by laddering hiding motives, the coefficients θ1 and θ2 are either insignificant
or with the opposite sign in the placebo regressions.
The remaining volume component, that is the relative amount of shares bought
through brokers other than the lead underwriters (BuyNonLead or BNLi,j /Ni), is
positively correlated with the net buy through the lead underwriters in month 3.
Intuitively, it makes sense: institutions that buy a stock, buy it through any broker
they trade with. Noticeably, this positive correlation disappears in specifications
(1)-(4): when laddering and hiding incentives are at place, buying through lead un-
derwriters is not anymore correlated with buying through non-lead brokers. Intrigu-
ingly, lead underwriters’ usual clients have a significantly lower net buy through the
lead underwriters: NormalTradeLead enters the regression with a negative sign.
Instead, the coefficient of AllocPerc is positive and statistically significant in month
1, while being insignificant in month 3. This is broadly consistent with laddering
practices (Griffin et al. (2007)): institutions with higher allocations tend to buy
more shares through the lead underwriters in the IPO aftermarket. However, an
alternative interpretation could be that institutions receive rationed IPO allocations
and buy more shares in the aftermarket to reach their optimal holdings. Since we
do not observe institutions’ bidding behavior, we cannot draw conclusions about
the interpretation of the positive correlation between net buy and IPO allocations.
Overall, our evidence suggests that, contrary to the conventional view, flipping
does not seem to be an important motive for hiding sell trades from the lead un-
derwriters. Instead, we find evidence consistent with the laddering motive being a
relevant driver of institutions’ hiding behavior.
6 Conclusion
We document that institutional investors are less likely to sell than buy through the
lead underwriters in the aftermarket of IPOs issued between 1999 and 2010 in the
United States. The probability of trading through a lead underwriter during the first
month after the issue is about 6 percentage points less for sell trades than for buy
trades. This result holds when controlling for important determinants of the choice
to trade with a lead underwriter, such as the relationship between the institution
and the lead underwriters, and is robust to institution, IPO, and institution-IPO
fixed effects. We find that the documented buy/sell asymmetry varies consistently
with hiding incentives: it is stronger when the aftermarket demand for IPO stocks
is weaker (i.e., in cold IPOs), it does not hold after the first month of trading, and
it does not hold for a matched sample of non-IPO stocks.
We rule out potential alternative explanations for the buy/sell asymmetry. Our
findings are not driven by underwriters’ strategically setting differential brokerage
commissions to disincetivize sell trades. Moreover, our evidence suggests that the
buy/sell asymmetry is not only driven by investors buying more through the lead
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underwriters, but also by investors selling less through the lead underwriters. Fi-
nally, potential endogeneity concerns are unlikely to make the buy/sell asymmetry
vanish and we find evidence consistent with this view in an IV setting, using a proxy
for institutional fire-sales as exogenous shock for the decision to sell an IPO.
We investigate the motives behind institutional investors’ hiding behavior. Con-
trary to the conventional view, we find that flipping IPO allocations is not an impor-
tant motive for hiding sell trades from the lead underwriters. This is reasonable, as
underwriters have access to reports that document investors’ flipping activity. We
propose a novel hiding motive and find evidence in favor of it. Institutional investors
that agree with the underwriters to buy additional shares in the IPO aftermarket
in exchange of receiving allocations (a practice known as “laddering”), might break
this agreement by hiding-and-selling the shares bought in the aftermarket through
other brokers. Consistent with the laddering motive for hiding, we find that: i)
the percentage of sell volume executed through non-lead brokers is higher when
institutional investors buy more shares through the lead underwriters in the IPO
aftermarket and when institutional investors execute more “secondary” sales (i.e.,
sales other than allocation sales); and ii) the volume of “secondary” shares sold in
the aftermarket by an institution is positively correlated with its net buy volume
through the lead underwriters. Moreover, an investor that hide his/her sell trades
because of laddering motives should avoid flipping trades. These trades signal to
the lead underwriters that the investor sold more shares than it bought in the af-
termarket, thus revealing that it has broken the laddering agreement. Consistently,
we find a negative correlation between the flipping volume of an institution and its
net buy volume through the lead underwriters.
Our evidence sheds light on how hiding incentives affect institutions’ choice of
their broker in the IPO aftermarket and stimulates further research to investigate
how the incentives of IPO investors may influence the IPO allocation process.
A Appendix
This data appendix provides a detailed description of ANcerno data inspired by
years of exchanges with the data provider, as well as the explanation of the mapping
procedure we use to produce the dataset. Our sample consists of institutional
transaction-level trading data from ANcerno/Abel Noser Solutions. ANcerno clients
(money managers, pension plan sponsors, and brokers) provide their trading data
to ANcerno to monitor their transaction costs. Each client has a unique numerical
identifier in the dataset (clientcode) that allows distinguishing among the three
types of clients. Nevertheless, the identity of the client is anonymized. We use
clientcode mainly as a technical variable in several matching exercises we perform.
One of the main variables of interest to us is managercode by ANcerno attributed
to the trading institutions. After receiving data from their clients, ANcerno assigns
a code to each manager within the clients portfolio. Because several clients may
use the same manager, in order to associate a manager with a particular client,
ANcerno codes the manager in relation to a client. Another reason they do this is
because different clients may report the same managers differently (e.g., different
spelling). By coding the manager in relation to a customer, ANcerno can trace
back the manager to a particular client. Managers can be grouped across clients by
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using the managercode. ANcerno uses the same logic in mapping executing brokers
in the data. The main ANcerno trading dataset includes clientcode, clientmgrcode
and clientbkrcode we use in our matching process.
ANcerno data is subscription specific. For a limited period of time in 2010,
ANcerno provided its academic subscribers with the identification table “Master-
ManagerXref” that includes managercodes with the associated names of trading
institutions. The file we got includes 1088 unique institutions. Additional identifi-
cation files “ManagerXref” and “BrokerXref” include clientcode, clientmgrcode, and
clientbkrcode variables allowing to link fund families and brokers to the trading data
in the main ANcerno dataset. The mapping procedure we use is shown in detail
in Figure 5. Figure 5 shows the two-step matching we use to get the managing
company name on the main ANcerno trading dataset. In the first step, we merge
“ManagerXref” file on the main ANcerno table using clientcode-clientmgrcode as
a key identifier. We further link the resulting table with the managing company
name (variable manager) from the “MasterManagerXref” file on provided (man-
agercodes).
We use the S12type5 Table provided by Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS)
to map management companies from SEC 13F filings to mutual funds reporting
their holdings in the Thomson Reuters S12 Mutual fund holdings database. S12
data contains funds associated to fund families in 13F. Finally, we match ANcerno
institutions with the institutions from S12/13F Thomson Reuters database. We
manually match managing company names from both datasets: variable manager
in ANcerno and mgrco in S12 database.
[Figure 5 about here.]
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Table 2. This table provides IPO allocations summary statistics at the institution level
(AllocPerc) and issuer level (Number of Allocations; Total % Institutional Allocation).
AllocPerc is the percentage of IPO shares allocated to an institution (winsorized at the 95%
level). The table reports summary statistics for all IPOs and for subsamples of IPOs based on
Underpricing terciles: hot IPOs (highest tercile), weak IPOs (middle tercile), and cold IPOs
(lowest tercile). For each variable, the table reports its average (mean), its median (p50), and
its standard deviation (sd).
mean p50 sd
AllocPerc (all IPOs) 1.89 0.54 3.05
AllocPerc (hot IPOs) 1.53 0.40 2.71
AllocPerc (weak IPOs) 1.98 0.67 3.02
AllocPerc (cold IPOs) 2.53 0.78 3.67
Number of Allocations (all IPOs) 22.7 21 14.4
Number of Allocations (hot IPOs) 30.6 30 13.9
Number of Allocations (weak IPOs) 23.7 22 13.6
Number of Allocations (cold IPOs) 13.6 12 10.1
Total % Institutional Allocation (all IPOs) 42.7 42.5 21.7
Total % Institutional Allocation (hot IPOs) 47.0 45.6 23.1
Total % Institutional Allocation (weak IPOs) 46.9 47.3 20.6
Total % Institutional Allocation (cold IPOs) 34.3 33.9 18.7
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Table 3. This table reports the estimation results of several specification of a linear probabil-
ity model in a sample of institutional trades in 1,361 IPO stocks issued between 1999 and 2010.
The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the broker executing the trade is any of
the lead underwriters of the IPO (LeadDummy). Panel (A) includes 44,576 trades executed
in the first 21 trading days after the issue date; Panel (B) includes 24,891 trades executed in
the first 7 trading days after the issue date. Column (1) reports the results of an OLS regres-
sion of LeadDummy on a dummy variable equal to one if the institution is selling and zero
otherwise (Sell). Column (2) introduces several control variables: RelV ol is the number of
shares traded by the institution scaled by the number of shares issued; NormalTradeLead is
the percentage volume of sell or buy trades in non-IPO stocks made by the institution through
the lead underwriters in a 6-month period prior to the issue; Day is the day in which the trade
is executed, relative to the issue date; ExcLeadComm is the average percentage commission
to the lead underwriters minus the average percentage commission to any other broker paid by
sample institutions for their buy or sell trades in the first 21 trading days after the issue date;
AllocPerc is the percentage IPO allocation received by the institution. Columns (3), (4), and
(5) introduce institution, firm, and institution-firm fixed effects. All non-dummy variables are
winsorized at the 95% level. Standard errors are clustered at the institution level (t-statistics
are in parentheses). Significance levels are denoted as: * 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
(A) First 21 trading days after the issue date
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sell -0.060∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗
(-2.08) (-3.62) (-3.15) (-2.97) (-2.44)
RelVol 0.070∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(2.44) (6.72) (8.06) (7.12)
NormalTradeLead 0.0086∗∗∗ 0.0092∗∗∗ 0.0094∗∗∗ 0.0025
(5.20) (9.55) (7.40) (0.64)
Day -0.011∗∗∗ -0.0092∗∗∗ -0.0089∗∗∗ -0.0081∗∗∗
(-5.78) (-6.02) (-5.76) (-4.77)
ExcLeadComm -0.17 -0.16 -0.057 -0.25∗∗
(-1.13) (-1.53) (-0.49) (-2.29)
AllocPerc -0.00028 0.0021 0.0024∗
(-0.06) (1.41) (1.82)
Constant 0.32∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
(9.91) (10.12) (21.54) (9.49) (17.34)
Institution fixed effects No No Yes Yes No
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes No
Institution-Firm fixed effects No No No No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.0043 0.049 0.15 0.26 0.45
Observations 44576 44576 44576 44576 44576
% Outside [0,1] 0 0 0 0.080 0
(B) First 7 trading days after the issue date
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sell -0.11∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗ -0.089∗∗∗
(-5.09) (-5.59) (-3.03) (-3.46) (-2.63)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution fixed effects No No Yes Yes No
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes No
Institution-Firm fixed effects No No No No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.014 0.044 0.16 0.28 0.44
Observations 24891 24891 24891 24891 24891
% Outside [0,1] 0 0 0 0.077 0
90
TABLES
Table 4. This table reports the estimation results of several specification of a linear proba-
bility model in a sample of institutional trades in 1,361 IPO stocks issued between 1999 and
2010. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the broker executing the trade is
any of the lead underwriters of the IPO (LeadDummy). The table includes 44,576 trades
executed in the first 21 trading days after the issue date. Column (1) reports the results of an
OLS regression of LeadDummy on a dummy variable equal to one if the institution is selling
and zero otherwise (Sell), a dummy variable equal to one if the IPO is in the lowest tercile
of Underpricing (ColdIPO), and an interaction variable between the two (Sell∗ColdIPO).
Column (2) introduces several control variables: RelV ol is the number of shares traded by
the institution scaled by the number of shares issued; NormalTradeLead is the percentage
volume of sell or buy trades in non-IPO stocks made by the institution through the lead
underwriters in a 6-month period prior to the issue; Day is the day in which the trade is
executed, relative to the issue date; ExcLeadComm is the average percentage commission to
the lead underwriters minus the average percentage commission to any other broker paid by
sample institutions for their buy or sell trades during the third month after the issue date;
AllocPerc is the percentage IPO allocation received by the institution. Columns (3), (4), and
(5) introduce institution, firm, and institution-firm fixed effects. All non-dummy variables are
winsorized at the 95% level. Standard errors are clustered at the institution level (t-statistics
are in parentheses). Significance levels are denoted as: * 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sell -0.051∗ -0.072∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗ -0.048∗∗ -0.041∗
(-1.66) (-3.06) (-2.42) (-2.43) (-1.88)
Sell*ColdIPO -0.066∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗
(-2.71) (-2.46) (-3.47) (-3.10) (-3.23)
ColdIPO 0.0018 -0.011 -0.00063
(0.09) (-0.56) (-0.05)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution fixed effects No No Yes Yes No
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes No
Institution-Firm fixed effects No No No No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.0053 0.050 0.15 0.26 0.45
Observations 44576 44576 44576 44576 44576
% Outside [0,1] 0 0.00060 0 0.081 0
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Table 5. This table reports the estimation results of several specification of a linear proba-
bility model in a sample of institutional trades in 1,361 IPO stocks issued between 1999 and
2010. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the broker executing the trade is any
of the lead underwriters of the IPO (LeadDummy). The table includes 24,643 trades executed
during the third trading mont after the issue date. Column (1) reports the results of an OLS
regression of LeadDummy on a dummy variable equal to one if the institution is selling and
zero otherwise (Sell). Column (2) introduces several control variables: RelV ol is the number
of shares traded by the institution scaled by the number of shares issued; NormalTradeLead
is the percentage volume of sell or buy trades in non-IPO stocks made by the institution
through the lead underwriters in a 6-month period prior to the issue; Day is the day in which
the trade is executed, relative to the issue date; ExcLeadComm is the average percentage
commission to the lead underwriters minus the average percentage commission to any other
broker paid by sample institutions for their buy or sell trades during the third month after the
issue date; AllocPerc is the percentage IPO allocation received by the institution. Columns
(3), (4), and (5) introduce institution, firm, and institution-firm fixed effects. All non-dummy
variables are winsorized at the 95% level. Standard errors are clustered at the institution level
(t-statistics are in parentheses). Significance levels are denoted as: * 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sell 0.029 0.025 0.0061 0.0048 -0.0013
(1.35) (1.51) (0.63) (0.62) (-0.13)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution fixed effects No No Yes Yes No
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes No
Institution-Firm fixed effects No No No No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.0015 0.030 0.091 0.26 0.48
Observations 24643 24643 24643 24643 24643
% Outside [0,1] 0 0 0 0.15 0
Table 6. This table reports the estimation results of several specification of a linear prob-
ability model in a sample of institutional trades in non-IPO stocks matched to 1,109 IPOs
issued between 1999 and 2010. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the broker
executing the trade is any of the lead underwriters of the matched IPO (LeadDummy). The
table includes 28,990 trades executed during the first 21 trading days after the issue date of
the matched IPO. Column (1) reports the results of an OLS regression of LeadDummy on a
dummy variable equal to one if the institution is selling and zero otherwise (Sell). Column (2)
introduces several control variables: RelV ol is the number of shares traded by the institution
scaled by the number of shares outstanding; NormalTradeLead is the percentage volume of
sell or buy trades in non-IPO stocks made by the institution through the lead underwriters
in a 6-month period prior to the issue; Day is the day in which the trade is executed, relative
to the issue date of the matched IPO; ExcLeadComm is the average percentage commission
to the lead underwriters minus the average percentage commission to other brokers paid by
sample institutions for their buy or sell trades during the first 21 trading days after the issue
date in the matched non-IPO stock; Holdings is the number of shares held by the institution
in the non-IPO stock at the first filing date prior to the issue date scaled by the number of
shares outstanding. Columns (3), (4), and (5) introduce institution, firm, and institution-
firm fixed effects. All non-dummy variables are winsorized at the 95% level. Standard errors
are clustered at the institution level (t-statistics are in parentheses). Significance levels are
denoted as: * 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sell 0.0030 0.0066 0.0076∗ 0.0061∗ -0.0010
(0.33) (1.28) (1.70) (1.85) (-0.27)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution fixed effects No No Yes Yes No
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes No
Institution-Firm fixed effects No No No No Yes
Adjusted R2 0 0.10 0.11 0.21 0.44
Observations 28990 28990 28990 28990 28990
% Outside [0,1] 0 0.16 0.16 0.32 0.0013
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Table 7. This table reports difference of means tests for the percentage trading commission
paid to lead underwriters and to any other broker by financial institutions in IPOs issued
between 1999 and 2010. The sample includes 20,107 sell trades and 24,469 buy trades executed
during the first month after the issue date. The percentage trading commission paid by an
institution to the broker is winsorized at the 95% level. Standard errors are corrected for
unequal variances (t-statistics are in parentheses). Significance levels are denoted as: * 0.1,
** 0.05, *** 0.01.
All others Lead UWs Diff. of means
% sell commissions 0.0886 0.0895 -0.000869
(-0.472)
% buy commissions 0.109 0.122 -0.0124∗∗∗
(-6.814)
Table 8. This table reports Difference-in-Differences estimation results. The dependent
variable is SVi,m,l, which is the total number of shares of IPO i sold by financial institutions
in month m through a broker of type l. The volume is divided by the number of shares
issued and multiplied by 100. We consider trades executed in month 1 and month 3 after
the IPO; Month1i,m is a dummy variable equal to one if the shares are sold in month 1 and
zero otherwise. We consider trades executed through two types of brokers: lead underwriters
and brokers that do not belong to the underwriting syndicate; LeadDummyi,l is a dummy
variable equal to one 1 if the shares are sold through the lead underwriters and zero otherwise.
LeadDummy ∗Month1i,m,l is the interaction between the two variables. The sample includes
1,227 IPOs issued between 1999 and 2010 that have a non-zero selling activity during the first
month or the third month of trading after the offer. Standard errors are clustered at the IPO















Table 9. This table reports the estimation results of several specification of a 2SLS regression
in a sample of institutional trades in 1,361 IPO stocks issued between 1999 and 2010. The
dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the broker executing the trade is any of the
lead underwriters of the IPO (LeadDummy). The sample includes 44,576 trades executed in
the first 21 trading days after the issue date. Panel (A) reports the first stage results; Panel
(B) reports the second stage results. Column (1) reports the results of a 2SLS regression of
LeadDummy on a dummy variable equal to one if the institution is selling and zero otherwise
(Sell), instrumented by LnDistressFunds. LnDistressFunds is the natural logarithm of the
number of funds managed by the institution that are in distress. A fund is defined to be in
distress if: 1) its total volume traded in all stocks in the IPO month is more than 25 million
dollars and 2) its total dollar netbuy in all stocks divided by the total volume traded is less
than -0.99. Column (2) introduces several control variables: RelV ol is the number of shares
traded by the institution scaled by the number of shares issued; NormalTradeLead is the
percentage volume of sell or buy trades in non-IPO stocks made by the institution through
the lead underwriters in a 6-month period prior to the issue; Day is the day in which the trade
is executed, relative to the issue date; ExcLeadComm is the average percentage commission
to the lead underwriters minus the average percentage commission to any other broker paid
by sample institutions for their buy or sell trades in the first 21 trading days after the issue
date; AllocPerc is the percentage IPO allocation received by the institution. Columns (3)
and (4) introduce institution and firm fixed effects. All non-dummy variables are winsorized
at the 95% level. Standard errors are clustered at the institution level (t-statistics are in
parentheses). Significance levels are denoted as: * 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
(A) First stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LnDistressFunds 0.11∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(3.17) (3.98) (8.02) (4.22)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Institution fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes
F-stat 10.0 70.3 96.4 .
Adjusted R2 0.0058 0.067 0.18 0.31
Observations 44576 44576 44576 44576
(B) Second stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sell -1.32∗∗∗ -1.12∗∗∗ -0.56∗∗∗ -1.35∗
(-3.92) (-5.26) (-3.02) (-1.65)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Institution fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes
Observations 44576 44576 44576 44576
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Table 10. This table reports the coefficient estimates of logit and conditional logit models
in a sample of institutional trades in 1,361 IPO stocks issued between 1999 and 2010. The
dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the broker executing the trade is any of the
lead underwriters of the IPO (LeadDummy). The original sample includes 44,576 trades
executed in the first 21 trading days after the issue date. Column (1) reports the results
of a logit regression of LeadDummy on a dummy variable equal to one if the institution is
selling and zero otherwise (Sell). Column (2) introduces several control variables: RelV ol
is the number of shares traded by the institution scaled by the number of shares issued;
NormalTradeLead is the percentage volume of sell or buy trades in non-IPO stocks made by
the institution through the lead underwriters in a 6-month period prior to the issue; Day is the
day in which the trade is executed, relative to the issue date; ExcLeadComm is the average
percentage commission to the lead underwriters minus the average percentage commission to
other brokers paid by sample institutions for their buy or sell trades in the first 21 trading days
after the issue date; AllocPerc is the percentage IPO allocation received by the institution.
Column (3) controls for institution-firm fixed effects by means of a conditional logit model.
All non-dummy variables are winsorized at the 95% level. Standard errors are clustered at
the institution level (t-statistics are in parentheses). Significance levels are denoted as: * 0.1,
** 0.05, *** 0.01.
(1) (2) (3)














Institution-Firm fixed effects No No Yes
Pseudo R2 0.0036 0.041 0.078
Observations 44576 44576 21693
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Table 11. This table reports the estimation results of several specification of a linear probabil-
ity model in a sample of institutional trades in 698 IPO stocks issued between 2001 and 2010.
The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the broker executing the trade is any of the
lead underwriters of the IPO (LeadDummy). The sample includes 24,109 trades executed in
the first 21 trading days after the issue date. Column (1) reports the results of an OLS regres-
sion of LeadDummy on a dummy variable equal to one if the institution is selling and zero
otherwise (Sell). Column (2) introduces several control variables: RelV ol is the number of
shares traded by the institution scaled by the number of shares issued; NormalTradeLead is
the percentage volume of sell or buy trades in non-IPO stocks made by the institution through
the lead underwriters in a 6-month period prior to the issue; Day is the day in which the trade
is executed, relative to the issue date; ExcLeadComm is the average percentage commission
to the lead underwriters minus the average percentage commission to other brokers paid by
sample institutions for their buy or sell trades in the first 21 trading days after the issue date;
AllocPerc is the percentage IPO allocation received by the institution. Columns (3), (4), and
(5) introduce institution, firm, and institution-firm fixed effects. All non-dummy variables are
winsorized at the 95% level. Standard errors are clustered at the institution level (t-statistics
are in parentheses). Significance levels are denoted as: * 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sell -0.052∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗
(-2.27) (-3.48) (-3.78) (-3.43) (-2.34)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution fixed effects No No Yes Yes No
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes No
Institution-Firm fixed effects No No No No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.0032 0.063 0.15 0.24 0.40
Observations 24109 24109 24109 24109 24109
% Outside [0,1] 0 0.0016 0.00040 0.072 0
Table 12. This table reports the estimation results of several specification of a linear prob-
ability model in a sample of institutional trades in 1361 IPO stocks issued between 1999 and
2010. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the broker executing the trade is any
of the underwriters of the IPO (UWDummy). The sample includes 44,576 trades executed
in the first 21 trading days after the issue date. Column (1) reports the results of an OLS
regression of UWDummy on a dummy variable equal to one if the institution is selling and
zero otherwise (Sell). Column (2) introduces several control variables: RelV ol is the number
of shares traded by the institution scaled by the number of shares issued; NormalTradeUW is
the percentage volume of sell or buy trades in non-IPO stocks made by the institution through
the underwriters in a 6-month period prior to the issue; Day is the day in which the trade
is executed, relative to the issue date; ExcUWComm is the average percentage commission
to the underwriters minus the average percentage commission to other brokers paid by sam-
ple institutions for their buy or sell trades in the first 21 trading days after the issue date;
AllocPerc is the percentage IPO allocation received by the institution. Columns (3), (4), and
(5) introduce institution, firm, and institution-firm fixed effects. All non-dummy variables are
winsorized at the 95% level. Standard errors are clustered at the institution level (t-statistics
are in parentheses). Significance levels are denoted as: * 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sell -0.066∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗ -0.044∗
(-2.07) (-3.33) (-2.90) (-2.59) (-1.85)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution fixed effects No No Yes Yes No
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes No
Institution-Firm fixed effects No No No No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.0047 0.053 0.14 0.25 0.42
Observations 44576 44576 44576 44576 44576
% Outside [0,1] 0 0 0 0.042 0
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Table 13. This table reports the estimation results of several specification of a linear proba-
bility model in a sample of institutional trades in 1,361 IPO stocks issued between 1999 and
2010. The sample includes 44,576 trades executed in the first 21 trading days after the issue
date. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the broker executing the trade is
any of the lead underwriters of the IPO (LeadDummy). Column (1) reports the results of
an OLS regression of LeadDummy on a dummy variable equal to one if the institution is
selling and zero otherwise (Sell) and a dummy variable equal to one if the sell trade contains
an allocation sale and zero otherwise (Flip). Column (2) introduces several control variables:
RelV ol is the number of shares traded by the institution scaled by the number of shares issued;
NormalTradeLead is the percentage volume of sell or buy trades in non-IPO stocks made by
the institution through the lead underwriters in a 6-month period prior to the issue; Day is the
day in which the trade is executed, relative to the issue date; ExcLeadComm is the average
percentage commission to the lead underwriters minus the average percentage commission to
any other broker paid by sample institutions for their buy or sell trades in the first 21 trading
days after the issue date; AllocPerc is the percentage IPO allocation received by the institu-
tion. Columns (3), (4), and (5) introduce institution, firm, and institution-firm fixed effects.
All non-dummy variables are winsorized at the 95% level. Standard errors are clustered at
the institution level (t-statistics are in parentheses). Significance levels are denoted as: * 0.1,
** 0.05, *** 0.01.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sell -0.15∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗
(-5.40) (-5.65) (-4.47) (-3.84) (-3.62)
Flip 0.12∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
(5.71) (3.98) (3.94) (2.88) (2.76)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution fixed effects No No Yes Yes No
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes No
Institution-Firm fixed effects No No No No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.0093 0.051 0.15 0.26 0.45
Observations 44576 44576 44576 44576 44576
% Outside [0,1] 0 0.00070 0 0.080 0
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Table 14. This table reports the estimates of an OLS regression of the volume of sales ex-
ecuted through the lead underwriter as a percentage of total sales [SNLi,j /S
T
i,j ] on the trading
volume components scaled by the number of shares issued: BuyLead is the relative number
of shares bought through the lead underwriters [BLi,j/Ni]; OtherSales is the relative volume
of sales other than allocation sales [(STi,j −FTi,j)/Ni]; SharesF lipped is the relative number of
shares flipped [FTi,j/Ni]; and BuyNonLead is the relative number of shares bought through
non-lead brokers [BNLi,j /Ni]. Control variables are described in Table 3. All ratios are multi-
plied by 100. Columns (1)-(4) include trades executed during the first month after the issue
by financial institutions that received an IPO allocation. Column (5) includes trades exe-
cuted during the first month after the issue by financial institutions with no IPO allocations.
Column (6) includes trades executed during the third month after the issue by financial insti-
tutions that received an IPO allocation. Standard errors are clustered at the institution level
(t-statistics are in parentheses). Significance levels are denoted as: * 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Placebo Placebo
BuyLead 1.12∗ 0.41 1.64∗∗∗ 1.24∗∗∗ -0.37 -2.24∗∗
(1.75) (0.58) (4.60) (3.50) (-0.23) (-2.08)
OtherSales 1.74∗∗∗ 1.22∗ 3.11∗∗∗ 2.02∗∗∗ 0.92 -0.96
(2.77) (1.78) (3.29) (2.83) (0.42) (-1.01)
SharesFlipped 0.23 -1.48∗ -0.14 -1.93∗∗∗ 0.41
(0.28) (-1.87) (-0.14) (-3.15) (0.45)
BuyNonLead 1.55∗∗∗ 1.18∗∗ 0.40 -0.045 1.56∗ 3.30∗∗∗
(2.71) (2.52) (0.80) (-0.11) (1.93) (4.96)
NormalTradeLead -3.81∗∗∗ -3.86∗∗∗ -4.43∗∗∗ -3.96∗∗∗ -2.17∗ -3.12∗∗∗
(-14.61) (-15.06) (-19.52) (-18.52) (-1.95) (-9.04)
AllocPerc 1.99∗∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.24
(6.90) (4.37) (3.21) (1.15)
Constant 75.2∗∗∗ 73.9∗∗∗ 75.4∗∗∗ 62.2∗∗∗ 84.0∗∗ 78.7∗∗∗
(34.32) (33.25) (33.91) (16.55) (2.60) (11.63)
Institution fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.20 0.20 0.32 0.41 0.33 0.34
Observations 8539 8539 8539 8539 479 2421
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Table 15. This table reports the estimates of an OLS regression of the net buy through
the lead underwriters scaled by the number of shares issued [(BLi,j − SLi,j)/Ni] on other trad-
ing volume components scaled by the number of shares issued: OtherSales is the relative
volume of sales other than allocation sales [(STi,j − FTi,j)/Ni]; SharesF lipped is the relative
number of shares flipped [FTi,j/Ni]; and BuyNonLead is the relative number of shares bought
through non-lead brokers [BNLi,j /Ni]. Control variables are described in Table 3. All ratios
are multiplied by 100. Columns (1)-(4) include trades executed during the first month after
the issue by financial institutions that received an IPO allocation. Column (5) includes trades
executed during the first month after the issue by financial institutions with no IPO alloca-
tions. Column (6) includes trades executed during the third month after the issue by financial
institutions that received an IPO allocation. Standard errors are clustered at the institution
level (t-statistics are in parentheses). Significance levels are denoted as: * 0.1, ** 0.05, ***
0.01.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Placebo Placebo
OtherSales 0.31∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.20 -0.20∗∗∗
(8.43) (7.31) (5.97) (5.49) (0.67) (-3.04)
SharesFlipped -0.30∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗∗ -0.36∗∗∗ -0.40∗∗∗ -0.018
(-6.81) (-6.80) (-9.45) (-8.25) (-0.30)
BuyNonLead 0.00013 -0.011 -0.023 -0.028 -0.028 0.44∗∗∗
(0.00) (-0.34) (-0.59) (-0.68) (-0.21) (9.48)
NormalTradeLead -0.0051∗ -0.0071∗∗∗ -0.0082∗∗∗ -0.0068∗∗∗ 0.059 -0.0075∗∗∗
(-1.73) (-2.77) (-3.26) (-2.75) (0.41) (-4.34)
AllocPerc 0.066∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.012
(4.86) (5.67) (5.23) (0.89)
Constant 0.073∗∗∗ 0.029∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.072 1.16 -0.088
(2.80) (1.74) (2.27) (1.39) (0.88) (-1.07)
Institution fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.15 0.24 0.23 0.31 0.17
Observations 8539 8539 8539 8539 479 2421
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FIGURES
Figure 1. This figure shows the average brokerage market share for buying trades (dark
grey lines) and selling trades (light grey lines) of the lead underwriters by month from the
IPO date. For each IPO, we compute the percentage of institutional buying and selling trades
executed by the lead underwriters in each month from the IPO date; then we average these
percentages across IPO and we compute 95% confidence intervals of the means (dashed lines).
Panels (A) reports the brokerage market share for all IPOs. Panel (B) reports the brokerage
market share for hot IPOs (highest tercile of Underpricing); Panels (C) reports the brokerage
market shares for weak IPOs (middle tercile of Underpricing); and Panels (D) reports the



































































































Figure 2. This figure shows the average cumulative netbuy and buy/sell volume in the first
21 trading days after the issue date. For each IPO, we compute the total amount bought
and sold in each day by institutions that trade through the lead underwriters, through other
syndicate members, and through brokers that did not participate in the IPO syndicate. We
also compute the cumulative netbuy of lead managers’ clients, syndicate members’ clients, and
other brokers’ clients in the first 21 trading days after the IPO. We scale the volume traded
by the number of shares issued and we average it across IPOs. Bars show institutions’ daily
volume bought and sold; lines plot institutions’ cumulative netbuy. Panel (A) averages buy
and sell volumes and cumulative netbuy for all IPOs. Panels (B)-(D) break the averages down
for hot IPOs (highest tercile of Underpricing), weak IPOs (middle tercile of Underpricing),
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Figure 3. This figure plots the average cumulative percentage of IPO shares flipped, scaled
by the number of shares offered, by month from the issue date. 95% confidence intervals are
reported with dotted lines. The black line report the average for the whole sample of IPOs.
The grey lines break the averages down for hot IPOs (highest tercile of Underpricing), weak
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Figure 4. This figure plots the average trading commission paid to the lead underwriters for
buying trades (dark grey line) and sell trades (light grey line) by month from the issue date.
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FIGURES
Figure 5. Mapping money managers and brokers across databases (key identifier(s) for the
match are provided in bold).
 
Main ANcerno trades database 
clientcode (ANcerno’s unique client identifier) 
clientmgrcode (as reported by the client) 
clientbkrcode  (as reported by the client) 
MasterManagerXref file from ANcerno 
managercode (unique asset manager 
identifier by ANcerno) 
manager (unique asset manager name) 




reportedmanager (asset manager name as 
reported by the client) 
 on managercode 
BrokerXref file from ANcerno 
clientcode 
clientbkrcode  
broker (unique broker identifier in ANcerno) 
brokername  
 
Thomson Reuters 13F filings 
mgrcocd (asset manager numerical identifier) 
mgrco (asset manager name) 
manager  and 
mgrco hand-
matched 
Thomson Financial Security Data Company 
(SDC) 
IPO underwriters’ (brokers’) names 
broker names 
hand-matched 
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